Page 2 of
2 Iran rocks its nuclear
boat By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
leader", has been removed "from a
key position". According to Bahonar, "Therefore,
the government of Ahmadinejad appears to be losing
its initial supporters as it is getting closer to
the end of its era and it is unclear with which
recognized personality it can work with for the
remainder of its time." As for the reasons for
Larijani's resignation, Bahonar stated that
"Larijani had reached a dead end in his
cooperation with the president and there was no
longer
any possibility of cooperation."
This is
in sharp contrast to a statement by government
spokesperson Gholam Hossein Elham that Larijani
resigned "due to personal problems". Enjoying
solid support by the majority of majlis deputies,
who have credited Larijani with making some
tangible headway in his talks with the Europeans,
Larijani may be thinking of the next round of
presidential elections in 2009. He may hope to
capitalize on his early exit from the Ahmadinejad
camp and fare better than he did in losing to
Ahmadinejad. Everything depends on what happens
between now and early 2009, ie, whether there is
war or a diplomatic breakthrough in the nuclear
stalemate.
Iran's handling of the nuclear
crisis will to a large extent dictate events,
which is why a number of top majlis deputies,
including Alaedin Boroujerdi, the head of the
National Security and Foreign Policy Committee,
have put the emphasis on the leader's
macro-management of the nuclear issue and the
"role of others in implementing those policies".
This is a veiled reference to Ahmadinejad and his
circle of advisors in the executive branch.
Another member of the majlis, Mohammad
Nabi Roudaki, has said that "the leader had no
role in the disputes between Larijani and
Ahmadinejad". That was then, and now that Larijani
is back in the picture with more teeth to his
policy preferences, he also needs to be more
cautious since his actions will be directly
attributed to the leader; in other words,
Larijani's new role and clout, yet to be
finalized, come with a price tag.
The
road ahead Larijani, who once criticized a
nuclear agreement by his predecessor, Rowhani,
that led to a temporary suspension of uranium
enrichment activities, had pinned his hopes on a
"win-win" situation in the nuclear diplomacy, but
now there is growing concern in Iran that the net
result may turn out to be "lose-lose" instead.
Despite a Foreign Ministry spokesman's
premature disclosure of "good news" regarding the
Bushehr power plant in Iran by the visiting
Russian president last week, no such thing
materialized. Now Foreign Minister Manouchehr
Mottaki is due to visit Moscow soon to push for a
Russian date for the completion of the
much-delayed power plant.
Yet Mottaki is
reportedly a candidate for replacement and there
is talk of the president's close advisor, Samareh
Hashemi, taking over at the Foreign Ministry.
If so, this would be yet another major
shuffling of the deck at the top, one being the
replacement of the leader of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps, Rahim Safavi, with
Mohammad Ali Jaafari, and the other the
appointment of "centerist" former president Ali
Akbar Hashemi as chairman of the powerful Assembly
of Experts. The latter's role is to select the
leader of the system and to review his
performance. In addition to the Assembly of
Experts, Rafsanjani is also head of the Exigency
Council, which has been put in overall charge of
foreign policy issues through a directive by the
leader two years ago.
Rafsanjani and his
associates, including Rowhani, have made no secret
of their unhappiness with the government's
handling of the nuclear crisis and are likely to
utilize the replacement of "heavyweight" Larijani
with the "lightweight" Jalili for even greater
criticism of Ahmadinejad's "offensive approach" in
the nuclear talks.
The growing
intersection of factional politics with nuclear
crisis management, though understandable through
the prism of domestic politics, represents a
threat to Iran's national security interests,
given the gravity of the crisis and the
possibility of policy paralysis in Tehran.
The developments cited above may lead some
Iranians into the false thinking that the nuclear
crisis can be made to disappear by the leader's
magic wand, This only puts unrealistic excess
demands on the leader, who has a traditional role
of balancing factions and macro-managing the
nation's priorities.
The mere fact that
Khamenei and his representatives are now involved
in nuclear micro-managing does not by definition
make the resolution of this crisis any more
likely. This is because the crisis is complex,
multi-faceted and involves a net of (rather
convoluted) national security concerns and
considerations at the national, regional and
international levels.
What is clear,
however, is the exaggerated response of some
Iranians, such as Khatami's chief of staff,
Mohammad Ali Abtahi, that Larijani's resignation
represents "important and dangerous news for
Iran". This is not necessarily so, partly due to
Larijani's reinstatement by Khamenei, and partly
due to the fact that Jalili's ability to make a
singular contribution and/or push for policy
continuity should not be dismissed out of hand.
Concerning Jalili, this author has had the
occasion to speak with him and discuss Iran's
foreign policy issues a number of times and has
found him well informed, astute and
strategically-minded.
Logically, after
Rome Jalili should be given the sole
responsibility to negotiate on Iran's behalf, with
Larijani relegated to the background now that he
has formally resigned from his post. As the
Persian saying goes, "With two chefs in the
kitchen, the food will be either too salty or
saltless". The right balance in Iran's nuclear
diplomacy cannot be found in long-term dual
nuclear management, no matter what the exigencies
of Iran's domestic politics are.
The point
remains that despite the George W Bush
administration's constant ratcheting up of
rhetoric against Iran, there is no evidence of
nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran - even Putin
accepted this. Should Iran be given a clean bill
of health by IAEA inspectors, then Iran's bid to
"normalize" the file and bring it back to the IAEA
from the UN Security Council should gain
considerable momentum.
Sadly, in today's
world order, there is also the opposite logic of
warmongering and disinformation and calculated
misperception. Yet this can be effectively
countered by Iran's consistent nuclear
transparency and sustained cooperation with the
IAEA.
Note 1. Concerned
about his own balancing act, Putin may have
calibrated his visit to cause a split in the
Iranian leadership in a "game of bargaining with
Europe and the US", according to Elaheh Koolaee, a
Tehran University political science professor.
But, in light of what the Israeli paper, Ha'aretz,
has described as Israeli Prime Minister Eduh
Olmert's "hasty visit to Moscow" immediately after
Putin's Iran visit, we must also add Israel to
that equation - all the more reason for Iran to
insulate itself from "post-Putin visit tremors",
to quote a Tehran daily.
Kaveh L
Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After
Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
(Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating
Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World
Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with
Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's
nuclear potential latent", Harvard International
Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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