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2 COMMENT The art of the possible By Lee H Hamilton
American foreign
policy confronts a basic paradox. The United
States stands alone as the world's most powerful
nation, with the strongest military, the largest
economy, the highest level of technological
capacity and the most extensive cultural influence
around the world. Even after the setbacks of
recent years, no other single power or grouping of
states comes close to matching the United States.
And yet America's ability to accomplish things
abroad has rarely - in recent
memory - seemed so limited. Why?
Objectively, we are not the omnipotent
power we appeared to be in 2003, nor are we the
impotent power we sometimes appear to be today.
But by President George W Bush's own rubric,
American foreign policy is failing. He declared in
his second inaugural address: "It is the policy of
the United States to seek and support the growth
of democratic movements and institutions in every
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world." When the standard
for foreign policy is so high, failure is a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
Robust rhetoric
renders the essential prioritizing of
foreign-policy objectives impossible. If you look
at any national security strategy or presidential
campaign platform, the stated aims exceed our
implementation capabilities. There are
authoritarian regimes throughout the world. Does
bringing democracy to Egypt take precedence over
bringing it to Turkmenistan or Zimbabwe? Do
democratization efforts in the Middle East take
precedence over stabilizing Iraq, which, as the
Iraq Study Group noted, will require assistance
from Iran and Syria, not to mention authoritarian
allies like Saudi Arabia?
Lofty oratory
has a long and proud history in American politics,
and it is a feature of our Union that will never
disappear. But just as it can inspire, grandiose
rhetoric can handcuff our policymakers, binding
them to rhapsodic words that limit their freedom
of action in confronting international challenges.
Both our overreach and the course
correction that seems to be taking place today -
with an increasing deference to diplomacy and
international cooperation - have ample historical
precedents. A foreign policy that avoids extreme
ups and downs better suited to a roller coaster
would serve us well. The unachievable goals we set
for American foreign policy distort policy
implementation. Our competence suffers as we seek
to carry out hugely ambitious missions, and our
leaders ask the American people to shoulder
unbearable burdens.
We often hear about
the balance between our interests and our ideals,
as though they are mutually exclusive. But freedom
and liberty are not just universal abstractions
that flow freely in presidential addresses and
opinion pieces. They have concrete meaning, real
costs and there are limits to the lengths we will
go in their name. This paints a stark contrast to
today's policy discussions.
What we do not
often hear is a frank discussion of what we can
achieve and what we cannot achieve in the world;
what we are prepared to sacrifice in terms of
lives and resources; what we can accomplish on our
own and what we must seek to achieve through
international cooperation; which objectives we can
realize quickly and which ones will take steady
time and effort. American foreign policy would be
better off if it reflected a core aspect of the
American character that is often overlooked:
pragmatism.
After the attacks of September
11, 2001, Bush set astonishing goals for US
foreign policy - at a time when countries around
the world, even hostile regimes like Iran, were
offering support. We would defeat terrorism and
states that sponsor terrorism, not hesitating to
take pre-emptive action to do so. No longer would
we rely on distasteful regimes in the Middle East
to advance our interests; instead, we would create
a network of democratic states that would
enthusiastically embrace the American agenda for
the region. We would ensure that no competitor to
American hegemony was permitted to emerge,
solidifying our global role and the existing
international hierarchy.
To implement
those goals, US action was robust. We launched a
global war against terrorism. We largely spurned
an international system of our own making,
rejecting several international norms and treaties
- the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Geneva
Conventions, to name two. We invaded Afghanistan.
We refused to engage our adversaries. Most
notably, we invaded and occupied Iraq. It is hard
now to take ourselves back to 2003. In the days
running up to and following the toppling of Saddam
Hussein, the mainstream debate in this country
dealt openly with the transformation of the world
with American power. Some spoke openly - and
favorably - of American empire.
Today, we
confront a very different international landscape,
and the heady days of 2003 permanently belong to
the past. Everywhere we turn, we confront the
limitations of our power. In Iraq, the definition
of success has been lowered to the containment of
sectarian violence. In Afghanistan, we struggle
against a resurgent Taliban and rampant opium
trade. In Pakistan, al-Qaeda has reconstituted its
sanctuary and its top leaders elude capture. In
Iran, a defiant president chastises us, foments
instability in Iraq and continues to pursue a
nuclear program. China and particularly Russia
openly defy us - President Vladimir Putin has
accused us of provoking a nuclear-arms race,
acting "illegitimately" and has criticized our
"hyper use of force". In Latin America, Hugo
Chavez has consolidated his power and stands at
the vanguard of a new generation of leftist
leaders. Across the Islamic world, extremism only
seems to be increasing, and the cause of democracy
appears to have stalled.
This all appears
catastrophic in the context of our unachievable
goals. In articulating foreign policy, presidents
aim for simple and dramatic frames that can rally
the nation. A few rungs down the ladder, our
policy elites’ approach to the world is by nature
interventionist - the aim of the specialist is to
find solutions to every problem, not to set
priorities about the key interests of the American
public. Without executive prioritization and
management, the political aims of presidents often
find common ground with the policy aims of our
foreign-policy elites on ambitiously
interventionist goals. And these problems are not
unique to our time.
Take John F Kennedy's
vow to "pay any price, bear any burden" in defense
of liberty or Bush's aforementioned goal of
"ending tyranny" in the world - the former sets
the bar too high, the latter is simply impossible.
But these goals have practical consequences.
Vietnam becomes tougher to abandon when it is a
test of our national will, not simply a distant
nation with an internal conflict. The post-Saddam
Hussein problems in Iraq can be attributed in part
to the zeal to spread transformational democracy,
not maintaining stability coupled with
gradual
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