Page 2 of 2 Muqtada moves to stop a Sunni
'surge' By Sami Moubayed
presented
candidates to fill in [posts left vacant] by the
Front, have breached the agreement made by the
Anbar tribes with the Front, to present no
candidates for posts left vacant by the
Front."
Abbas al-Bayati of the ruling
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) reportedly said that
Maliki has already chosen three ministers off this
list, to
further anger the Sunni Front
and perhaps to please Muqtada.
Muqtada's changing fortunes The
Sadrists had worked with Maliki since 2006. He
promised them government support and office while
they gave him legitimacy in the poorer districts
of Baghdad and among the Shi'ite community at
large. They were allowed to keep their militias
armed. Maliki also turned a blind eye to their
military activity, and used his influence at every
interval to prevent the US military from cracking
down on the Mahdi Army in Baghdad's Sadr City.
When things became rough, the Sadrists
upheld Maliki's regime in the Shi'ite street. This
was done through indoctrination and intimidation,
but mostly through money and reward. The two men
parted when Muqtada insisted on Maliki severing
his ties to US President George W Bush and
demanded a timetable for US troop withdrawal from
Iraq.
They were already at odds when it
came to the degree of Iranian influence needed in
Iraq, relations with the Kurds, and the
distribution of oil wealth with other communities.
Maliki easily - almost gladly - let go his
troublesome ally. Muqtada had become an
embarrassment for the prime minister regarding not
only the US but the Arab world at large.
The Arabs had a major problem with
Muqtada, seeing him as sectarian and blaming him
for anti-Sunni events, such as the humiliating
execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006. As
long as Maliki remained under Muqtada's influence,
he would forever remain very unwelcome in the Arab
world because he was believed to be vehemently
anti-Sunni.
When the marriage of
convenience broke up, Maliki started to strike at
the Sadrists. They collectively walked out of
Parliament and the Maliki cabinet, getting other
Iraqi heavyweights to do the same and increasingly
isolate the prime minister. Maliki now only has a
few Shi'ites supporting him within the UIA, along
with Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani (head of the
Kurdish Regional Government) and Jalal Talabani
(Iraq's president).
Over the past six
months, however, Maliki has come to realize that
the Mahdi Army is stronger than he thought.
Keeping it out of government and arresting its
members did not make it disappear. The Americans
could not get rid of Muqtada. Nor could Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council. Nor
could former prime ministers Iyad Allawi and
Ibrahim al-Jaafari. And in fact nor could Iran,
which was never too pleased at his maneuvering in
Iraq and his independence from full Iranian
control. The closest thing to a "peaceful" Muqtada
who was not using his militia for armed attacks
against anybody was Muqtada in government.
To be fair to the Mahdi Army, however, we
must acknowledge two realities. One is that its
members were voted into power through truly
democratic elections and were the overwhelming
choice of Iraqi Shi'ites. That is why the UIA
brought them into the Iran-backed coalition in the
first place. Why? Not because they promised
liberation, but because they vowed to end
corruption, promised better security and more
jobs, along with administrative, social and
political reforms not for Iraqis as a whole but
for Iraqi Shi'ites in particular.
They
promised social justice based on an Islamic
agenda. When the Sadrists were voted into power,
they were dying to be recognized as statesmen
rather than guerrilla warriors. They made several
important gestures towards the Americans, crying
"Uncle" without actually saying it (after having
waged a war against the US in 2004), by the de
facto legitimizing of the US presence in Iraq. By
joining the government, they were accepting its
legality.
The only way to prevent the
Sadrists from being a state-within-a-state was to
let them become the state, or major power-sharers
within the state. The case is similar to that of
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. By
accepting the duties of power, and sharing
responsibility and accountability before the
international community, Muqtada could not - even
if he wished - continue his military war against
his opponents in the Iraqi arena (Americans
included).
Now it appears the political
wheel has gone full circle, with Muqtada opting
once again for the statesman's role.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
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