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2 US dismisses nuclear report on
Iran Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The much-anticipated report on Iran by the
head of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
that was released this week confirms "substantial
progress" in Iran's cooperation with the agency
and the steady resolution of disputed issues and,
yet, the US government has reacted swiftly by
belittling Iran's cooperation and maintaining its
aggressive push for a new round of United Nations
sanctions on Iran.
By arguing that
"selective cooperation is not enough", to
paraphrase the US's envoy to the IAEA, Gregory
Schulte, the US
now
hopes that the report's other finding, that Iran
has not suspended the enrichment-related
activities as demanded by the UN, will suffice to
persuade the other permanent members of the UN
Security Council, chiefly Russia and China, to
endorse tougher Iran sanctions.
But, this
may not be so easy in light of the depth and scope
of Iran's genuine cooperation, the IAEA's
confirmation of consistency of new Iranian
information with their own independent
investigations, and the sheer absence of any
evidence of nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran.
The report states:
The agency has been able to verify
the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the agency with
access to declared material, and has provided
the required material accountancy reports in
connection with declared nuclear material and
activities ... Iran has provided sufficient
access to individuals and has responded in a
timely manner and provided clarification and
amplifications on issues raised in the context
of the work plan [of Iran and the
IAEA].
Still, despite the leap forward
in Iran-IAEA cooperation signifying a qualitative
improvement in the area of Iran's nuclear
transparency, eg, the fact that all of the 266
tonnes of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) "remain under
agency containment and surveillance", the US
government and aspects of its media allies have
opted to focus on IAEA head Mohammad ElBaradei's
claim that the agency's knowledge of Iran's
nuclear program is "diminishing" solely due to the
lack of implementation of the intrusive Additional
Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).
"UN losing grip on Iran nuclear
plan," the CNN headline on ElBaradei's report
read, followed with the spin, bolstered by
commentators sounding the US government's
position, that the IAEA has admitted "it was no
longer in touch with how Iran's nuclear program
was developing".
That is certainly
stretching it, since a careful scrutiny of the
nine-page IAEA report conveys the opposite
impression - of the agency's near complete mastery
of knowledge of all aspects of Iran's nuclear
program. Case in point, the report cites several
recent visits to Iran by IAEA delegations, seven
"unannounced" inspections of facilities, finding
"no indication of any UF6 reconversion and casting
activity in Iran", and confirming that "there has
been no indication of ongoing reprocessing related
activities at those facilities".
With
respect to lingering "outstanding issue", such as
Polonium-210, sources of contamination, etc, the
report positively cites progress according to the
work plan's timetable, ie, answers will be
provided within "the next few weeks".
Compared to his previous reports,
ElBaradei's new report is distinguishable by fresh
details on the long-sought information on the
history and development of Iran's
uranium-enrichment technology. With respect to P-1
centrifuges, the IAEA has "concluded that Iran's
statements are consistent with other information
available to the agency concerning Iran's
acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuges".
The IAEA has been checking with Pakistan,
the source of Iran's purchase of P-1 centrifuges,
and the report states conclusively that
"information provided by Iran on these purchases
and the quantities is consistent with the agency's
findings".
As for Iran's limited
experimentation with the more advanced P-2
centrifuges, the report states that "environmental
samples taken at declared research and development
location and from equipment did not indicate that
nuclear material were used in those experiments".
Equally important is the information in
the report that the IAEA has made arrangements to
"verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the
Bushehr power plant". This, indeed, goes to the
heart of Iran's contention, cited in the report's
preliminary statements, regarding past bitter
experience with foreign nuclear contractors,
forcing the country to push for nuclear fuel
self-sufficiency.
Irrespective, the
ElBaradei report ignores its own introductory
statements and ends by an obligatory call on Iran
to adopt the "confidence-building measures
required by the Security Council, including the
suspension of all enrichment-related activities".
Yet, this statement is problematic on two
counts. First, Iran has already adopted several
confidence-building measures resulting in an
unprecedented nuclear transparency, thus
fulfilling important aspects of the UN Security
Council resolutions. Second, the IAEA's
confirmation of the absence of any illicit nuclear
activity on the part of Iran is not without
consequences with respect to Iran's NPT right to
possess a nuclear fuel cycle, just as several
other nations, such as Japan and Brazil, do. In
fact, Iran's transparency
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