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2 Maliki thrown a political
lifeline By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - The Iraqi Accordance Front, the
Sunni heavyweight in Iraqi politics, has decided
to rejoin the cabinet of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki, which it abandoned on August 1.
It is unclear whether the same five
ministers, along with deputy prime minister Salam
Zoubai, who all stepped down, will return to work
with the premier or whether the Front will
nominate new ministers for the vacant posts. They
resigned because Maliki had
not
responded to any of the 11 demands they had made.
These included a greater decision-making role for
Sunnis and an amnesty for Sunni prisoners - mainly
former Ba'athists who had joined - or been accused
of taking part in - the Sunni insurgency.
This comes amid increased speculation that
Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr will also soon
reconcile with Maliki, having also walked out on
him in recent months due to Maliki's "friendship"
with US President George W Bush.
If both
comebacks succeed, it would seem that Maliki,
whose days were believed to be numbered, might
survive - a little bit longer. When the Front
originally withdrew its ministers, its leader,
Adnan Duleimi, explained: "The [Accordance] Front
has reached a dead end with Maliki, who takes
decisions on his own without consulting with
anybody. He then claims that these decisions
represent everybody." Tarek al-Hashemi, a vice
president who is a member of the Front, said the
withdrawal was final and it would be "an
opportunity for Maliki to run his cabinet without
the Accordance Front, which he says is the source
of all problems".
That all seems to be
forgotten today, three months later, although the
Front has put forward a set of demands that it
wants Maliki to fulfill before rejoining
government. This list is much shorter than the one
presented earlier to the prime minister. If
anything, this shows a significant U-turn in the
Front's position.
With as much face-saving
as he could, Duleimi explained his new stance:
"The reason behind reducing our demands is to
enable the government to achieve the minimum,"
noting, "if the government carries out our
conditions, we shall return."
In a gesture
of goodwill towards the Sunnis, Maliki issued an
amnesty, reinstating 70 former Ba'athists into
their jobs after they agreed to help him combat
al-Qaeda. They in turn have downplayed and ignored
- except for a few pro-Saddam Hussein newspapers -
stories of corruption related to members of his
family.
One story spinning around Baghdad
says that the husband of Maliki's sister-in-law
had "stolen" 300 guns and 60 automobiles from the
Iraqi government, using the prime minister for
cover. Such stories are muted within the currently
cooperative Sunni community.
One reason
behind the u-turn in the Front's policies is
pressure from neighboring Arab states, mainly
Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These two pro-American
kingdoms do not want Sunni heavyweights to leave
the scene in Iraq. They think that for Maliki,
this would be a blessing in disguise. He would
just replace them either with radical Shi'ites of
his own Da'wa Party or from within the United
Iraqi Alliance, or with colorless Sunnis willing
to cooperate. What remains of Sunni influence in
Iraq would then be overshadowed completely by
Shi'ite politicians. Getting the minimum from
Maliki, therefore, would be better than getting
nothing at all.
Stephan Biddle, a defense
analyst at the New York-based Council on Foreign
Relations, put it well recently: "The Sunnis lost
the battle of Baghdad and understand that they
lost it. As a result, Sunnis have come to realize
that if this violence goes all out, they lose,
they don't win." This reality comes after all
parties concerned are becoming increasingly
convinced that the United States is not interested
- at this stage - in replacing the Iraqi prime
minister.
Although he has failed at
bringing security to Iraq, ending the insurgency,
crushing al-Qaeda and reconciling with Sunnis, the
Americans fear what post-Maliki Iraq would look
like. There is already too much violence and chaos
and any vacuum would be an opportunity for more
troublemaking from one of America's numerous
enemies: the Ba'athists, al-Qaeda or Iran.
The only credible politician who could
take the job is Iyad Allawi. Despite the support
he enjoys in the Arab world, and his secular
credentials, the former prime minister simply does
not have a power base in the Iraqi street.
Restoring legitimacy to Maliki, therefore, by
forcing him to change behavior, would be easier
for the Americans than finding a replacement for
him.
While convinced of this argument, the
Front also has its own agenda, and worries. When
it stepped out of the Maliki government, it
wrongly believed that the prime minister would beg
its members - literarily beg them - to stay on
board. His coalition was so weak that the
slightest walkout - they believed - would bring
him down. That did not happen.
Maliki
tried to be nice to the resigned Sunni ministers,
but the minute they walked out on him he began
searching for allies to replace them. What raised
red sirens within the Front was Maliki's
cooperation with other Sunni groups - the Anbar
Awakening Council - and his toying with the idea
to invite them to become cabinet ministers instead
of the Accordance Front.
The Anbar
Awakening Council The council was founded
in Iraq, with funds from the United States, in
September 2006. It had no political program and no
ideology or party structure, just one objective:
combating al-Qaeda. Its architects were a group of
Sunni tribesmen who were
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