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    Middle East
     Nov 22, 2007
Page 1 of 2
DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA
The Bush administration conquers Washington
By John Brown

As I write, on a cloudy Washington afternoon, my "Bush's Last Day Countdown Keychain" tells me there are 433 days, 11 hours, 50 minutes and 41.3 seconds left before our 43rd president leaves office. Like other citizens concerned about the fate of the republic, I wonder what the George W Bush legacy will be.

Many commentators have written about how the domestic politics of this administration have left the United States more divided than



ever; or perhaps the unsettled illegal immigration issue is what Bush will be most remembered for - with an unfinished barrier across the US-Mexican border as the main monument to his eight years in office.

To some concerned with foreign affairs, the Bush era will be remembered most for the acceleration of America's putative march to empire. Advocates of such a view highlight the exorbitant sums the US has sunk into its land bases in the Middle East and Afghanistan, its massive sea power, and its all-volunteer professional army; the inordinately expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter being evidence that the US is engaged in a ruthless effort to control the world's oil resources); the threats of possible military action against Iran (interpreted as a desire to control the Middle East in collaboration with Israel); the growing tensions with Russia, as well as the urge to maintain and expand its foothold in former Soviet areas in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (seen as a reflection of America's determination to remain the global hegemon); the increasing frictions with China (proof that the US will not tolerate a competitor in Asia); the constant disagreements with the Europeans (a reminder on our part that we - not they - are the boss).

Indeed, there is little doubt that the military, economic and cultural impact of the United States continues to be enormous. Calling this global footprint "imperial" is certainly tempting. But for a nation to be an empire, its leaders must have a plan or vision for how to deal with the rest of the world - as, arguably, Theodore Roosevelt and his entourage did with their "large policy" for American overseas dominance. Some historians cite these schemes as the beginning of an American-style empire that led to "the American century", a period that now seems so long ago and so far away. (Are we not now, in fact, living in the Anti-American Century?)

Bush and visions of empire
The immense (but declining) global power of the United States notwithstanding, the conceptual baggage required to engage in truly imperial ambitions has simply not been a part of the Bush administration's mindset. This remains so despite its assembly-line-style production of countless "national security" reports on a vast range of global security matters - committee-written, unreadable documents marked by a total lack of intellectual coherence or clear direction. These can, if anything, be seen as a collective "cover-up" for the administration's obvious lack of thought beyond the here-and-now.

To be sure, no imperial plan is ever perfectly framed or implemented (as Roosevelt himself realized), but the Bush administration's version of such now appears to have been remarkably without rhyme or reason - on, in fact, an automatic pilot, driven by a self-aggrandizing Pentagon budgetary process and "priorities" strikingly determined by shifting domestic politics (what Congressional district or crony corporation had put in the best, or most influential, bid for a base, military-style activity, or war-production plant).

True, our generals remain engaged in the fearsome-sounding "war on terror" by order of the White House - but this has proven a helter-skelter example of global confusion, regularly renamed by an administration clueless about what its "war" really is.

Put another way, the Bush administration was never able to define, shape, or direct in an "imperial" fashion the powerful forces, negative and positive, stemming from various segments of American society that do so much to determine the destiny of our planet. (This may have been inevitable, given the contentious nature of American democracy.)

As for the once-dynamic duo who characterized much of this administration - Vice President Dick Cheney and secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld (and those clustered around their "offices") - the only "empire" that really counted for them was the parochial world of Washington, DC, with its lobbyists, bureaucrats, politicians and assorted supporting think-tankers, all absorbed in their petty turf-wars about who among them would get government money for their minions and projects, overseas or at home.

This was the narcissistic province that the vice president and secretary of defense had the urge to dominate with their "unitary executive", "wartime" commander-in-chief presidency and the foreign wars that made it all possible. Developments outside the US, however, mattered largely to the extent that they helped in the aggrandizement of their own power, their fiefdoms, and those of their cronies, on the banks of the Potomac.

The president and his diplomats
To make some sense of all this, let's start at the top. With his utter lack of experience in foreign affairs and complete lack of curiosity about the outside world (with the possible exception of Mexico), Bush was incapable of having a global vision himself, imperial or otherwise. In the words of commentator William Pfaff, "Bush is happy deciding, even though he knows nothing."

The president's major foreign-policy decision - to invade Iraq - was certainly not based on any understanding of the global implications of what he was doing (including, conceivably, expanding an empire). It was taken for reasons that still remain unclear, but may have ranged from his tortuous relationship with his father to his desire to portray himself as a decisive commander-in-chief to the American electorate. Perhaps, to use his words, the former cheerleader frat boy just wanted to "kick ass" overseas to show the media, voters and possibly even himself that he was doing something other than sitting in the Oval Office preaching the virtues of compassionate conservatism.

Kicking ass - playing cowboys and Indians with the world, as little boys once did on playroom floors or in backyards - has remarkably little to do, however, with anything that might once have been defined as imperial planning or the knowledge necessary to implement such plans.

For example, a year after his "axis of evil" State of the Union address, when informed by Iraqi exiles that there were both Sunnis and Shi'ites in their country, "emperor" Bush allegedly responded that he thought "the Iraqis were Muslims". (No way, after all, that you can tell those Indian tribes apart!) And what better summarizes Bush's preparation for putative empire building than the following nugget from the 2000 presidential campaign season, as related by Elaine Sciolino of the New York Times:
When a writer for Glamour Magazine recently uttered the word "Taliban" - the regime in Afghanistan that follows an extreme and repressive version of Islamic law - during a verbal Rorschach test, Mr Bush could only shake his head in silence. It was only after the writer gave him a hint ("repression of women in Afghanistan") that Mr Bush replied, "Oh. I thought you said some band. The Taliban in Afghanistan! Absolutely. Repressive."
Given the tabula rasa in Bush's mind regarding the world outside "the homeland" (a word his administration has regrettably contributed to the American language), it is hardly surprising that he selected as his main foreign policy advisers two people with very limited global visions of their own: Condoleezza Rice as national security advisor and, as secretary of state, Colin Powell. (Rice herself admitted in 2000 that as a "Europeanist, I've been pressed to understand parts of the world that have not been part of my scope"; and Powell's qualifications were based on his military savvy - and loyalty - not his geopolitical perspectives. The general, as Bill Keller of the New York Times reported in 2001, was "a problem solver, not a visionary".

As became clear after the horror of September 11, 2001 - a foreign policy failure of the first order, if ever there was one, that 

Continued 1 2 


The illusion of American 'smart power' (Nov 13, '07)

Spooks refuse to toe Cheney's line on Iran (Nov 10, '07)


1. Warnign shot for Iran, via Syria

2. Israel, the hope of the Muslim world

3.  More than 'sheets' hitting the fan

4. Pakistan put in its real place

5. Sifting schizoid ASEAN's reality from rhetoric

6. US lacks a smart nuclear policy

7. US tripped up over Iranian captives

8. Crunch time

9. Fallujah under a different siege

(24 hours to 11:59 pm ET, Nov 20, 2007)

 
 



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