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2 British pullout stokes Iraq's
southern fire By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - When then-US secretary of state
James Baker suspended talks with the Palestinian
Liberation Organization on June 20, 1990, he
famously said, "Our telephone number is
202-456-1414. When you are serious about peace,
call us."
This is what British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown should have said to Iraqi
leaders while visiting southern Iraq last week.
After all, thanks to the indifference of Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki and
a
completely paralyzed central government in
Baghdad, the British-controlled city of Basra has
become a hotbed for militants and Islamic
fundamentalists.
Instead, Brown chose to
speak to his own countrymen - downplaying
unquestionable failure in Iraq - saying, "Your war
is over. We have managed now to get Iraq into a
far better position." Brown's statement was far
more realistic than the 2003 speech of President
George W Bush, in which he said, "Major combat
operations in Iraq have ended."
Brown did
not say, however, that the British had succeeded.
He literally could not say that because it would
have been factually incorrect - very incorrect. He
also did not say, however, that they had failed.
British troops will remain in Basra, he claimed,
training and assisting Iraqi authorities, until
the spring of 2008. Their military role is over,
however, as of mid-December.
Maliki had
recommended a rapid two-week transfer of local
authority in Basra, and Brown - eager to rid
himself of the Iraqi burden - immediately said
yes. Brown acknowledged, "Not that violence has
ended, but we are able to move to provincial Iraqi
control and that's thanks to everything you
[British soldiers] have achieved."
Let's
take a closer look at what all of this means for
Brown, Bush and Iraq. Brown is effectively ending
a three-year military operation that has cost the
lives of over 170 British personnel. It has become
very unpopular in Great Britain. Brown never
endorsed the Iraqi adventure, but was always too
afraid to strongly oppose it, but since coming to
power in June has wants to bring it to an abrupt
end.
What he has done is drop British
forces in Iraq to about 2,500. Good news for the
British - bad news for the White House. Shortly
before the British announcement, Australia and
Poland also said their forces will be leaving Iraq
in 2008. Some in Washington are distressed,
claiming they are being abandoned by their closest
ally in Iraq. They see that Brown's announcement
is a de facto defeat for Great Britain and
coalition forces in the war-torn country.
It makes it very difficult for Bush to
tell the American public, "Wait and see, I was
right on Iraq." What makes life a little easier
for the US president is that if the US loses
Britain, it still has France. Tony Blair's
departure from the premiership coincided with the
rise of Nicolas Sarkozy, a man who is willing to
bury all previous animosity between his
predecessor Jacques Chirac and the White House.
But France is not an active player in
Iraq. It does not have troops stationed in Iraq,
and apart from a recent visit by French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner to the country, the
French have been absent from Iraqi affairs since
2003. And although a staunch ally of Washington,
Sarkozy has already parted with the US on a
variety of issues, primarily in his willingness to
engage with Hezbollah (which the US claims is a
"terrorist" organization) to advance presidential
elections in Lebanon.
Brown hopes that any
tension in British-US relations will be resolved
when the Bush team leaves the White House in
January 2009, almost certain that post-Bush
America will be ruled by the Democrats, who are
more opposed to the military adventure in Iraq.
Additionally, Brown will now be able to call for
early elections in 2009, without having the
headache of explaining what British troops are
doing and why they are dying in relatively large
numbers in a war that according to most people in
Britain does not concern them.
When Blair
ordered 46,000 troops to Iraq in 2003 (one third
of the army's land forces) many wondered whether
these soldiers even knew where they were heading.
Operation Telic, as it was called, was the largest
operation of the British army since World War II.
With time, it became increasingly difficult to
justify what the British were doing. Saddam
Hussein was arrested; it was clear that he had no
weapons of mass destruction and was not
cooperating with al-Qaeda. And territories under
British control were not becoming a haven for
democracy, as Bush and Blair had been saying since
2003.
The British will not part with the
Americans completely, however, keeping a large
number of civilian personnel in Iraq, hoping to
transfer their mission from a military one into an
economic and developmental one that can serve
bilateral British-Iraqi relations. The fact that
Iraqi forces in Basra are unable - by their own
account - to take over from the British seems to
mean little to Brown. General Jalil Khalaf, the
police commander of Basra, confirmed that his men
cannot deal with the security vacuum that will be
left by the British, noting that recently 40 women
were killed in Basra by Islamic fundamentalists
for not adhering to Islamic dress code.
Their bodies were mutilated - and this
while the British were there - shedding light on
what will likely happen to Basra the minute the
British leave. Even at the House of Commons in
London, the Defense Select Committee expressed
doubt over Brown's decision to pull out, fearing
that a post-British Basra will become a city
swarming with violence, "dominated by criminals
and Shi'ite militias".
Brown promised a
phased withdrawal on reaching 10 Downing Street
this summer. In October, he announced that the
5,000 troops in Basra would be dramatically
reduced by mid-2008, and completely returned by
Christmas 2008. That was simultaneous with (and
regardless of) relative US success in arming Sunni
militias to combat al-Qaeda in al-Anbar province.
Brown wants to portray himself as a patriot who is
gravely concerned about the wellbeing of British
troops in Iraq.
He reads polls well - and
realizes that for the first time in 20 years the
opposition Conservative Party is 11 points ahead
of the Brown government. Earlier, Brown had been
accused by British servicemen in Iraq of showing
"contempt" for the British war effort, failing to
provide his men with needed equipment and funds
while serving as minister of finance. General Lord
Guthrie, the former chief of defense staff,
claimed that a success story in Basra "could have
been made available earlier if adequate funding
had been found sooner" adding, "Brown must take
most of the blame." Simultaneously, Anthony
Seldon, in his biography of Blair, The Blair
Effect, confirmed that when Brown was arguing
with Blair
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