Eyeball to eyeball in the Persian
Gulf By Kaveh L
Afrasiabi
Despite critical strategic
importance and escalating military deployment,
reliable mechanisms to alleviate tension in the
waters of the Persian Gulf region remain weak or
non-existent. Three major wars during the past
three decades have created one of the most
volatile regions in the world, an area that is
also the hub to nearly half the energy needs of
the industrialized world.
Glaring issues
in the region's maritime arena, specifically the
physical proximity of naval vessels of the United
States and Iran, have the potential to ignite an
already heated political and
military
climate.
Perpetual preoccupation with the US-Iran rift has
left little time or resources to establish prudent
measures to thwart unwanted military escalation.
The US and Iran are eyeball to eyeball in
the Persian Gulf, where maritime borders between
Iran and Iraq remain murky. Considering recent
incidents involving British sailors temporarily
apprehended by Iran, it is clear that the risks of
an accidental clash are running high. This threat
is heightened by the fact that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps, the country's most
powerful military unit branded as terrorists by
the US, shoulders the main responsibility in
protecting Iran's territorial waters.
Iran
is a major regional power because its size,
geography, population, lengthy coastlines and
strategic islands award it a prominent, strategic
position in the Persian Gulf. The US has a vested
interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf
because of its traditional reliance on energy
imports from the region - imports that are
projected to increase. According to one estimate,
total US demand for oil will increase 40% by 2025.
Washington considers the Persian Gulf region as
vital to national interests and has long sought to
preserve its stability through an extensive
forward military presence.
But the US
cannot solve all the region's problems and must
desist from unilateral actions that would likely
fuel regional instabilities and incite
anti-American sentiments already entrenched in the
region.
In light of an increased US-Iran
dialogue, and the latest US intelligence report
indicating that Tehran has no current nuclear
weapons program, new possibilities have emerged to
de-escalate bilateral tensions. Obviously, this
requires deft diplomacy from both sides.
Otherwise, the region, and the world, may witness
another unfortunate case of missed opportunities.
The time is right to make an intervention
in the Cold War-like impasse between Iran and the
US. Because the bilateral relationship is rife
with mutual suspicions and mistrusts, it is time
to draw from fruitful maritime pacts of the past,
such as the US-USSR or India-Pakistan agreements
on "incidents at sea". Such dialogue may help set
relations between the two countries on the right
track, off the path to confrontation, and in line
with the provisions of international law.
It is well possible that a joint study
conducted by Americans and Iranians, and pitched
to both sides in a confidential manner, would have
a decent chance of serious consideration in
today's environment - one marked with
uncertainties, but untapped possibilities as well.
Today in the Persian Gulf, the US and Iran
are engaged in what could be called "gunboat
diplomacy". Such engagement stretches back to
military skirmishes of the 1980s, including the
blunder of the USS Vincennes' downing of an
Iranian passenger jet. Past incidents are
obstacles to any maritime agreement between the
two rivals - foes whose naval operational
readiness in the Persian Gulf has long been
directed against each other.
Considering
current naval force projections, ironing out an
efficient crisis-prevention maritime agreement is
a serious policy challenge. A successful pact will
only be reached through an in-depth understanding
of each side's security priorities, and an
emphasis on preventing unwanted, even accidental,
confrontation. Such an agreement would at least
provide minimal maritime safety. Dwarfed by the
preponderant power of the US, Iran pursues
"asymmetrical" naval warfare. This factor may
prove to complicate any offense-defense balance.
No matter how beneficial an incident at
sea agreement might be, it could be viewed in
Tehran as a restriction of the sovereign rights of
the coastal states. Washington might consider a
pact as unfairly fettering the US Navy's freedom
of navigation and force deployment.
Only
careful consideration of the concerns of both
sides coupled with careful wording that would not
alter settled doctrines and strategies will yield
the mini-breakthrough such an agreement would
recommend. This is the only path towards a prudent
mechanism to prevent conflict.
An incident
at sea agreement must make creative and explicit
provisions to avoid accidental war. This could
range from advanced notices on military maneuvers
to assistance in disaster management at sea, and
possibly to new communication links and
improvements in the present de facto rules of
interaction.
This requires a study of the
various scenarios for "accidents" at sea. Some
examples are submarine collision, surface ship
collision and false alarms. Establishing
confidence-building and practical measures will
reduce risks at sea. The proposed study would also
examine the present "rules of engagement". Also, a
preparatory study must review the existing
communication links between the US and Iran in the
Persian Gulf with the goal of providing for
fail-safe and secure communication.
Above
all, any study or subsequent agreement must be
"delinked" from the larger outstanding problem
between the US and Iran.
As military and
Middle East expert Anthony Cordesman has correctly
stated: "The entire history of the Cold War
indicates it is better to talk to hostile regimes
and to try to prepare the way for limited
cooperation and a better future."
Ideally,
an incident at sea agreement could activate formal
contacts and, perhaps, a future joint US-Iran
maritime security commission focused on a mutually
satisfactory risk-avoidance approach.
For
the moment, however, creating an initial "zone of
agreement" is the first step. Identifying areas of
mutual interest with respect to strategic
priorities is absolutely integral to establishing
an incident at sea agreement.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi,
PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview
Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's
Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs,
Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa
Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear
potential latent", Harvard International Review,
and is author of Iran's Nuclear
Program: Debating Facts Versus
Fiction.
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