DAMASCUS - The long-lasting presidential
dilemma in Lebanon is finally on its way to being
solved. The Presidential Office in Lebanon has
been empty since the term of ex-president Emille
Lahhoud ended last November 24.
This week,
the Arab League called for the immediate amendment
of the Lebanese constitution to enable army
commander Michel Suleiman to become president. It
also expanded the powers of the Maronite president
by giving him the right to appoint 10 ministers in
the upcoming Lebanese government.
Another
10 would be named by the Hezbollah-led opposition,
while the final 10 would be in the hands of the
Saudi-US-French
backed
March 14 Coalition headed by Saad al-Hariri. The
Hariri-led parliamentary majority would still hold
the post of prime minister. Therefore, the top
posts in Beirut would be one anti-Syrian (prime
minister), one pro-Syrian (speaker of Parliament),
and one relatively pro-Syrian (the president). The
new formula divides power equally among Lebanese
adversaries, without giving major influence to one
party over another.
Some saw this as a
coup against the Sunnis of Lebanon, since it gave
the Maronite president more powers than he has
ever enjoyed since the signing of the Taif Accord
at the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1989. From
where Syria stands, that is okay as long as one of
its allies stands at the Presidential Palace in
Lebanon. Had an anti-Syrian president been in
power, that means that he, and the Hariri-led
team, would control 20 seats in the Lebanese
government.
Syria would certainly have
said "no". That would be too dangerous for the
Syrians since they have always said that they
would never tolerate an anti-Syrian regime in
Beirut. It is a fact that the Syrians lost the
bulk of Lebanese Sunnis to Saad al-Hariri after
2005. Those who remain pro-Syrian are
more-or-less, lightweights in Beirut politics. To
weaken the Hariri bloc, Syria did not mind a
formula that empowers a Maronite president who is
allied to the Shi'ites. If that is what it takes
to take power and decision-making away from the
March 14 Coalition, then so be it. This might
explain why Vice President Farouk al-Shara went to
the Vatican roughly two months ago.
At
first glance, this formula is not-too-satisfying
for Hezbollah and ex-army commander Michel Aoun,
since they were demanding a blocking third of the
cabinet. But that is too ambitious - they have
probably realized - and settled for the second
best thing that was offered by the Arab League in
Cairo. A win-win solution, the new formula means
that the Hariri-led bloc will be unable to impose
a two-thirds majority on decision-making, but the
Hezbollah-led opposition will not have a one third
vote to bloc legislation as well. The Syrians
are beaming at the results - although the March 14
Coalition insists that this formula was reached
only after Saudi Arabia and Egypt exerted immense
pressure on Damascus. Unable to accept that this
formula comes out tailor-made to Syria's interest,
they are saying that it was imposed on Syria. They
claim that Syria accepted the resolution only
after Saudi Arabia threatened to boycott the
upcoming Arab Summit, scheduled to be held in
Damascus in March 2008. That is not true. This is
actually what the Syrians have wanted all along.
During the presidential campaigns in
Beirut, Syria made sure to refrain from saying:
"We want Mr X for President." It was very clear,
however, that it would not tolerate a member of
the March 14 Coalition. Given the slim chances of
bringing any March 14 candidate to power, due to
the veto of Hezbollah and its ally, General Aoun,
the only real candidates for presidential office
were Aoun, Suleiman, Riad Salameh, the governor of
the Central Bank of Lebanon, and to a certain
extent, the elderly Michel Edde, who was backed by
the Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros
Sfeir. At the end of the day, the campaign boiled
down to the two Michels: Aoun or Suleiman.
Many in Beirut thought that Syria wanted
Aoun. It seemed only logical: Aoun was allied to
Hezbollah and Hezbollah was allied to Syria. That
is the impression Syria gave - without ever saying
it. That actually ruined Aoun in his Christian
constituency and was severely used against him by
his opponents in March 14. That was done on
purpose. The Syrians actually feared Aoun as
president. The man has a strong anti-Syrian
record, and is accredited with the Syrian
Accountability Act that was passed in 2003.
When they were in Beirut, the Syrians
prevented him from returning to Lebanon due to his
unwavering criticism of Syria and its then number
one ally, prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. The
Syrians do not forget that in the 1990s, Aoun
wrote an open letter to then-US president Bill
Clinton, saying: "Even if we [and the Syrians] are
the same people, we don't have the same values, so
there is a big difference between us."
In
an interview with Middle East Quarterly in 1996,
Aoun was asked if he dislikes the United States.
He replied: "My grandfather and cousins fought in
the American army. My mother was born in the
United States, my sister and her family live in
the United States. I studied in the United States.
I have never been against the United States and
have always respected Americans, a democratic
people who forward their values and peace, as we
do. I cannot be against the United States;
besides, politically, I am linked to American
politics."
What can the Syrians expect
from someone with such a record? But nevertheless,
he is playing it wisely nowadays because he
realizes that the only way to become a
pan-Lebanese leader is to be allied to Christians
and non-Christians alike. Since Hezbollah is a
numerical majority, he cannot develop his own
presidential ambitions without them. Likewise,
they need a strong Christian patriot with them to
ward off accusations that they are establishing a
Shiite Republic in Lebanon.
Who wins
and who loses? The Arab League formula
produces several winners and losers in Lebanon.
Winner 1: The upcoming
president Suleiman is certainly a winner, since
not only will he come to power, but he will also
have more powers than previous presidents Lahhoud
and Elias Hrawi. By virtue of his post becoming
not-so-ceremonial after all, he will enjoy greater
influence in the Lebanese streets, particularly
among Lebanese Christians.
Winner
2: Syria is definitely a winner because it got
what it wants, did not have to change its
policies, yet showed the world that it was
cooperating on the Lebanese file.
Winner 3: Hezbollah and its leader
Hasan Nasrallah. The military group was fearful
for its fate in case a March 14 president came to
power. After all, prime on his agenda would be
implementing UN Resolution 1559, which calls for
the disarming of Hezbollah. He would also honor UN
Resolution 1701, passed after the summer war of
2006, keeping Hezbollah away from the
Lebanese-Israeli border. Even worse, he would
rally his 10 ministers rank-and-file behind March
14 in carrying out the Hariri international
tribunal under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Now with Suleiman as president, this
becomes highly unlikely. The new president is a
friend of Hezbollah. He believes in its mission to
liberate the Sheeba Farms from Israel and does not
seem to be annoyed by them being a state-within-a
state nor does he feel threatened by the arms they
hold. Those arms, he says, will never be used
against the Lebanese.
Loser 1:
Michel Aoun. The former army commander was
obsessed with becoming president, in a manner
similar to how French President Nicolas Sarkozy
once said that he had been thinking about the
presidency in France since he was 17 years old.
Aoun is currently 72 and by the time the next
elections take place in 2010 he will probably be
too old to run for president.
Loser
2: Iran wanted Aoun for president. It fears a
Syrian-US rapprochement via Suleiman - a formula
that brings Syria and the US closer at the expense
of Tehran. In April and May 2007, the Iranians
made it clear they were unimpressed with the
Syrian-US meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh or the visit
of US House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi to
Damascus. News of Iranian contempt was published
in the Saudi daily al-Hayat. The Syrians always
defended their alliance with the Iranians. They
claimed - and still do - that Washington could not
continue not talking to both Tehran and Damascus.
It has to talk to one of them and Syria is
the most likely partner since it is moderate,
reasonable and does not have a history of
anti-Americanism. Syria can talk to the Iranians
and get them to moderate their behavior, like it
did in 2007 when 15 British sailors were abducted
in Iranian waters. Under request from then-British
prime minister Tony Blair, the Syrians helped
secure their release. The Iranians fear Suleiman
will be a new link between Damascus and
Washington. This stance is not secure, however,
nor is it permanent. It just worries the Iranians.
Loser 3: The March 14 Coalition.
Not only did it not get one of its members as
president. It also had to accept 10 seats being
given to the pro-Hezbollah president, Suleiman.
March 14 already considered itself having made a
grand concession by accepting Suleiman in the
first place. It now has to tolerate another two
years of someone who will block any anti-Syrian
legislation in Beirut.
The Christians win.
The Syrians win. And Hezbollah wins.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
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