SPEAKING
FREELY Towards a new 'Suez
crisis' By Alan G Jamieson
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
The economic
problems in the United States have drawn attention
away from the continuing efforts of certain
members of the George W Bush administration to
provoke a military confrontation with Iran. Yet
these two themes, economic vulnerability and
warlike intent, may be woven together in the near
future in a way that parallels an earlier crisis
in the Middle East.
Just over 50 years
ago, Britain, France and Israel decided, for
their different reasons, that
the Arab nationalism personified by president
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt posed a threat to
peace in the Middle East. When Nasser nationalized
the Suez canal in the summer of 1956, he seemed to
have played into the hands of his enemies. Britain
and France believed they had an excuse for
military action against Egypt which might be
acceptable to the wider international community.
Keeping their plans a secret from the
United States, Britain, France and Israel prepared
to attack Egypt. When this assault took place, it
was militarily successful. However, it soon became
clear that the attackers had fatally miscalculated
international reaction, above all from the US.
Whatever their military power, both
Britain and France had fragile economies. Britain
in particular soon faced a financial crisis. A run
on the pound led to a desperate appeal to the US
for financial support. America refused any aid
until Britain and France withdrew their forces
from Egypt. Those weaker powers had no choice but
to comply.
However, the international
economic impact of the Suez crisis lingered into
1957. As an immediate reaction to the Anglo-French
attack, Nasser had ordered the blocking of the
Suez canal. It took months to clear this blockage,
keeping world oil prices high because of the extra
transport costs involved in tankers having to take
the longer sea route from the Gulf to Europe
around southern Africa.
Could some aspects
of the 1956 Suez crisis be repeated if the US
launches military action against Iran? This seems
entirely possible, and American miscalculation of
the consequences of such action could have a more
serious and long-lived impact than that produced
by the Suez intervention.
The US claims
that the Islamic Republic of Iran presents a
threat to peace in the Middle East. In 1956,
British prime minister Anthony Eden called Nasser
of Egypt "a new Hitler". Today, the American
government applies a similar label to President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Eden demanded military action
against Nasser, not sanctions that amounted to
appeasement. Bush echoes such sentiments when
speaking about Ahmadinejad.
Given that the
US spends more on its armed forces than all the
other nations of the world put together, the
military imbalance between that country and Iran
is vastly greater than that which existed between
the attacking powers and Egypt in 1956. American
success in a military attack on Iran is assured,
but as Britain and France discovered in 1956, such
success may not matter.
Nasser blocked the
Suez Canal. Could Iran render the local
environment in the Strait of Hormuz so hostile
that it is effectively closed to tanker traffic?
If so, the impact on world oil supplies and prices
would be profound. Nearly one quarter of the
world's oil supplies passes through the strait. If
it is closed, the only alternative routes to get
oil out of the Gulf are pipelines whose carrying
capacity cannot be greatly increased.
In
1956-7, the closure of the Suez canal merely
forced oil tankers to make longer voyages to reach
their markets. The total amount of oil coming out
of the Middle East was not reduced. If the Strait
of Hormuz is closed, there will be an absolute
reduction in the amount of oil coming out of the
gulf. This will not please emerging economic
powers such as China and India. Even a long-time
US ally such as Japan might become discontented if
its oil supplies were disrupted as a consequence
of US military action.
However, as in
1956, the economic consequences of military
intervention may not solely relate to energy
supplies. In the 1950s, the US could claim to be
both the world's leading military and economic
power. The first claim can still be made, but
today the second claim is being increasingly
undermined. For years, the American government has
underwritten much of its vast expenditures by
selling US Treasury bonds to foreign national
banks. Now, in the shadow of a possible economic
recession, leading US financial institutions are
becoming increasingly dependent on injections of
new capital from foreign government investment
funds.
It is not inconceivable that if a
US military intervention against Iran caused
serious instability in the world economy,
America's foreign creditors might seek to rein in
its actions through financial pressure. A threat
to the pound forced Britain to climb down over
Suez in 1956. Would pressure on the dollar force a
change in America's attitude to Iran today?
The actions of the US during the 1956 Suez
crisis effectively served notice on Britain and
France that their days of imperial power were
over. Could a hostile international reaction to
American military action against Iran send a
similar message to the US, indicating that its era
of world hegemony may be drawing to a close?
It may be objected that America's economic
position today is not yet as precarious as that of
Britain in 1956, a country exhausted by the
financial burdens of waging two world wars and
enduring the inter-war depression. Nevertheless,
it is already becoming clear that the military
aims of the US may increasingly exceed its
economic ability to sustain them.
In 1908,
imperial Britain was the world's principal
creditor nation and income from its vast foreign
investments allowed Britain to finance its naval
arms race with Germany without undue strain on the
economy.
In 2008, imperial America is the
world's principal debtor nation, kept afloat by
the willingness of the rest of the world to lend
it money. Lenders like Kuwait or Singapore may
just be small nations buying military protection,
but it is unrealistic to expect economic powers
like China, India and Japan to provide money and
then stand back while the US takes action which
may damage their economies. Sooner or later, he
who pays the piper calls the tune.
Alan G Jamieson is the author
of Faith and Sword: A Short History of
Christian-Muslim Conflict (London: Reaktion
Books, 2006).
(Copyright 2008 Alan G
Jamieson.)
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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