DAMASCUS - When Hamas came to power in
January 2006, trading the bullet for the ballot,
many believed the Islamic group - as we knew it -
was finished. History after all is riddled with
stories of resistance groups that fell from grace
the minute they abandoned warfare in favor of
government office. The National Bloc of Syria is a
good example, accredited with leading the
anti-French struggle during the 1930s and early
1940s.
They were voted into power in a
landslide victory in 1943, based on their earlier
successes, but were ejected six years later in
1949, by a military putsch with little ceremony or
respect because they had fallen from grace in the
Syrian street. Government
destroys in the Arab world.
It blinds and corrupts. It damages - often beyond
repair. Every Syrian - by birth - was a member of
the National Bloc until its leaders decided to
transform it into a political party in 1946. The
same applies to Yasser Arafat's Fatah Party before
and after Oslo in 1993. It also applies to the
Wafd Party in Egypt and more recently, to Hamas in
Palestine.
During the years 2000-2006,
Hamas obtained all the war medals it needed by
steering what has become called the al-Aqsa
Intifada. There was no higher reward for the
leaders of Hamas than an esteemed reputation in
the Islamic world, the ability to inflict pain on
Israel, discredit Yasser Arafat, and achieve
martyrdom; the ultimate goal of jihadis worldwide.
By 2006, it was clear that something was still
missing for Hamas. It was the opportunity to rule;
the chance to dictate policy and be recognized not
only by Arabs and Muslims but by the international
community as well.
That, of course, in
addition to their conviction that they could run a
state, combat corruption and find jobs for the
Palestinians. They sincerely believed - and still
do - that they can deliver if given the chance.
This is actually why they were voted into office
in 2006. Palestinians did not vote for them
because they promised to annihilate the state of
Israel. They actually did not use that during
their parliamentary race but rather, campaigned on
a social agenda, banking on the bankruptcy of
Fatah and the numerous shortcomings that surfaced
after the death of Arafat in November 2004. It was
a pragmatic victory rather than an ideological
one. The Palestinians voted for Hamas because they
promised better schools, more security, less
bureaucracy and no corruption. Voters included
seculars and Christians.
Giving them the
full burden of government would have sidelined
them from the resistance - the way it did to Fatah
after 1993. They would have been too busy cleaning
up house in the civil service, inspecting schools,
and building roads, to lead a proper resistance.
They made several important gestures towards
Israel and the Americans, however, crying "Uncle"
without actually saying it, because they wanted
recognition as statesmen rather than guerilla
warriors. Decision-makers in Washington, however,
refused to listen, seeing Hamas as no different
from al-Qaeda, because of its Islamic program.
Instead of taking advantage of the situation,
Israel brought Hamas back to the fold of the
resistance (what they know how to do best).
When Arafat died in 2004, nobody blamed
him for having abandoned the resistance in 1993.
Although he spoke of peace, everybody, even the
Israelis, knew that he was a man of revolution.
But by playing two faces, he managed to run a
country. He managed to give the Palestinians
wages, jobs, schools and security. This is the
game Hamas should play. Khaled Meshal once
appeared on al-Jazeera TV and confessed that in
early 2004, Hamas officials had in fact sat down
to negotiate a truce with US officials. The
Americans tried to get them to disarm, and only
when Hamas refused did the US allegedly give
Israel a green light to assassinate the Hamas
founder Ahmad Yassin in March and his successor
Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi in April 2004. Then-British
foreign secretary Jack Straw also admitted that
British diplomats had a dialogue with Hamas.
Looking forward To be fair to
Hamas, they were never given the opportunity to
succeed. They were sentenced to fail from day one,
thanks to an international boycott of Palestine,
headed by the US, which refused to deal with the
democratically elected representatives of the
Palestinians. The boycott resorted a proud people
to hunger and need. Hamas at the time was dying
for the chance to prove itself - to prove that it
could deliver. It was willing to walk that extra
mile to earn international recognition and lift
the boycott imposed on the Palestinians.
This was certainly not out of conviction -
but helplessness. Had Israel allowed Hamas to take
over government, with its full responsibilities,
this would have been a win-win scenario for
everyone - everyone, that is, except for Mahmud
Abbas and Fatah. The Palestinians would have been
ruled by the leaders for whom they voted. American
"democracy" would have been upheld. Hamas would
have been firmly in control of government and
Israel would have tamed one of its deadliest
enemies. By letting it share power, treating it as
a partner, showing it respect, and giving it real
duties, Israel could have forced Hamas to share
responsibility.
It is very similar to what
happened in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. The
Americans sidelined the Sunnis for three years,
then realized that the keys to security in Iraq,
and to ending the insurgency, involved courting
the Sunnis and bringing them back to power. By
letting them share power, the Americans reasoned,
they would also share responsibility for security.
They would be obliged, before the voters who voted
them into office, to provide the functions of
government, including proper security. In the
past, Israel refused to negotiate with a
government that included Hamas. Now, due to its
stubbornness, Israel has to deal with a government
in Gaza that is Hamas.
One possible
solution to the present confrontation would be to
give Hamas the benefit of the doubt, to give them
what they are asking for - money, food, medicine
and security - then see if they can deliver. That
would manage - not end - the conflict between
Hamas, Fatah and Israel. That would need a serious
mediating effort to restore Gaza to the West Bank
and create a cabinet of national unity, under
Abbas' authority, to be composed of both Fatah and
Hamas members. Collectively, the Islamic party can
still boast of a war record in combating Israel,
despite all the damage done to its image since it
took over Gaza. Fatah - with no Arafat - does not
have that luxury anymore. Fatah can provide
legitimacy in the international community for
Hamas.
Hamas can provide Fatah with
allegiance at a grassroot level, in the
Palestinian street. Hamas has enough legitimacy -
still - to talk and sell peace to the Palestinians
and get away with it. Abbas, who nobody sees as a
war hero or red-blooded Palestinian nationalist,
cannot. He needs Hamas - still - in as much as
they need him. Arafat provides the example. In the
1970s, he went to the United Nations and said that
he came carrying "an olive branch and a freedom
fighter's gun", and the world believed him. That
was made clear 30 years later, at Oslo in 1993.
The Israelis should have invested in that
turning point to achieve their end result with
minimum loss and damage to Israel. They could have
hollowed out Hamas, emptying it of its very
essence, without firing a single shot at the
Palestinians. The siege of Gaza, which started
last January 2007, has done Israel a great
disservice in the international community; almost
as painful as the Winograd Commission that came
out this week, criticizing the Ehud Olmert
government for malpractice during the summer war
with Lebanon in 2006. In as strange as it may
seem, Olmert needs Hamas in government.
But many things have to be done before
this happens. Step one would be to end the siege
of Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinians. Step two would
be to get Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyya on one
table to talk and find an acceptable solution to
both Fatah or Hamas. Or, to get both men to step
down, for the sake of the Palestinians, for the
people to chose new leaders who can deliver
security, peace and stability.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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