DAMASCUS - Six Arab countries recently
held a secret meeting in Amman, Jordan, aimed at
finding ways to topple the cabinet of Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the meeting, according to
reports, was chaired by Egyptian intelligence and
was attended by representatives from Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Libya, Oman, Egypt and the United Arab
Emirates. They countries claimed that the Maliki
government in Baghdad was a "Shi'ite
administration".
Such a story sounds
logical - given the dominating fear that Arab
states have from the spread of Iranian influence
in the Arab region. Officials from any of the six
states would downplay such news, especially as
they originated from Fars, a news agency set up in
Tehran in 2002 to "promote
the ideals of the Islamic revolution [of 1979]".
But these Arab states are indeed afraid of
what they call "Shi'itification". They are worried
by how long Maliki has survived, despite the poor
security conditions in Iraq since he came to power
in 2006. They are even more worried by how long he
plans on staying in power.
Over the
weekend, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Najaf. They decided
to solve the political gridlock that has crippled
Iraq since last August and they put an end to what
the six Arab states were reportedly planning to do
by deciding to re-invest in Maliki.
Talabani said there was no intention to
replace Maliki with current Vice President Adel
Abdul Mehdi, from the Supreme Iraqi Islamic
Council (SIIC), who has had his eyes on the post
since 2005. Talabani had one condition, however,
for renewing confidence in the prime minister.
Maliki had to chose ministers based on their
professional merit and not on their political
party affiliation or their sectarian origins.
There is a lot of speculation in Baghdad
that the two "delinquent blocs" (the Sunni one of
the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Shi'ite one of
Muqtada al-Sadr) will join the new Maliki cabinet.
Both of them abandoned the prime minister in 2007,
for different reasons.
The Sunni bloc was
opposed to his anti-Sunni policies and his refusal
to seek real reconciliation with Sunnis by issuing
a general amnesty, amending the de-Ba'athification
laws and curbing the powers of Shi'ite officials
at the Ministry of Interior, who have been using
it to settle scores with Sunni notables.
Adnan al-Duleimi, the head of the
Accordance Front, said there were "positive
signals" with regard to a comeback, making it
conditional, however, with Maliki responding to
Sunni needs. For his part, Muqtada - sending a
positive signal both to Maliki and the Americans -
said he would be willing to extend the "freeze" on
the military activities of his Mahdi Army, to give
the prime minister a few months of peace and
quiet.
He did not set conditions, but they
are clear to observers of the Iraqi scene, the
prime one being a timetable for US troop
withdrawal, and more power for the Sadrists. He
also seeks protection from the prime minister, in
exchange for Muqtada drumming up support for
Maliki within the ghettos and slums of Baghdad,
and among grassroot Shi'ites.
Whatever
happened to the "ultimatum" given by the Americans
to Maliki in May 2007? Wasn't he supposed to
deliver on reconciliation and security, or be
replaced by somebody who could? The anti-Maliki
team needed 138 votes for a no-confidence vote in
Parliament. That required 53 votes from the
Kurdish parties (that were beginning to grow
disenchanted with the prime minister), 55 votes
from the Sunni groups and 40 from the team of
former prime ministers Iyad Allawi and Ibrahim
al-Jaafari.
Clearly, they were unable to
get the 138 votes. Despite that, the death toll
continues to rise, security remains in a shambles,
with over 2 million Iraqi refugees scattered
around the Arab world. Maliki claims things have
improved since he began with his Baghdad security
plan, enforced by thousands of new fresh US
troops, and cooperation from the Mahdi Army and
Iran. For all practical purposes, and despite all
rhetoric coming against him from his enemies
within Iraq, it appears Maliki has survived and is
up for a second round as premier.
Often,
US and British diplomats are asked: "Why do you
insist on keeping Nuri al-Maliki when you know
that he has delivered nothing but failure after
failure and done nothing to improve the livelihood
of grassroot Iraqis?" The lame response is
usually: "Iraq is a sovereign state and a
democracy, and we cannot interfere with the choice
of the Iraqi people. Nuri al-Maliki was elected by
them and is a legitimate representative due to the
parliamentary majority that supports him [the
United Iraqi Alliance UIA]."
Another
argument usually says: "We fear what a post-Maliki
Iraq would look like." That sounds more logical -
given the potentials of chaos in Iraq. So the
Americans are responsible for how long Maliki has
survived.
Who also is responsible for
Maliki's "re-birth?"
Sistani steps
in Clearly, from the weekend summit in
Najaf, the Sistani has played an important role in
polishing Maliki's image and getting all sides
within the UIA to accept his re-nomination.
The wise old man of Najaf might be old and
no longer as popular as he used to be, due to the
rising influence of radical younger Shi'ites like
Muqtada, but he still has his say in the Shi'ite
community - and it still goes uncontested. Had it
not been for Sistani's final word, the UIA would
have been busy debating who should replace Maliki.
The Da'wa Party of Maliki would want the
seat for itself - again - and so would the SIIC.
Adel Abdul-Mehdi, after all, has always coveted
the post of prime minister. If anything, the
weekend summit in Najaf proves that the grand
ayatollah is still powerful, respected and obeyed
by different players in the Shi'ite community.
Sistani might have his differences with
Maliki - mainly over the prime minister's earlier
honeymoon with the Sadrists. He might disagree
with how Maliki turns a blind eye to Shi'ite
militias while clamping down on Sunni ones,
thereby increasing the sectarian divide. But
ultimately, Sistani is the godfather of the UIA,
which brought Maliki to power. He too, pretty much
like the Americans, fears what a post-Maliki Iraq
would look like.
Talabani and the
Kurds Although relations reached a low
point in recent months, over Maliki's inability to
prevent a Turkish attack on Iraqi Kurdistan, the
prime minister's alliance with the Kurds
apparently remains intact. This week, a Kurdish
delegation arrives in Baghdad to meet Maliki,
headed by Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani. Talks
between both parties had led to nowhere in recent
months, but this time, Sadiq al-Rikabi, one of
Maliki's advisors, promised that the prime
minister was "open" for dialogue with Barzani. The
Kurds want the government to support Article 140
of the constitution, regarding Kirkuk being
incorporated in the Kurdish autonomous region, and
to subsidize the Peshmerga armed militias in
Kurdistan.
And some Sunnis
too Although Maliki's cooperation with
Sunnis has been minimal, he is accredited recently
with approving a landmark bill allowing thousands
of former Ba'athists to reclaim their positions in
the bureaucracy. He has also changed course over
the Awakening Councils that have mushroomed in
Iraq, with the aim of combating al-Qaeda.
That too has secured him bonus points with
Sunnis, explaining why the Accordance Front is
considering a comeback into the Maliki government.
The Sunni community as a whole, however, cannot be
accredited with bringing life back to the premier,
since its strings remain in the hands of Arab
players - mainly Saudi Arabia, that are afraid of
Maliki.
And don't forget
Iran The Iranians pulled it off
brilliantly, distancing themselves from Maliki for
most part of the past two years, to give him
maneuvering space within the Iraqi arena. He was
believed to be "close to Iran", but observers
always said he didn't take orders from the
Iranians. That proved to be incorrect, with the
passage of time.
Sometimes (when
Sunni-Shi'ite tension was high in Baghdad) the
Iranians went as far as to say that he was not
even pro-Iranian, but rather, independent from the
Islamic regime. When Maliki needed some form of
peace and quiet, the Iranians halted their
meddling in Iraqi affairs, and according to the
prime minister himself, security has improved by
77%.
The world might have been fooled with
Maliki's facade, but it never convinced the
Saudis. In 2007, Nawaf Obeid, a security analyst
and adviser to the Saudi government, wrote in the
Washington Post that if the US left Iraq, "one of
the first consequences will be massive Saudi
intervention to stop Iranian-backed Shi'ite
militias from butchering Iraqi Sunnis". Obeid
added, "The Saudi leadership is preparing to
substantially revise its Iraqi policy. Options now
include providing Sunni military leaders
(primarily ex-Ba'athist members of the former
Iraqi officer corps) with the same type of
assistance - funding, arms, logistical support -
that Iran has been giving to Shi'ite armed groups
for years."
With that kind of influence,
Iran intervened - at the right moment - to save
Maliki's neck. They got the Sadrists to "freeze"
all military activity, with the aim of supporting
Maliki and purging the Mahdi Army of wild and
uncontrollable elements that gave the Sadrists -
and Iran - a bad name. Shortly, Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad will visit Baghdad - the first
visit by an Iranian head of state since the
Islamic revolution of 1979. He is due to arrive on
March 20 and the visit is expected to add power to
Maliki's arm in dealing with Iraqi domestics.
Some believe Ahmadinejad's visit will
present a challenge to American interests in Iraq.
On the contrary, it will complement - indirectly -
American efforts to pump life back into the Iraqi
prime minister.
Margaret Scobey, the
current US ambassador to Egypt, once
well-described the situation in Iraq: "The Sunnis
fear the future. The Shi'ites fear the past. And
the Kurds fear both the future and the past."
That is so true, and strangely enough, all
of them have decided that for the present - the
only person able and willing to hold things
together (no matter how clumsily) is Maliki. The
upcoming weeks are going to see plenty of flirting
on behalf of the prime minister - with practically
everybody in Iraq.
He is going to cozy up
to the Sunnis to give legitimacy to his upcoming
cabinet. He already sent them a positive signal by
"legitimizing" their arms and calling on over
12,000 militiamen from the Awakening Councils to
join the ministries of Defense and Interior. He is
likely to reward the Accordance Front with
powerful portfolios in the cabinet, in addition to
issuing a new amnesty, setting political prisoners
free.
With regard to the Sadrists - and
Iran - he is probably going to "freeze" all
persecution of the Mahdi Army, and also grant them
crucial posts. They used to hold principle posts
like Education, Commerce and Health.
As
for the Kurds, Maliki has to walk a tight rope.
They want oil-rich Kirkuk - which as much as he
would want to give he cannot because this would
enrage the Arab world and Turkey. He might try to
appease them with other carrots - like granting
them the needed subsidies for the Peshmerga, and
lifting a government ban on foreign firms doing
business with Iraqi Kurdistan, independent of the
Baghdad government.
Previously, these
contracts had been considered "illegal" by
Maliki's Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani. Last
December, they sent him an ultimatum, showing
grave concerns over his failed policies with
regard to the Kurdish issue. Kurdish
parliamentarian Mahmud Othman said, "If Maliki
doesn't consult with the Kurdistan coalition ...
about political, security and economic decisions,
his government cannot continue."
If Maliki
does not deliver on the issue of Kirkuk, he added,
then they would make it clear to him their words
would be followed by action. Apparently, that
rhetoric is now history, given the life-saving
effort of Talabani. Even the Kurds - the
disgruntled Kurds - are willing to give him a last
chance. Its either Maliki or chaos, everybody
believes, and Maliki is better than chaos.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
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