US and Iran: A history of
violence By Khody Akhavi
WASHINGTON - By his own admission, US
ambassador John W Limbert's ordeal as a captive
during the Iranian hostage crisis began with a
monumental failure of negotiation.
"In
1979, somebody thought it would be a good idea to
the let the Shah [of Iran] into the US for medical
treatment, despite - I must say - the very
eloquent and well-stated advice of our charge
d'affairs at the time, Bruce Langein, who told
Washington in no uncertain terms what he thought
about the idea," said Limbert, during a talk at
the government-funded think-tank the United States
Institute of Peace. He is now charge d'affairs of
the American Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan.
Soon after, the then 36-year-old political
officer found himself in
front of
the sealed door of the US Embassy in Tehran,
talking with a group of "unhappy young Iranians"
who had forced their way into the compound,
insisting they only wanted to have a sit-in.
"My job was negotiate them out," he said.
Limbert and 51 other US diplomats were
held captive for 444 days until their release on
January 20, 1981. Since the embassy siege, Iran
and the US have remained in a state of "no war, no
peace". Enmity and mistrust run deep, with each
side accusing the other of past misdeeds. An
oft-told Washington joke goes something like this:
Iranian: "Will you guys get over
1979?" American: "Sure, only if you get over
1953." Iranian: "Never."
In 1953, the
Central Intelligence Agency backed a coup d'etat
to oust democratically elected prime minister
Mohammad Mossadeq and return the Shah to the
Peacock Throne.
Limbert discussed his
experience of negotiations with Iran and his
recommendations, in a newly-published report
entitled "Negotiating with the Islamic Republic of
Iran: Raising the Chances of Success - Fifteen
Points to Remember".
He underscored three
important points: Check the sermonizing at
the door, and separate the view of the person from
the problem. The past matters, so be aware of
Iran's history. Give your counterparts credit
for intelligence.
"They're not ignorant
fanatics. Give them credit for intelligence. There
seems to be a tradition - and it's not just us -
for treating the Iranians as though they don't
really understand things," said Limbert.
Iran's ascendance and the intentions of
its hardline president have become pressing issues
for US policymakers, who acknowledge the challenge
posed by Iran's nuclear program, yet who are
equally unsettled by the prospect of a military
confrontation with Tehran.
Washington has
pursued "coercive diplomacy" to change Iran's
behavior, but the value of economic sanctions is
still questionable. Will it soften Tehran's
defiance, or further entrench the hardliners?
From some corners of Washington come faint
whispers advocating normalization, or at the very
least, negotiations with Iran. But the limited
diplomatic experience thus far appears to have
left some US officials deeply suspicious of
Iranian intent and sincerity.
"It's not
just at those critical historic junctures where we
really did bad things to each other, but it's also
the recent experience of negotiations themselves,"
said Ellen Laipson, a former US diplomatic officer
who currently heads the Stimson Center.
"I
was in the White House in the spring of 1995 when
president [Bill] Clinton made two executive orders
to further tighten sanctions against Iran and the
role that [secretary of state] Warren Christopher
played was really quite striking," she said.
"He was clearly deeply influenced by his
experience negotiating the Algiers Accord with
Iranians and was still really profoundly
mistrustful of the Iranians, and I think that very
much shaped his own policy recommendations and
preferences that president Clinton then endorsed."
The Algiers Accord helped negotiate the US
hostage release in 1981.
Michael Rubin, of
the right-wing American Enterprise Institute
think-tank, questioned the merits of placing too
much faith in negotiations, suggesting that they
may serve as a convenient tool for the Iranian
regime.
"How do you judge sincerity? How
do you judge success? Because there may come a
point when too much negotiation undercuts that
success if the negotiation becomes a delaying
tactic on one side, if there's no sincerity," he
said.
Rubin also described the difficulty
of negotiating with the different power centers in
Iran.
"I would not suggest that the
Iranians aren't intelligent, or that they are
crazy, they certainly aren't, but when we talk
about the nuclear issue, what always concerns me
is who's in charge of that?" he said.
"Is
it the Iranian nuclear program, or is it the
Revolutionary Guards' nuclear program, or is it
the Office of the Supreme Leader's nuclear
program?"
If and when Iran and the US
finally sit down to talk, analysts say that
history and culture will factor heavily in
negotiations. The question is exactly how much
culture should matter?
"We all agree that
culture matters, but when does it matter? Under
what circumstances is it important, as opposed to
the rational incentive for getting people to
negotiate," asked Dan Brumberg, a professor of
political science at Georgetown University and
United States Institute of Peace fellow.
"How much weight are we going to attach to
culture?"
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