Discord and
consensus are bedfellow in Iranian politics,
coexisting sometimes easily and sometimes, like
today, rather uneasily. The nation's
post-revolutionary history since 1979 has been
rife with conflicts over political, economic,
cultural and foreign-policy issues, which come
into sharper focus during elections. The runup to
the polls on March 14 for 290 seats in the Majlis
(Parliament) is no different.
In theory,
elections in today's Iran serve the same purpose
as in any Western or non-Western democracy, ie, as
a mechanism for
making important political
choices, framing debates, rotating elected
offices, and re-affirming the principle and
practice of popular control, by keeping those in
government accountable for their actions.
Also, as with the mass rallies this week
celebrating the revolution, elections are primary
instruments of political socialization, that is, a
process by which the Iranian people acquire the
values and opinions that motivate their "presence
on the stage", to paraphrase the late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's founding
father who left a legacy of ensuring that no
specific political faction monopolizes political
power, a legacy continued by his successor,
Ayatollah Seyed Ali al-Khamenei.
This has
not been an easy responsibility for the supreme
leader, the final arbiter of policies who is,
simultaneously, cast in the role of constant
arbiter between and among (increasingly) fractious
politicians representing diverse interests and
orientations.
A factor of systemic
stability, the leader has intervened in the
torrent of accusations and counter-accusations
following the mass disqualification of hundreds of
candidates for the Majlis, urging a trust in the
due process of law and the people who implement
them. The key term utilized by government leaders
and yet contested by the disqualified candidates
as falling short in practice is "election ethics".
As usual, the initial sound and fury of
objections to the disqualifications has given way
to a politics of bargaining and mediation, with
the competing factions making recourse to the
office of leader, the Guardian Council, and even
the Majlis itself, in their race to determine who
is and who is not eligible to run. And this while
utilizing the media to enhance their relative
gain. The intervention of some key leading clergy,
like Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, exhorting the
government to reconsider the disqualifications,
which include some representatives of the leader
as well, has also been instrumental, reflecting
the role of countervailing power centers in
today's Iran.
As a result, hundreds of
disqualified candidates have been reinstated
already, thus bringing it closer to the spirit of
"competitive" elections. Nonetheless, serious
problems persist. The reinstated include a
grandson of Khomeini, Ali Eshraghi, who was one of
more than 2,200 mainly reformist candidates
disqualified in the initial phase of vetting by
the Guardian Council. [1]
For one thing,
Iran's leaders are weary of the elections becoming
a conduit for fomenting ethnic discord, as they
are also worried about voter apathy, that could be
exploited by the nation's foreign enemies and
dissent groups, explaining why the country's
leaders have veered toward a middle path that
would balance their multiple concerns for national
security, political participation, etc.
Simultaneously, they must tackle the purely
procedural problems of holding national elections.
Procedural problems In addition
to factional politics, the candidate-selection
process in parliamentary elections in Iran is
hampered by purely procedural issues stemming
from, among others, the sheer number of people
registering as candidates, more than 7,000 in the
present elections for the 290-seat Islamic
Consultative Assembly. Arguably, even with some
30% of candidates disqualified, per a report by
the nation's top elections official, there are
still far more candidates than is really
necessary, or the system can properly screen, thus
giving the process a somewhat chaotic image.
Other problems include vagueness of
certain aspects of elections laws, such as
regarding the eligibility requirement of a "high
degree or its equivalent". In light of the
announcement by a spokesperson for the vetting
body, the Guardian Council, that a majority of
those disqualified was because of a lack of
"education degree", the need for revising the
existing requirement, perhaps in favor of
transparency by mandating a minimum high school
degree, is inescapable. As is, the present vaguely
elitist requirement, requiring a high college
degree, is neither in tune with the populist
spirit of the Islamic Republic, nor reflective of
the electorate. This could be conceivably added to
the pending legislation to revise the elections
laws.
Another problem has to do with the
eligibility of current members of the Majlis, some
of whom have been rejected by either the Oversight
Boards or the Executive Boards - that are the
implementation arms of the Guardian Council. After
review, most of those Majlis deputies, 60 to be
exact, have been either reinstated to the race or
their cases are still pending, and this raises the
question of why not give the automatic seal of
approval to incumbents since they have passed the
filtering process in the past.
Alternatively, the Majlis incumbents could
be put in a special category whereby the Guardian
Council would directly review their credentials.
The same applies to candidates who have been
approved for other elections and, yet, rejected
for parliamentary elections.
Concerning
the latter, a case in point is Hojat ol-Eslam
Seyed Mohsen Mousavi Tabrizi, from a theology
faculty in Qom, who was approved to run for the
Experts Assembly (that selects the leader) and yet
has seen his bid for a Majlis seat denied pursuant
to items of the elections law pertaining to "lack
of allegiance to Islam and the constitution".
This makes no sense and a more rational
candidate selection process is needed whereby
recently approved candidates for any national
position would receive an automatic green light,
barring exceptional circumstances. [2] In the
absence of such adjustments, the parliamentary,
presidential and other elections in Iran run the
risk of piling up largely avoidable political
estrangements threatening the system, by
unnecessarily labeling and even stigmatizing
people, some of whom have impeccable credentials.
Yet, somehow, such self-inflicting wounds
continue irrespective of a near universal lament
about them from all sides in Iran, mainly because
power politics is still viewed in Iran as a
zero-sum game - a misperception for the most part,
yet a dangerous and costly one.
Election coalitions and political
realignments As we move closer to the
elections, it has become evident that they are
principally marked by a dynamic process of
political splits in all (right, center, and left)
camps, featuring a dizzying revamping of political
lineups via election-based coalition-building
that, in turn, reflects a greater political
fracturing in the Islamic Republic.
By all
indications, the elections have as much importance
for determining the nature of (core branch of) the
legislative branch as for the 2009 presidential
elections, although such close coat-tailing the
two elections by the dominant factions will only
diminish the importance of the Majlis both
directly and indirectly.
Inevitably
however, the fate of the next (eighth) Majlis has
been closely put in league with the presidential
elections, an unhealthy development that is bound
to cause certain legislative atrophy in the near
future, particularly if the present equilibrium of
forces between the various tendencies of the
dominant Osoolgarayan faction persists.
Who are the Osoolgarayan (loosely
translated in English as "advocates of
principles")? There is no easy answer, even though
the battlelines between Osoolgarayan, often
identified in the West as "hardliners", and other
factions, principally the reformists
(Eslahtalaban) and centrists
(Etedaltalaban) may be more or less clear
on individual or organizational terms, it is less
so when venturing in the realms of outlooks and
programs for action, where the same lines turn out
to be often fuzzy and even exaggerated.
To
elaborate, when a leading reformist, Mohammad Reza
Aref, the first vice president under the previous
president, Mohammad Khatami, declined to run in
the race despite being approved, the conservative
daily Kayhan ran an editorial claiming with some
justification that Aref did so partly because of
dissension in the reformist camp and some
reformists' criticism that Aref is closer to the
Osoolgarayan.
To give another
example, a leading reformist candidate who is
disqualified, Mohsen Armin, has questioned
criticism by the Osoolgarayan that the
sixth Majlis dominated by the Eslahtalaban,
commonly known as the Second Khordad Movement, was
weak on nuclear policy, by pointing out that
various advances in nuclear technology were made
during their sway (2000-2004). Presently, a united
front of the Osoolgarayan has been formed,
bringing 11 groups under the same umbrella, some
known as pro-President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, such as
Rayeh-e Khosh Khedmat (Well-Serving Scent) and
some better known as Osoolgarayan-e
montaghed, that is, those who have been
critical of the government. The latter includes
member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakol, who has led a
Osoolgarayan faction in the present
(seventh) Majlis that has occasionally called into
question certain domestic and foreign initiatives
of Ahmadinejad, such as lowering interest rates
and use of exchange reserves.
On the
whole, the Osoolgarayan have occupied some
220 seats in the present Majlis, with roughly half
of them known as ardent
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
