Page 2 of 2 IRAN VOTES Factions and friction
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
supporters of Ahmadinejad, led by the deputy Majlis speaker, Mohammad Reza
Bahonar. The reformists, led by Mohammad Reza Tabesh, a close confidant of
former president Khatami, have a minority presence of some 70 members in the
current Majlis, and have thus been unable to make much input.
In comparison, the second Osoolgarayan faction led by Tavakoli, and
closer to the Majlis speaker Hadad Adel, has been somewhat dominant. This
faction has now been bolstered by the rise of a new triumvirate of Ali Larijani
(the leader's representative at the Supreme National Security Council), Mohsen
Rezai (former head of the the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and a current
member of the Expediency Council), and Mohammad Ghalibaf (the mayor of Tehran
and a likely presidential hopeful). This group's splitting off from the Osoolgarayan
unity list, under the veneer of Jebh-e Mardomi Osoolgarayan (popular
front of Osoolgarayan) was sealed after failed attempts to reach a
consensus on the list of candidates.
Given the internal competition within the Osoolgarayan coalition, some
pro-Ahmadinejad groups have complained that the final list is not sufficiently
government-oriented (dowlati), this while other Osoolgarayan complain
of the opposite.
A clue was recently given by Ali Davarani, the executive secretary of Jebh-e
Abadgaran-e Jihadi, who was quoted in the papers as stating, "We have lost hope
in the united front of Osoolgarayan ... and that is why we pursue our
discussions with the independent Osoolgarayan and the supporters of Mr
Ghalibaf, Rezai and Larijani toward the establishment of a coalition more
principle-oriented [osoolgara] than the United Front of Osoolgarayan."
Conspicuously absent from the race are the allies of (centrist) former
president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, such as Hassan Rowhani, who
nevertheless wield considerable clout in Iranian politics and who may throw
their weight behind the above-said triumvirate. The latter are rumored to be
plotting a new organization called Kargozaran-e Jadid (The New Kargozaran),
named after the largely dormant technocratic party that had aligned itself with
the Rafsanjani faction.
As a result, the once formidable line between the hardliners and centrists may
be thinning. On the other hand, the bifurcation of the Osoolgarayan camp
into pro-Ahmadinejad and critical of Ahmadinejad may indeed be the salient
feature of this year's elections, with the contest between them shedding much
light on the nature of things to come for the presidential race. The
pro-Ahmadinejad factions are hoping for a strong showing in light of Iran's
steady economic growth, pro-poor "populist" policies and tangible
foreign-policy gains.
With respect to Ahmadinejad, he is a bona fide populist whose political
hermeneutic follows closely the developmental model intermixed with a vibrant
non-secular version of Third World anti-imperialism that puts him in league
with other Third World assertive leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro.
Ahmadinejad's planned trip to Baghdad on March 2 is likely to benefit his
supporters who are running for a Majlis seat, by adding to their overall
foreign-policy portfolio.
As for the disgruntled reformists and their plethora of organizations, such as
the Islamic Participation Front, Etemad-e Meli and Mojahedin of Islamic
Revolution, it is far from clear that in the absence of disqualifications they
would gain a big foothold in the next Majlis, irrespective of the popularity of
certain reformist politicians such as Khatami.
The reformist camp suffers from leadership problems, disunity and vision
shortages, particularly with respect to national-security questions, and it is
not a small matter that they have proved more apt in criticizing the
government's economic policies, for example as financially undisciplined and
inflationary, than in producing viable alternative programs. As a result, it is
estimated that in Tehran alone, the reformists will be able to run a list of no
more than 10 to 12 candidates.
Be that as it may, the political space for public debate and discussion
afforded by the Majlis elections has benefited the reformists, who can, in
turn, capitalize on their voter assets to enter into coalition with the
anti-Ahmadinejad factions. As a result, it is far from certain that the outcome
of the elections will be a "rubber stamp" Majlis for the government, as charged
by some reformists.
Rather, a new equilibrium of pro and anti-Ahmadinejad conservative factions in
the next Majlis is more probable, one that can tip the balance against
Ahmadinejad's bid for re-election next year. In a word, the reformist camp is
in dire need of reforming itself, with the left wing more along the lines of
European social democracy.
Larijani's decision to run from the clergy-run city of Qom, instead of Tehran,
is yet another indication of his looking ahead to the presidential race,
seeking to bolster his chances early on by locking the crucial support of
clerical circles.
To this effect, Larijani has described his split from the president on the
nuclear question as a "ideological split" (ekhtelaf-e maslaki - in sharp
contrast to his earlier description of the split, widely interpreted as a
result of tactical disagreements between the two men.
But, with the nuclear crisis still persisting, the Ahmadinejad-Larijani coming
duel in the presidential contest may well be decided on the basis of voters'
perceptions of who has the best remedy to end this crisis.
For now, Ahmadinejad and his foreign-policy team appear to have the upper hand,
betting on the results of the next International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
report, due out later this month. It could turn the tide against the present
attempts at the United Nations for a third round of sanctions in light of
Iran's nuclear transparency and fulfillment of its obligations toward the IAEA.
Should their hopes be realized, despite reports of the US government's intense
lobbying of the IAEA, with purported new "intelligence on Iran", then one can
expect better results at the polls for Ahmadinejad and his supporters. The
entwinement of domestic and foreign politics in Iran's elections no doubt will
continue.
Note
1. With respect to Western and the media's criticism of shortcomings in Iran's
elections, it is noteworthy that a new report by Human Rights Watch has
lambasted the hypocritical double standards of the US and Europe, concluding
that "by allowing autocrats to pose as democrats, without demanding they uphold
the civil and political rights that make democracy meaningful, the United
States, the European Union and other influential democracies risk undermining
human rights worldwide".
2. This draws on the the theories of rationality and rationalization, above all
those of Jurgen Habermas, which connect democratic elections with citizen
empowerment and enhanced "communicative rationality". Elections in Iran create
a sense of citizen input and civic efficacy that are held back somewhat as a
result of some of the distortions discussed here.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of
"Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume
XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping
Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard International Review, and is author
of
Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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