Page 4 of
4 The door
to Iraq's oil opens By M K
Bhadrakumar
in with the US geostrategy of
developing Turkey, Israel and India as three
"pivotal" states that are Washington's natural
allies in the regions surrounding the volatile
Middle East.
In January, Turkey launched a
feasibility study for a natural gas pipeline
connecting northern Iraq's fields to its
Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik, which will run
parallel to the oil pipelines. Once the northern
Iraq gas fields are developed, 353 billion cubic
feet of natural gas will flow to Yumurtalik.
Turkey hopes to export liquefied natural gas (LNG)
by tankers to destinations such as Israel and
India. There is strong US backing for the project.
To the extent that India is kept away from
linking with Iran, Washington also hopes to
scuttle the prospect of an Asian
energy grid developing that
might involve Iran, Pakistan, India and China
alongside Russia and the Central Asian states.
Significantly, serious discussions have begun for
the first time between Turkey and India on energy
cooperation.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ali
Babacan, who visited Delhi recently, has
reportedly proposed to his Indian counterpart the
possibility of Turkey exporting oil from the
Ceyhan port to Israel's Ashkelon-Eilat pipeline
and Indian super tankers sourcing oil from the
Israeli port of Eilat in the Gulf of Aquba. A
visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to India,
followed by a visit by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, is in the cards.
The Indian Oil
Corporation is already building pipelines in
Turkey. A major Indian company belonging to the
powerful Reliance Group (which has collaboration
with Chevron) is active in northern Iraq. (By a
curious coincidence, the Kurdish leadership in
northern Iraq and the Indian government have
employed the same lobbying firm - run by Robert D
Blackwill, a former deputy national security
advisor and ambassador in New Delhi - to canvass
for their interests in Washington.)
Indian
companies have traditionally been active in the
Iraqi oil sector. But what explains the US's
interest at this juncture is that energy
cooperation in Iraq could significantly cement the
strategic ties between Israel and India and
thereby ease Israel's regional isolation. On the
face of it, it would have made eminent sense for
India to connect Iraq via a pipeline through Iran.
But Washington's entire strategy is to cut Iran
out of the loop and to instead encourage Turkey,
Israel and India to forge an energy grid.
However, a Turkey-Israel-India energy grid
may face domestic opposition within India. The
question of India partaking of the economic
bonanza of US-occupied Iraq may militate sections
of the Indian public opinion. The present Indian
Parliament has adopted a resolution which
seriously delimits Delhi's collaboration with
US-occupied Iraq. How Indian public opinion
reconciles its antipathy towards US "imperialism"
with the tantalizing prospect of the country
tapping into Iraq's vast energy reserves will
offer an engrossing political and diplomatic
spectacle. But, in the short term, the prospect of
Iraq as a significant source of energy supply is
surely working as yet another damper on India-Iran
energy cooperation. In that respect, the US
strategy is working.
Turkey major
beneficiary In sheer geopolitical terms,
the single biggest beneficiary out of all Iraq's
neighbors is going to be Turkey. Shahristani's
projects will catapult Turkey into the status of a
crucially important energy hub in the US's
strategy. During his Washington visit last month,
Turkish President Gul had meetings with Bush, Vice
President Dick Cheney and the secretaries of State
and Energy. The agenda of discussions related to
the US and Turkey jointly working in Iraq to
develop its energy sources.
US-Turkey
energy cooperation in Iraq impacts on the
geopolitics of the region in many directions.
First, Washington will expect that Turkey go
slowly on expanding and deepening its cooperative
ties with Iran, a trend that the Bush
administration had been viewing with disquiet in
the recent past. Turkey can be expected to respond
with pragmatism and calibrate its ties with Iran
in accordance with the US sensitivity.
In
turn, any recalibration of the dynamics of
Turkish-Iranian ties will be a matter of utmost
satisfaction for Israel. Correspondingly,
therefore, we may expect a revival of warmth in
Turkish-Israeli relations. Furthermore, Turkey is
now poised to be a conduit for energy supplies
from northern Iraq to Israel. Israel already
enjoys strong influence in the Kurdistan region in
northern Iraq. Thus, there is a tremendous
convergence of interests between Turkey and Israel
over issues of Israel's energy security.
The Israel-Turkey political axis is bound
to consolidate in the coming period, thanks to
Iraq's oil. But from Turkey's point of view, the
most important outcome is the readiness on the
part of Washington to disengage from its erstwhile
Kurdish allies in northern Iraq. This is already
giving Ankara a relatively free hand in militarily
countering Kurdish militant activities. Washington
is not only turning a blind eye to Turkish
military incursions into northern Iraq but is even
reportedly sharing vital intelligence with Turkey,
which makes the Turkish military's "hot pursuit"
of Kurdish militants inside northern Iraq more
effective. Washington is definitely leaning on the
Iraqi Kurdish leadership to rein in the activities
of Turkish militants based in northern Iraq.
Equally, Turkey is able to exploit the
vested interests of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in oil
trade. There are signs that Iraqi Kurdish leaders
are cooperating with the Turkish military
operations in meaningful ways.
Turkey has
certainly influenced the US decision to scuttle on
technical grounds the holding of a referendum
regarding the status of oil-rich Kirkuk region in
December as provided under the provisional Iraqi
constitution of 2005. Conceivably, growing US
dependence on Turkey could even lead to an
indefinite postponement of the referendum beyond
June this year. Turkey is pressing for a
UN-negotiated "special status" for Kirkuk, making
it a region unto itself. Washington may well heed
the Turkish suggestion. At a minimum, Ankara can
heave a sigh of relief that the specter of an
independent Kurdish national identity taking shape
in northern Iraq has receded into the background.
Without US backing, it is simply not possible for
the Kurds in northern Iraq to assert their
independence.
Turkey also finds common
ground with the Iraqi Sunni and Shi'ite political
blocs, who have made a pact against holding any
referendum in Kirkuk until a new law is passed
that would firmly establish Baghdad's control over
the province's oil wealth. This enhances Turkey's
leverage in Baghdad. The Iraqi political alliance
challenging the Kurdish separatist aspirations
includes as many as 145 legislators in the
275-member Iraqi Parliament.
Indeed, from
the Turkish perspective, all this is far from
offering a permanent solution to the Kurdish
problem as such. As the prominent Turkish editor
Ilnur Cevik pointed out recently, "It is a problem
that has to be addressed with pragmatism and with
the notion that there are citizens of Kurdish
origin who still do not feel they are being
treated as first class citizens of the Turkish
republic." But the fact remains that Turkey gains
valuable time to set its own house in order while
Washington dotes on Ankara as a key ally in Iraq.
Turkey has played its cards brilliantly.
With the correct mix of strategic defiance and
realism, Ankara has persuaded the Bush
administration to view the northern Iraqi
situation through its prism. In fact, out of all
Iraq's neighbors, it is Turkey that the US will
have to count on in the coming period. The
Turkish-US relationship, which went through a bad
four-year period following Ankara's refusal to
assist in the US invasion of Iraq, has certainly
regained some of its traditional verve as a key
alliance. This adds immensely to Turkey's regional
status vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors, Russia, Iran,
and even the European countries.
Turkey's
influential role in Iraq, in fact, makes it a
significant player in the Middle East. But, more
important to medium-term Turkish national
priorities would be that Europe would be more
inclined as time passes to take note of Turkey's
strategic importance. For the EU, Turkey is
emerging as a vital energy bridge connecting the
Middle East. At some point in the foreseeable
future, this should turn to Turkey's advantage, if
only Ankara relentlessly continues to pursue its
EU membership.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and
to Turkey (1998-2001).
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