DAMASCUS - The Arab press covered, with
mild enthusiasm, the visit of Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad to Iraq. One reason was Arab
preoccupation with the Israeli war on Gaza.
Another reason was embarrassment. The Arabs,
mainly the Saudi press that dominates Arab media,
were ashamed that they had failed to establish the
same kind of dominating presence that Iran enjoys
in war-torn, oil-rich Iraq.
By showing up
in Baghdad, Ahmadinejad ended all speculation on
who rules contemporary Iraq, along with the
Americans. It certainly is not Saudi Arabia. The
Iranians say it publicly; post-Saddam Hussein Iraq
has been a blessing for the mullahs of Tehran.
What was once the stronghold for obstructing
Shi'itification is now a stepping stone for the
Iranians to export the
Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, through pro-Iran leaders like
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Shi'ite cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr, Abdul-Aziz Hakim, leader of the
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani. These were the leaders with
whom Ahmadinejad met during his visit to Baghdad
this month. The Lebanese weekly al-Kifah al-Arabi
raised the question, "Was the Iranian president
meeting Iraqi officials, or was he conferring with
another Mahmud Ahmadinejad?"
To the horror
of many Arabs, the only leaders who have dared
venture into Baghdad since 2003 are President
George W Bush and Ahmadinejad. There are
differences, however, between the two visits. Bush
lands in Iraq "suddenly" and leaves without
notice. His visits are sporadic and never
official, in a state-to-state definition.
For security reasons, he never has the
luxury of spending a night in Iraq. Ahmadinejad
came in broad daylight, with an official agenda
agreed to well in advance, and spent the night in
Baghdad. Bush comes with no prior appointment;
Ahmadinejad comes at the official request of the
Iraqi government. Symbolically for the Americans,
the American leader refused to stay in the Green
Zone, which is under US control, but rather,
stayed at the home of his Iraqi counterpart, Jalal
Talabani. He seemed to be saying: "Regardless of
reality, I still refuse to accept American control
of my own backyard."
The only similarity
is that both are greeted by Sunni demonstrators
who feel neglected and persecuted by post-Saddam
Iraq. Bush's visits to Iraq aim at negotiating
current policy, and inspecting US troops. Bush is
interested in Iraq as long as his tenure lasts at
the White House. Bush's interests, therefore, end
in January 2009. Ahmadinejad's aims are more
futuristic; he seeks a long-term extension of
Iranian influence to the Arab world, via Iraq, and
the empowerment of fellow Shi'ites.
A
secret deal? One issue that puzzles
the Sunni Arab mind and raises eyebrows in the
Arab Gulf is if the Americans are the de facto
rulers of Iraq, why then are they turning a blind
eye to Iranian influence in Iraq? How can the
Iranians make such a grand appearance in Baghdad
while the USS Cole is stationed in Lebanese
waters, directly threatening Hezbollah, and while
Israeli planes are bombing the Palestinians and
Hamas, who are another Iranian proxy in the Arab
world?
True, both the White House and the
US State Department have been very articulate
about Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs, but they
have still done nothing to end it. Some speculate
that some kind of under-the-table deal has been
made between Washington and Tehran. This "deal" is
believed to be: we the Americans give you a free
hand in Iraq (provided that you do not harm our
interests) while you abandon your proxies in
Lebanon and Palestine.
This might explain
why Iran has recently cooperated at bringing more
security to Iraq. According to Maliki, there has
been a 77% improvement in security conditions in
Baghdad. The Iraqi government admits that part of
this is due to direct Iranian cooperation through
border control, along with the "freeze" on the
military activity of the Mahdi Army of Muqtada.
Both ways, Iran gets the credit for
relative calm, through its proxies, in Iraq. One
Iranian analyst observed: "Iran still believes
that it has the luxury of time on its side. They
think that the US is not really interested in war
but want maximum results from the Iranians,
without war. They know that any US attack that
does not break the Iranian regime will only make
it stronger." He adds, "For years, they used their
influence to create havoc in Iraq, waiting for the
minute when the US becomes so desperate that it
calls on Iran to help control Iraq, a-la Syria in
Lebanon-1976."
This means, the Iranians
are waiting for the Americans to invite them to
send troops to Iraq to help bring security. The
Iranians, after all, know the terrain well. They
are bound to Iraqi Shi'ites by religion and
geographical proximity, in addition to
inter-marriage, customs and history, just like the
Syrians were to the Lebanese when they sent their
army into Lebanon in 1976.
This theory
might be on Ahmadinejad's mind, but it would be
madness to believe that the Americans will even
consider such an option, with so much luggage on
their shoulders in US-Iranian relations. They
would rather talk to other parties, like the
Syrians or Saudi Arabians, than plead to the
Iranians for such assistance. The first theory
sounds more reasonable, being that for now, the
Iranians agreed to turn a blind eye to their
proxies in the Arab world, in exchange for a free
hand in Iraq. There is considerable alarm in Iran
that the days of Hezbollah and Hamas are numbered.
Both parties have outlived their usefulness,
Hezbollah after the passing of UN Resolution 1701
that brought about the end of the war against
Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas after
its failed experience in government since 2006 and
the seizure of Gaza in 2007.
There is also
concern that in addition to the current war in
Gaza, an upcoming one is in the horizon in
Lebanon. The Iranians have watched, with great
alarm, the arrival of the USS Cole in Lebanese
waters, and Saudi Arabia's call on all citizens to
evacuate Lebanon. The Iranians believe that the US
destroyer was called into Lebanon by Lebanese
Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora and backed by
Saudi National Security Advisor Bandar Bin Sultan.
As far as the Americans are concerned, the war
between Israel and Hezbollah, which ended in
August 2006, is not over.
Iran knows this
and is preparing for the worst, expected before
the end of 2008. First, none of the declared
objectives of that war (the release of the two
Israeli soldiers, and demolishing Hezbollah) was
achieved. With such a record, Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert cannot possibly conduct a
peace treaty with the Palestinians. He needs to
polish his image in the eyes of ordinary Israelis,
to regain legitimacy, before talking peace with
the Arabs.
Second, for the Saudi-backed
March 14 Coalition to succeed, the Americans need
to get rid of Hezbollah. They are the only serious
obstacle to the dominance of the Sunni billionaire
politician Saad Hariri team and March 14 in
Lebanese politics. For the Iranians, this places
Hezbollah in a tight situation.
They can
no longer wage war against the Israelis, due to
the Security Council resolution and the stationing
of UN troops in the country. A civil war in
Lebanon would not destroy Hezbollah, but would
certainly distract it from its original objective,
being war with Israel. If there is a new stage of
hostility between Israel and Hezbollah, this time
the Israelis are more prepared for the Lebanese
guerillas, sending red sirens to Tehran.
Shi'ite
future and Persian worries When
Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah was
assassinated in Damascus in February, some in Iran
believed that Israel wanted to provoke Hezbollah
into a revenge operation. That would give Israel
all the pretext it needed to launch a new war on
Lebanon, this time with more intelligence and
better strategy.
The Israelis have studied
and observed Hassan Nasrallah well since he became
secretary general of Hezbollah in 1992. When they
killed his predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi, he
responded with an attack at the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aeries, where 29 people were killed. In May
1994, Israeli commandos penetrated into Lebanon
and captured Mustapha al-Dirani, a pro-Hezbollah
member of Amal. An infuriated Nasrallah responded
in July with another attack at the
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos
Aires. He was certainly going to do the same for
Imad Mughniyah, and Nasrallah was very public
about it on February 14 during the funeral of his
slain comrade.
Another scenario floating
in the Arab world is that the Israelis will use
the Hamas attack that took place in Jerusalem last
week as a pretext for another war on Hezbollah.
Israel has done it in the past when, in 1982, a
terrorist militia headed by the notorious Sabri
al-Banna (Abu Nidal) tried and failed to
assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador
to London.
Then-Israeli prime minister
Menachem Begin was clearly informed that Abu Nidal
(who was actually an opponent to Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat) was not operating under
orders from the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). It did not really matter to
him; it was the perfect pretext he had been
searching for to justify his upcoming war before
then-US secretary of state Alexander Haig.
Rafael Eitan, the Israel Defense Forces
commander, famously said, "Abu Nidal ... Abu
Shmidal ... I don't know, we need to screw the
PLO." And today, regardless of whether or not
Hezbollah did it, the Israelis "need to screw
Hezbollah".
This means that Ahmadinejad
must be on the lookout for Shi'ite alternatives in
the Arab world. Hamas is no longer a good bet,
leaving one option, being Iraqi Shi'ites. They are
the only ones left who can serve as an extension
of Iranian influence into the Arab world.
Bush has promised one more visit to Iraq
before his term expires in 2008. Ahmadinejad will
like make many more.
Sami Moubayed is
a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright
2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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