DAMASCUS - The Israelis insist they are
not seeking war with the Syrians, even as Israel
began its biggest military maneuver in its history
since 1948. This was on the border with Syria,
which has been calm since the June war of 1967.
This nation-wide "exercise" is being
carried out by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Home Front Command, in cooperation with the
recently-established National Emergency Authority.
President Shimon Peres insisted this was
not a prelude to war with Syria, telling the
Syrians not to worry. Israeli Radio, however, told
citizens the scenario being practiced was for how
things would look like on the fourth day of an
"imaginary" war with Hezbollah on one front, and
the Syrians on the other.
The training
envisioned Kassam rockets and Katyusha
missiles
raining down on Israel, yet the
IDF gave out a statement assuring Israelis not to
worry, saying that the drill was "part of the IDF
2008 work plan". It stressed the exercise was not
in preparation for any adventure, nor was it in
retaliation for earlier skirmishes between Syria,
Hezbollah and Israel. For its part, Hezbollah is
uncomfortable with the Israeli maneuver, saying it
neither routine - nor normal - for two countries
technically at a state of war since 1948.
As part of the exercise, sirens went off
inside Israel at 10am on April 8. News anchor Gadi
Sukenik was called in to stage "emergency
instructions" on television - and to do the same
in the event of a real war. Between 10-11am,
Channel 33, broadcasting from the Home Front
Command's new studio, gave instructions on what to
do in a time of war. Major General Yair Golan gave
guidance and showed tutorial videos on how to
behave while under attack.
Kindergarten
teachers practiced how to deal with little
children when and if war were to break out with
Syria or Hezbollah, while a field exercise
simulated various scenarios - conventional and
unconventional rockets being fired onto Israel, a
chemical attack, along with search and rescue
training.
Adding spice to the show were
the words of General Dan Harel, the deputy chief
of staff of the IDF, who said, "Anyone who tries
to harm Israel must remember that it is the
strongest country in the region, and retaliation
will be powerful - and painful."
If all of
the above is not a prelude for war, then what is?
Last September, four Israeli warplanes
invaded Syrian airspace and reached the village of
Tal Abyan near Deir ez-Zour. Things became murky
after that. Some said the planes struck at targets
in Syria. Others denied this, until President
Bashar al-Assad came out and confirmed the story,
a few months later, confirming that they had
struck, but he downplayed the targets.
Syria called it a "flagrant aggressive
act" and said it confronted the planes, forcing
them to drop their fuel and ammunition so they
could fly faster and escape. The Israelis at first
refused to comment, then confirmed they had in
fact carried out an air intrusion into Syria.
The Israeli and international media were
filled with speculation on why the story was
leaked by the Syrians, not Israel. One theory said
that the Israelis were preparing to back the
Americans in an upcoming war with Iran and were
trying to reach Iranian territory - thus
explaining the extra fuel. Another theory claimed
the Israelis were searching for Russian missiles
that Syria had acquired, and wanted to test Syrian
defenses.
This was seconded by Israeli
counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor, who said his
country was "collecting intelligence on long-range
missiles" deployed by Syria in the north. A third
speculation said the Israelis wanted to hit a
training camp for Palestinian militants in Syria
(Hamas and Islamic Jihad); and missed their
target. A fourth tale claimed the Israelis were
trying to flex their muscles and remind Syria that
although taken aback - or as the Arabs would say
"defeated" in the war with Lebanon in 2006, Israel
was still around in the Middle East - and could
create trouble. One theory even said that the
Israelis were after North Korean weapons being
stockpiled in Syria.
Regardless of what
the target was, this was provocation and an early
warning for the Syrians. The Israelis "were not to
be trusted" and were capable - and willing - to
engage in a new adventure with Damascus. It also
made all talk of a peace process seem increasingly
silly since nations interested in peace don't go
around invading other nation's air space, dropping
bombs then flying away.
There was much
speculation in the summer of 2007 that "something"
was going to happen on the Syrian-Israeli front.
The Israelis had mobilized the IDF on the Golan
border, and reports in Israeli dailies said that
70% of the army's reservists were taking part in
exercises along the Golan. Israel also declared
that one of its famous units, the Golan Brigade,
had just completed intensive training in war
games.
Guy Hazoot, the officer in charge
of the 91st Division deployed along the border
with Lebanon, noted: "The worst case is war, and
we have to be prepared for the worst case." United
Press International, quoted "well-informed sources
in Washington" saying that a "confrontation
between Syria and Israel may happen this summer".
This was echoed by Dennis Ross, a Middle
East envoy of the era of US president Bill
Clinton, who was quoted in Yediot Aharonot as
saying there was a serious "risk" of war, adding,
"The Syrians are positioning themselves for war."
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak came
out, however, to defuse the tension, one week
before the air invasion, saying Israel was going
to withdraw its troops from the Golan Heights. The
mobilization, he said, raised the risk of an
"accidental confrontation" between the Syrians and
Israelis, something that Israel wanted to avoid.
He seemed to be pouring cold water on the tensions
and telling the world that there would be no war
between Israel and Syria.
Syria responded
with similar commitments to peace, saying that
ever since it went to Madrid in 1991, its choice
had been a "just and comprehensive peace" based on
United Nations Security Council resolution 242;
the "land-for-peace" formula.
After the
intrusion, Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Shara
told the Italian daily La Republica, "All I can
say is that the military and political echelon is
looking into a series of responses as we speak.
Results are forthcoming." When asked what kind of
retaliation was expected from the Syrians, he
replied: "I cannot reveal details." A journalist
then spoke about an appeal from Peres to Syria, to
which Shara responded: "Excuse me for smiling. The
talks about peace are a disguise for blatant
aggression. Israel's responses in light of the
aircraft infiltration are amazing, with [Prime
Minister Ehud] Olmert saying he knows nothing
about it."
The Syrians - who seem to be
relatively calm about what is happening now - have
not, however, crossed off the possibility of war
with Israel. In May 2007, Assad spoke to
parliament and said defeated leaders like Olmert
could do strange things - like go to war rather
than make peace with his neighbors, to right the
wrongs done to Israel's image in 2006. Olmert
responded in an interview with the Saudi channel
al-Arabiyya, saying he was ready for peace with
the Syrian president. "Bashar al-Assad, you know
that I am ready for direct talks with you. I am
ready to sit with you and talk about peace, not
war." He added, "I will be happy if I could make
peace with Syria. I do not want to wage war
against Syria."
Assad in turn replied -
indirectly - in his July 2007 inauguration
address, saying: "The most Syria could do is send
a Syrian to a neutral place to negotiate with a
third party, who in turn would convey Syria's
message to the Israelis, who might be staying at
another hotel. Direct talks between Syria and
Israel are also out of the question at this
stage." The basis of the Syrian peace position
would be resolution 242 and the border of June 4,
1967. Out of experience, however, he added, the
Syrians do not trust Israel, "We did not trust
them before the 1990s and now distrust them
further."
The Syrians then went to
Annapolis in the United States in November 2007,
claiming beforehand that the entire peace
conference was destined to fail because neither
the Americans nor the Israelis was ready for
peace. The Syrians believe Israel cannot sign a
peace accord with the Palestinians or Syrians
unless it corrects the damage done in the Lebanon
war of 2006.
The Israelis, however, deny
this, claiming that although the results were less
than satisfying, they can live with them, just
like the Americans learned to live with Vietnam.
The Americans, however, in what remains of the
George W Bush administration - are unwilling to
engage the Syrians. They claim Syria is more
interested in a peace process than a peace deal; a
process aimed at breaking the isolation imposed by
the US since 2005.
If the Israelis wanted
to talk to the Syrians, however, the Americans
insist they will not discourage them. They won't
encourage - but they certainly won't say no. The
Syrians, however, don't believe that, yet find
themselves in a dilemma since they cannot enter
into a peace process without an honest and
reliable third party. The only acceptable broker
(to the Israelis) is the United States.
The last eight months of the Bush
administration cannot produce a peace deal,
neither with the Syrians, nor with Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas. Left hanging is the war
option.
At first glance, it is in nobody's
interest to see yet another war - the fourth in
the Arab world since 2001. A deeper look shows the
Israelis might have their reasons for seeking a
confrontation to wage a limited war - then peace -
with the Syrians.
The theory goes: you
cannot go to peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict
without first having obtained your war medals.
Olmert needs that for domestic consumption - and
for a better hand at the negotiating table with
the Arabs. This peace has many strings attached to
it; no Hamas, no Islamic Jihad and no Hezbollah.
While the first two are to be dealt with
via the Palestinian track, the last runs through
peace and war with the Syrians. Many in Israel are
starting to re-emphasize that the only way to get
rid of Hezbollah is to alienate it from its
natural allies.
Another war against
Hezbollah will not succeed - and a ground invasion
of Lebanon could prove disastrous for the IDF. The
Israelis couldn't do it in 2006.
The
Lebanese system, which in itself is on the verge
of collapse, couldn't do it in 2006-2008. The UN
couldn't do it with its resolutions. The Iranians
would never do it.
So the Israelis believe
the only people able to find a solution to the
Hezbollah problem are the Syrians, and they would
only do that if a full peace treaty were reached
with Israel. No peace process is possible with
Syria, however, without a war - a war that would
redraw the front lines, impose new realities on
everybody, and psychologically prepare all parties
for an end to the conflict.
Re-visiting
Sadat In times like these, it is
illuminating to revisit the late Anwar al-Sadat of
Egypt. Undoubtedly, the Israelis learned more from
Sadat than the Arabs. Sadat scored a psychological
and political victory in 1973 - in addition to the
famed crossing of the Suez Canal - by catching the
Israelis off guard.
He began to send off
messages to Tel Aviv - using all kinds of language
to assure them that Egypt was not seeking war with
the Jewish state. First, he requested that all
Soviet experts working in Egypt since the days of
Gamal Abdel Nasser return to the Soviet Union in
July 1972. In all, almost 20,000 advisors were
expelled. He wanted to assure the Americans, and
also wanted the Israelis to believe that he was
not planning a war.
Israeli intelligence
believed Egypt would not and could not go to war
unless it had arms from the Russians. A spy in the
Egyptian army, whose name until today has not been
revealed and is known only as "the source", told
the Israelis Egypt wanted to regain Sinai, but
Cairo would not go to war unless Moscow supplied
it with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli
Air Force and scud missiles to be used against
Israeli cities.
As long as the
fighter-bombers had not arrived, Israel believed
Sadat would never attack because he did not have
the weapons for war. The Israelis also believed
that if Egypt did not attack, then Syria also
would not. Both the Americans and Israelis
believed the expulsion of the Soviet advisors
would greatly weaken the Egyptian army.
Sadat also made sure that a constant
stream of false information was given to Israeli
intelligence. For example, Egypt made it public
that it did not have trained or qualified soldiers
to work with the new weapons that came from
Russia. It also sent messages to Israel that it
had a major problem with spare parts for its tanks
and airplanes. In May and August 1973, he
threatened to go to war. The Israelis mobilized to
fight and Sadat did nothing.
Each
mobilization cost Israel about US$10 million.
Because he always threatened to go to war against
Israel and never did anything, nobody believed him
in 1973. That is exactly what Sadat wanted and he,
along with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad,
managed to catch the Israelis off guard on October
6, 1973.
That is why the Syrians should
worry about the Israeli operations that started on
April 6. It might be costly to mobilize in
defense, but a lack of response and believing the
assurances of Peres would certainly be more costly
for the region as a whole, not only for Syria.
There are no assurances in war; and no promises
kept in the Arab world. The Israelis said one
thing and did the opposite in September 2007. They
can - and might - do it again in April 2008.
Sami
Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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