Room for two: US, Iran in the Middle East
By Trita Parsi
WASHINGTON - By negotiating a Shi'ite truce, Tehran embarrassed Washington last
week and arguably proved itself to be a more potent stabilizer of southern
Iraq.
Iran's role in Iraq came as a sharp reminder that the George W Bush
administration's accusations of Iranian mischief notwithstanding, Iranian
influence in Iraq is both undeniable and multifaceted. As Washington starts to
come to terms with this reality, the Middle East inches closer to its moment of
truth: Is the United States ready to share the region with Iran?
As the risk of a US-Iran war is deemed to have dropped in the past few months,
in spite of the resignation of Admiral William Fallon and Bush's designation of
Iran as the United States' number one threat, a modicum of optimism for US-Iran
relations in 2009 has emerged.
The poisonous atmosphere between the Bush and President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad administrations has prevented the two countries from
exploring areas of common interest. With a new US president taking office in
January 2009, and with the Iranian presidential elections in March of that
year, both Iran and the US may have new presidents by mid-2009. Such a
development would certainly help create a window of opportunity for the two
countries to reduce tensions and begin resolving their differences.
But both Tehran and Washington have a proven track record of missing political
opportunities. And in this specific case, even if the two parties make use of
changing political circumstances, much indicates that readiness to seek a
strategic accommodation is lacking in Washington.
This is not necessarily due to a lack of will but due to a failure to
appreciate what a resolution to US-Iran tensions would require - from the
United States.
Among the US presidential hopefuls, Republican John McCain and Democrat Hillary
Clinton seem intent on continuing Washington's current thinking on Iran. While
McCain has sought to soften his position from last year's gaffe about bombing
Iran by emphasizing that war would be the absolute last resort, he has been
critical of Clinton's rival, Barack Obama, for favoring direct diplomacy.
Clinton is on the record favoring talks, but prefers to strengthen Washington's
containment policy as a first choice. During the presidential debate April 17,
the former first lady proposed an anti-Iranian nuclear umbrella for the entire
Middle East.
"I think that we should be looking to create an umbrella of deterrence that
goes much further than just Israel," she said. "We will let the Iranians know,
that, yes, an attack on Israel would trigger massive retaliation, but so would
an attack on those countries that are willing to go under the security umbrella
and forswear their own nuclear ambitions."
Obama, on the other hand, stands out as the sole candidate articulating a
broader strategy on Iran centered on diplomacy. Yet even though Obama is less
likely to miss the political window of opportunity in 2009, it remains to be
seen if his administration would be clear on what Iran would expect in a give
and take - and if he is ready to consider such an arrangement.
The discussions in Washington regarding any potential opening to Tehran have
centered on boosting economic incentives in hope that larger economic carrots
would compel a change in Iranian behavior. At times, the idea of offering
security guarantees has been considered in an effort to deprive Iran of
incentives to develop a nuclear deterrence against the US.
Though both of these components may be necessary to put US-Iran relations on a
different footing, they are likely not sufficient. The notion that the US-Iran
standoff can be resolved solely through economic incentives and limited
security guarantees is premised on the realities of yesteryear's Middle East.
Current facts on the ground are quite different - Iran's regional influence is
unquestionable and rolling Iran back out of Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and
perhaps even Gaza, may no longer be realistic.
The question is no longer - if it ever was - what economic incentives are
required to change Iranian behavior. Rather, to reach a settlement with Iran
that could help stabilize Iraq, prevent a Taliban resurrection in Afghanistan,
reach a political deal in Lebanon and create a better climate to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the US must arguably grant Iran a role in the
region and begin focusing on how to influence Iranian behavior rather than how
to roll back Iranian influence.
Neither Washington nor Tehran can wish the other away. While the United States'
days in Iraq may be numbered, it is not likely to leave the entire Middle East
any time soon. Nor can Washington continue to design policies and arrangements
in the region based on the notion that Iran can be neglected and excluded.
Sooner or later, Iran and the US must learn how to share the region.
But a full comprehension of what a future Middle East order - with Iran fully
rehabilitated in its political and economic structure - has not been reached or
considered in Washington. While keeping Iran out is no longer a realistic
option - at a minimum Iran has sufficient spoiler power to undermine any
initiatives aimed at prolonging Tehran's exclusion - bringing Iran in from the
cold will have momentous repercussions for the region's order and for US allies
that currently are benefiting from Iran's exclusion.
It is understandable that Washington is unprepared for this scenario. After
all, Tehran has itself been notoriously incapable - or unwilling - to define
the regional role it envisions for itself and the implications this would have
for the US and Iran's neighbors. With Tehran reluctant to clarify what it
wants, Washington has been left guessing. Tehran's failure to be more
forthcoming about its ambitions has also enabled rivals to describe Iranian
objectives as hegemonic.
Nevertheless, reality requires Washington to begin considering not if, but the
extent of an Iranian role in the region that the US and its allies can agree
to. This may necessitate a paradigm shift in Washington's approach to Iran and
the Middle East, but failure to reconcile with Iranian demands justified by the
new balance in the region will likely disable future administrations from
turning political opportunities into real diplomatic breakthroughs -
irrespective of their positive intentions.
Trita Parsi, author of the newly released Treacherous Alliance:
The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the US. (Yale), is president of the
National Iranian American Council.
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