Turkey combines dialogue with bullets
By David Romano
In a significant change of policy, Turkey recently initiated high-level
official dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. A
columnist for the Turkish mass circulation daily Zaman commented that such an
official dialogue "was not an ordinary step. It was a turning point in the
approach to the Kurdish issue and broke a taboo."
The talks - which focused on a wide range of political, economic and security
issues - are the first to occur on such a high official level. The May 2 talks
in Baghdad involved a delegation led by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani
and a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, the senior advisor to Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan; Murat Ozcelik, the special coordinator for
Iraqi affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and
Derya Kanbay, Turkey's ambassador in Baghdad.
The KRG official media described the meetings as cordial, open and focused on a
convergence of common interests of both parties. According to the KRG, "Prime
Minister Barzani expressed the Kurdistan region's desire to develop good
neighborly relations with Turkey. He recognized Turkey's legitimate concerns
and highlighted the importance of solving common problems through cooperation,
political negotiation and dialogue."
Turkish officials and media stressed the positive effect of Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani's March visit to Ankara, as well as KRG President Massoud
Barzani's recent statements against attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) and in favor of good relations with Turkey.
President Barzani's recent statements have included: "Today, the use of
violence is left in the past. Kurds should adjust themselves to this
transformation and change their mentality; they should try the other path that
is modern and peaceful"; as well as: "Now is the phase of dialogue. Kurds
shouldn't get involved in violence, either amongst themselves or in neighboring
countries ... The mentality of the Kurds should change, and this way the
mentality of these countries will also change."
Ankara's new willingness to officially engage with the KRG stems from a number
of factors besides the KRG's well-worded diplomatic overtures, however.
Turkey's late February military incursion into northern Iraq to attack PKK
rebels, which lasted only eight days, did limited damage to the PKK and may
have convinced Ankara of the need to pay more attention to a variety of
At the same time, the incursion probably succeeded in convincing KRG leaders of
the need to work harder to both contain the PKK and improve relations with
Turkey. To Ankara's credit, its February military operation and a number of air
raids against the PKK in Iraq carefully avoided civilian casualties, which in
turn left KRG leaders the freedom to pursue better relations with Turkey. The
avoidance of civilian casualties and the operation's short duration probably
helped dispel Iraqi Kurdish suspicions that Turkey's real agenda aims at
damaging the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous government, rather than fighting the PKK.
The additional problem of increasing Iranian agitation regarding Free Life
Party of Kurdistan (PJAK - closely tied to the PKK) cross-border attacks on
Iran has also left the KRG worrying about joint Turkish and Iranian military
operations inside KRG territory. Finally, for obvious reasons, the United
States has likewise been working hard to convince both its Turkish and Iraqi
Kurdish allies to improve their often tense relations. Turkish business
interests currently doing an increasing amount of investment and trade in the
KRG region are also keen to see Ankara improve relations with Iraqi Kurds.
KRG actions against the PKK have stopped short of confronting the group
militarily, however. The principal approach consists of isolating the group by
blocking supplies to its mountain bases, forbidding journalists from visiting
the PKK, closing PKK political front organizations in Iraq, limiting the PKK's
ability to move about the region and similar tactics.
Because Turkish foreign policy tends to designate friends and enemies according
to their stance on the PKK, these KRG moves constitute a very necessary minimum
policy to pursue good relations with Ankara. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali
Babacan, while agreeing that the recent talks with KRG officials were very
positive, stated: "The level and the frequency of this dialogue will be closely
related to concrete action, especially on [the] fight against terrorism."
The KRG continues to resist Turkish pressure to act militarily against the PKK,
however, and Prime Minister Barzani insisted on May 7 that the KRG is not
responsible for the activities of the PKK, since the group's mountain bases are
not under its control and the group is not under the Kurdish administration's
KRG actions to constrain and isolate the PKK may prove more effective now that
they are being combined with Turkish military operations based on actionable,
real-time intelligence provided by the United States. Turkish air raids on PKK
positions have thus become more effective than in the past, and the PKK is
probably feeling a significant amount of pressure.
As a possible indication of this increased pressure, a PJAK leader based in
Qandil on the Iraq-Iran-Turkey border recently threatened suicide attacks
against US interests, in retaliation for US intelligence assistance to Turkey.
The PJAK admitted to suffering six dead from a Turkish bombing raid the
previous day. The threat, however, was quickly repudiated in an official PJAK
press release and removed from the Kurdistan Observer website.
With the snows now thawing on the Iraqi-Turkish-Iranian borders, both the PKK
and its PJAK allies have begun spring infiltrations into Turkey and Iran, with
close to 20 Turkish soldiers killed since mid-April. The Turkish military in
turn claims to have killed upward of 150 PKK and PJAK militants in its air
raids, although this number appears a bit high and lacks independent
confirmation. In any case, both the PKK and the Turkish state appear eager to
achieve a psychological advantage with the start of the new fighting season,
convincing opponents and observers alike that they have taken the initiative.
At the same time, officials in Ankara concede that a military approach, while a
necessary part of their policy in the face of PKK attacks, will not succeed
without a political program. In general, the non-military aspect of
counter-insurgency programs involves both a political and economic dimension.
In the economic realm, increased government services and prosperity buttress
the state's legitimacy, and the current robust trade between Turkey and the KRG
is helping to develop southeastern Turkey's economy. Combined with economic
initiatives, political reforms and concessions are also necessary.
These must generally be aimed at helping to mitigate the discontent that breeds
insurgency in the first place. The details and timing of such a political
program remain unclear, however, especially with Turkey's ruling Justice and
Development Party facing the threat of legal closure for violating
constitutionally-mandated secularism. While any Turkish governing party faces
severe challenges reforming the state's approach toward its Kurdish minority,
one under the threat of legal closure must likely focus on more immediate,
pressing issues than a new Kurdish policy.
David Romano is an assistant professor of International Studies at Rhodes