An
Iranian voice in the
wilderness By Chris Zambelis
The People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI),
more commonly known as the Mujahideen-e-Khalq
(People's Mujahideen - MEK), is one of the most
organized and controversial Iranian opposition
groups. Although it maintains an armed wing -
known as the National Liberation Army (NLA) - and
numerous front organizations, it derives its
greatest strength from the slick lobbying and
propaganda machine it operates in the United
States and Europe. The MEK also boasts extensive
support within US government and policy circles,
including many of the most vocal advocates of a US
invasion of Iran [1].
The MEK remains on
the list of banned terrorist organizations in the
United States and European Union (EU). Both
parties have
indicated no intention of
reconsidering their positions. The May 7 decision
by the United Kingdom's Court of Appeal to
overrule the British government's inclusion of the
MEK on its list of banned terrorist organizations,
however, may pave the way for both the United
States and EU to reassess their positions
regarding the MEK down the line.
Given the
MEK's history of violence and its willingness to
act as a proxy force against Iran, such a move
would represent a major escalation in hostilities
between the United States and Iran, with
consequences in Iraq and beyond.
Ideology The MEK is an obscure
organization with a long history of violence and
opposition activities. It emerged in the 1960s,
composed of college students and leftist
intellectuals loyal to prime minister Mohammad
Mossadeq; the popular leftist nationalist prime
minister was deposed by coup backed by the US and
British in 1953 that restored Mohammad Reza Shah
to power. Its revolutionary zeal combined aspects
of Marxist and Islamist ideologies in pursuit of
its goal to overthrow the US-backed shah through
armed resistance and terrorism.
Its
primary targets in the 1970s included ranking
officials and symbols of the shah's regime, both
within and outside of Iran. The regime responded
in kind with brutal repression through SAVAK, the
shah's notorious domestic intelligence apparatus.
Thousands of members and associates of MEK were
killed, tortured and jailed during this period.
Consequently, like many Iranians at the
time, the MEK viewed the Islamist opposition as a
positive force for change. The MEK supported the
revolutionary forces and the 1979 seizure of the
US Embassy and subsequent hostage crisis led by
student activists in Tehran.
The group's
unique brand of Marxism and Islamism, however,
would bring it into conflict with the rigid
Shi'ite Islamism espoused by the
post-revolutionary government. The failure of a
June 1981coup attempt intended to oust ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini elicited a massive crackdown by
the regime against the MEK, forcing the group's
leaders and thousands of members into exile in
Europe. When France ousted operational elements of
the group in 1986, many made their way to Iraq,
where they joined Saddam Hussein's war effort
against Iran and enjoyed a safe haven [2].
Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, a charismatic
husband and wife team that fled into exile in
Europe, lead the MEK. From her base in France,
Maryam Rajavi currently holds the position of
"president-elect of the National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI)" after her husband's
disappearance some time in 2003. He is presumed to
be in hiding [3]. The Rajavis enjoy a fanatical
cult-like following among MEK members and
supporters [4]. The group's cult-like character
was displayed when 16 followers of the Rajavis
staged dramatic public acts of self-immolation
over a period of three days in June 2003 across
major European and Canadian cities.
The
protests followed the arrest of Maryam Rajavi and
160 of her followers after a French court ruled
that the MEK and its numerous front groups
constituted a terrorist organization. According to
former members of the group, the MEK's "human
torches" are a testament to the stranglehold the
Rajavis have over their followers and the extent
to which members are brainwashed and manipulated
psychologically into blindly following them. The
MEK is reported to maintain a list of volunteers
ready and willing to perform acts of
self-immolation on the orders of the leadership
[5].
Like other cults, MEK members are
often separated from their children and families
and discouraged from maintaining contact with
individuals outside of the group. Former members
who defected from the MEK describe the Rajavis as
autocrats who demand unquestioned loyalty from
their followers.
Women make up a
significant contingent of the MEK's ranks,
especially in its armed wing. In addition to its
Marxist and Islamist pedigrees, the rise of the
Rajavis to the group's leadership led to the
introduction of feminist ideologies into the
group's discourse. This aspect of the MEK's
ideology indicates their attempt to tap into local
grievances and international sympathy regarding
the position of women in the Islamic Republic [6].
In this regard, the MEK presents itself as
a liberal and democratic alternative to the rigid
brand of Islamism espoused by the ruling clerics,
an image it has cultivated in US and Western
policy circles to great effect [7]. The UK court
based its ruling on the premise that the MEK has
renounced violence and terrorism, and that it
currently maintains no operational capability to
execute future acts of violence.
Violence and terrorism The MEK's
long history of violence and terrorism includes
the abduction and assassination of ranking Iranian
political and military officials under the shah in
the 1970s, as well as attacks against the clerical
establishment throughout the 1980s. Foreign-based
MEK operatives also targeted Iranian embassies
abroad in a series of attacks. MEK militants
struck diplomatic officials and foreign business
interests in Iran under both the shah and the
Islamists in an effort to undermine investor
confidence and regime stability.
Furthermore, the MEK targeted and killed
Americans living and working in Iran in the 1970s,
namely US military and civilian contractors
working on defense-related projects in Tehran. The
group has never been known to target civilians
directly, though its use of tactics such as mortar
barrages and ambushes in busy areas have often
resulted in civilian casualties.
In
addition, the MEK's repertoire of operations
includes suicide bombings, airline hijackings,
ambushes, cross-border raids, rocket propelled
grenade attacks, and artillery and tank barrages.
Saddam Hussein exploited the MEK's fervor during
the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. In addition to
providing the group with a sanctuary on Iraqi
soil, Saddam supplied the MEK with weapons, tanks
and armored vehicles, logistical support and
training at the group's Camp Ashraf in Diyala
province near the Iranian border and other camps
across Iraqi territory.
In a sign of the
group's appreciation for Saddam's generous
hospitality and largesse, the MEK cooperated with
Iraqi security forces in the brutal repression of
uprisings led by Shi'ite Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens
in 1991 [8]. MEK members also served alongside
Iraq's internal security forces and assisted in
rooting out domestic opponents of the regime and
other threats to Ba'athist rule.
Despite
its history of high-profile attacks, the MEK never
posed a serious threat to the Iranian regime. The
group never enjoyed popular domestic support,
despite its claims to the contrary. Many Iranians
actively oppose the clerical regime and sympathize
with segments of the opposition. At the same time,
most Iranians also regard the MEK as traitorous
for joining the Iraqi war effort against Iran and
resent its use of violence and terrorism against
Iranians at home and abroad.
Approximately
3,500 members of the MEK remain in Camp Ashraf.
Following an agreement with US-led coalition
forces, MEK units allowed coalition forces to
disarm the group. Decommissioned MEK units are
currently under surveillance in Camp Ashraf. Their
future status, however, remains a point of
controversy. Despite their demobilization, Iran
believes that the US is holding onto the group as
leverage in any future confrontation with the
Islamic Republic.
Political
activism Although it has been disarmed, the
MEK retains the capacity to remobilize, especially
if it gains a state sponsor. Nevertheless, it is
the MEK's lobbying and propaganda machine in the
United States and Europe that enables it to remain
a relevant force in Middle East politics and a key
factor in US-Iranian tensions.
The MEK's
political activism falls under the auspices of the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) - a
MEK political front organization that also serves
as an umbrella movement representing various
Iranian dissident groups. These efforts persist
despite the fact that US authorities ordered NCRI
offices in Washington to shut down in 2003.
From Iran's perspective, the US position
on MEK is both ambiguous and at times
hypocritical. On the one hand, the MEK remains on
the US State Department's list of banned terrorist
organizations, yet the group remains on Iraqi
soil, albeit disarmed and under surveillance by
coalition forces. The MEK has cultivated a loyal
following among an outspoken network of US
politicians, former and active government
officials, members of the defense establishment,
journalists and academics advocating violent
regime change in Tehran. The MEK is even credited
in some of these circles for disclosing aspects of
the Iranian nuclear program [9].
At the
same time, it is accused of fabricating
intelligence information to boost its profile in
the US. With their call for regime change in Iran
and pleas for international support, media-savvy
MEK representatives based in the US appear
regularly on the cable news show circuit and other
forums in Washington in a campaign reminiscent of
the one led by Ahmed Chalabi and the network of
Iraqi exiles who mustered American support for the
Iraq war [10]. The MEK has also gained legitimacy
as a liberal and democratic force for positive
change in Iran, despite evidence to the contrary.
Conclusion The MEK will continue
to capitalize on the ongoing tensions between the
US and Iran by enlisting the support of elements
in Washington seeking a bargaining chip against
Tehran. It is important, however, to see this
bizarre organization for what it is; that is, to
see through the facade of liberalism, democracy
and human rights that it purports to represent
through its propaganda. The well-documented
experiences of scores of former MEK members are
reason enough to consider this group and any of
its claims with a healthy dose of skepticism.
Notes 1. See "US Policy
Options for Iran", prepared by the Iran Policy
Committee (IPC), February 10, 2005. 2. For a
historical narrative of the MEK's formative years,
see Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian
Mojahidin, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992). For an insider's perspective on the history
of the MEK from a former member, see the website
of Massoud Khodabandeh at
www.khodabandeh.org/. 3. See the official
website of the National Council of Resistance of
Iran (NCRI) at www.ncr-iran.org/ and the official
website of Maryam Rajavi at
www.maryam-rajavi.com/. 4. See Cult of the Chameleon, an al-Jazeera
documentary on the MEK (broadcast October 17,
2007) at . For an insider's perspective on the
cult-like character of the MEK, see the website of
the Dissociated Members of the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran at pars-iran.com. 5. For
an overview of the events of 2003, including
graphic photographs of the acts of
self-immolation, see MKO Human Torches. 6. For an
overview of the MEK's position on women, see
Shahin Torabi, Women in the Cult of Mojahdin March 5,
2003 at and Sattar Orangi, The Strives for the Freedom of Women,
March 13, 2008. 7. A Ashfar, The Positive Force of Terrorism,
October 10, 2006. 8. See MKO and Massacre of Kurd and Turkmen
Iraqis, April 19, 2006. 9. See "US Policy
Options for Iran", prepared by the Iran Policy
Committee (IPC), page 7. 10. For more details
on the MEK's political activities in Washington,
DC see Ali Reza Jafarzadeh, Front Man for the MEK and NCRI in
Washington, February 2004.
Chris
Zambelis is an associate with Helios Global,
Inc, an international political and security risk
analysis and management firm based in the
Washington, DC area. He specializes in Middle East
politics. He is a regular contributor to a number
of publications, where he writes on Middle East
politics, international terrorism, and related
issues. He has extensive international experience,
including living and working in the Middle East,
East Europe and the former Yugoslavia, and Latin
America. He is a graduate of New York University
and holds an MS in Foreign Service from Georgetown
University. The opinions expressed here are the
author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the
position of Helios Global, Inc. He can be reached
at czambelis@heliosglobalinc.com
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