Alarm spreads over Turkey's troubles
By M K Bhadrakumar
The Turkish constitutional court's verdict last Thursday overturning the
attempt by the government in Ankara to create a legal basis to lift the ban on
women wearing headscarves from attending universities, sets the stage for a
battle royal between the ruling party of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and Turkey's secular elite comprising the judiciary, military and the
"Kemalists".
Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is fighting a last-ditch battle
for survival within a year of its dramatic victory in last July's parliamentary
elections in which it secured an unprecedented 40% of the votes polled.
According to top political commentator Ilnur Cevik, "What we see in Turkey is a
coup attempt spearheaded by the judiciary and supported by the elite
secularist groups." Cevik forewarned a few weeks ago, "In recent times [in
Turkey] military coups have been replaced by post-modern interventions where
certain elite civilian groups are encouraged to challenge the elected
government and parliament and impose their will on the nation."
But what is unfolding cannot be viewed merely as political skullduggery.
Profound issues are involved. The heart of the matter is whether the brand of
political Islam practiced by the AKP will be allowed to function within the
four walls of democratic principles and transform gradually, incrementally, as
a progressive force rather than being forced into the entrapment of radicalism.
The outcome of the struggle will be keenly watched in the Middle East and
wherever observant Muslims agonize over the state and religion. Needless to
say, growing political instability in Turkey will have massive international
repercussions at a time when the standoff between the US and Israel on one side
and Iran is nearing a fateful climax in the coming months.
It seemed for a fleeting moment that last year's elections in Turkey would lead
to engendering a balance between Islam, democracy, secularism and modernity.
The AKP secured its mandate as a party of religiously observant people and as a
party of the "average Turk" (to quote Erdogan), rather than as a party rooted
in Islam.
The AKP insisted that its principal mission lay in integrating different
sections of society as a movement dedicated to "socializing" secularism. The
AKP challenged Turkey's brand of militant secularism as a one-dimensional
concept, which the Kemalists in Turkey uphold as the final stage of their
society's intellectual and organizational evolution. The AKP maintained that
Turkey should not remain transfixed and must instead move in consonance with
modern democratic societies' understanding of libertarian secularism, which
provides scope for the cohabitation of individuals with different beliefs and
lifestyles in society.
The AKP's contention is that secularism cannot be projected as an alternative
to religion, as it is not the individual but the state that is secular.
Arguably, this approach is not quite at odds with the European-inspired secular
nationalism that provided the ideological underpinning for the Anglo-French
system of states in the Middle East that came about after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire in 1918.
But what is at issue is the reality that the nationalist regimes in the region
- including in Turkey - have increasingly lost their political legitimacy in
the past few decades, which in turn created a vacuum that Islamism increasingly
strove to fill in. The discredited secularist camp is unable to meet the
challenge of Islamism, which has shown tremendous skill in integrating
socio-economic grievances, couching it in appealing revolutionary idiom and
giving it the coloring of anti-Western nationalism that is widespread in the
region.
To be sure, the post-September 11, 2001, world politics and the
"Islamo-fascism" that the US and Britain insisted be at the core of the "war on
terror", provided much boost to the platform of political Islam. Simply put,
the Islamist forces are frontally challenging the established currency of
political power.
By resorting to populist methods such as forming neighborhood groups and by
their sheer ability to master the media, especially television, they have
reached out to large audiences to mobilize Muslim masses. In principle,
political systems, in order to be secular, need not ban religious parties.
Countries such as India, Israel and Germany have allowed an inclusive political
system that allows participation by religion or sect-based parties. The
yardstick ought to be that parties such as the AKP ought to abide by strong
norms of non-violent resolution of political differences. And as long as
parties exist, such as the AKP, which are committed to democratic principles
and which secure a mandate from the people to rule, they must be allowed to
rule - and to integrate into the system.
Thus, there can be no two opinions that the AKP passes the litmus test of being
a political party functioning in accordance with democratic norms. But the
catch lies elsewhere. Recent opinion polls have shown that the AKP continues to
ride a wave of popularity. In January, its rating rose to 54%. (In comparison,
the main "Kemalist" party, the Republican People's Party, or CHP, has a rating
of about 20%.)
The economy and political stability have been key factors of the AKP's
continuing popularity. Clearly, as Turkish columnist Tahya Akyol of the liberal
Milliyet newspaper wrote recently, "CHP isn't greatly influenced by social
developments. It moves around a stable and constant vote basis ... The AKP's
high but unsteady support shows its sensitivity to social trends. The fact that
CHP support is low but stable shows that it isn't so affected. So, millions of
small businesses, farmers and unemployed people have problems, and calls for
democratization in society are rising, but these millions of people don't see
an alternative [to AKP] in the CHP ... It [CHP] isn't a party of social needs,
but an elitist and ideological one.
"The CHP's elitist and ideological structure, inflexible and insensitive to
social requests, keeps it from being a mass party of average Turks ... An
average Turk rejects a theocratic state, but wants respect for religion;
believes in democratic secularism, but wants the headscarf ban to be lifted;
and places importance on a non-problematic course of things. Obviously, this
Turk usually votes for the AKP, to which there is no alternative because
unfortunately we lack a social democratic party supported by millions of
average citizens from the whole of Turkey."
Significantly, the Turkish military leadership has lost no time in endorsing
last Thursday's ruling by the constitutional court. The military leadership has
kept a low profile since the AKP's massive electoral showing in last July's
polls.
Last week, it lifted its head above the parapet. The military supremo, Chief of
Staff General Mehmet Yasar Buyukanit, has regained his lost elan. He thundered,
"The Turkish republic is the only country in the Islamic world with a secular
structure. There are those who want to destroy Turkey's secular structure or
attach epithets to the country's name. The judicial bodies will never allow
this to happen. There is no power strong enough to overthrow the republic and
its fundamental principles."
The general was condemning any foreigner who would dare visualize Turkey as a
"moderate Islamic" country. He added, "Turkey is a secular, democratic, social
state ruled by law. It is impossible to change these characteristics. This is
not a comment; it is statement of the obvious."
Last Thursday's ruling is bad news for Erdogan. A separate case filed by the
public prosecutor is pending, which brands the AKP for its anti-secular
behavior and forbids 71 of its prominent leaders - including Erdogan and
President Abdullah Gul - to be members of any political party for a five-year
period. Most Turkish observers visualize that Thursday's verdict makes the
court's closure of the AKP a foregone conclusion. (The court's verdict is
expected by September or October.) Turkish authorities have a long tradition of
banning political parties. There have been more than 20 such instances in the
past.
But the AKP's closure would have serious implications. The fact remains that
the AKP is the only truly national party in Turkish politics. And, despite
whatever aberrations of political conduct in recent months, Erdogan still
remains an immensely charismatic politician. His only "fault" has been that he
has led a movement that poses a serious threat to the entrenched elites who
pass as "Kemalists" and self-styled torchbearers of Kemal Ataturk's legacy as
the founder of the modern Turkish state.
True to past practice by banned political parties, the AKP in all probability
could always re-emerge under a different banner. Erdogan, even if banned from
active politics, might still remain an influential player on the political
chessboard. But that isn't the whole point. Turkey loses heavily. Its image
takes a beating internationally. Ankara's claim to European Union membership
almost certainly would suffer. The mainstream forces of Islamism that are
moderate - be it in the Levant or in Palestine or Egypt - would draw
conclusions about the limits to inclusive participation that democratic life
offers.
Israel and its neo-conservative supporters in the US might heave a sigh of
relief that the AKP government is at long last removed from the region's
political landscape. They watched with abhorrence Turkey's re-entry under the
AKP's stewardship into the Muslim world. Turkey's growing closeness to Iran,
its openness towards Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, its rapport
with Syria - all these were anathema to Israel.
The sense of relief in the neo-conservative camp in the US is palpable. Michael
Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute sees Erdogan as less an "aggrieved
democrat" and more as a "protege" of Russian Prime Minister (and
ex-president)Vladimir Putin, who has widened the gap between Islam and the West
"by encouraging the most virulent anti-American and anti-Semitic conspiracy
theories".
The problem, evidently, has to do with the Erdogan phenomenon. What do you do
when someone with extraordinary political acumen like Erdogan appears as the
figurehead of Islamism, and you have not even a remote match for him? The
despair is apparent in Rubin's words. He offers a useful guideline for the
Middle East's democratic charter: "Electoral success should never put
politicians above the rule of law. That Mr Erdogan won 47% in the last election
heightens the tragedy, but should not buy immunity ... Mr Erdogan may aspire to
be Mr Putin, but he should neither have US nor European support for his
ambitions."
Israel will invariably agree with Rubin - especially as it ratchets up
belligerence toward Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Yet, the million-dollar question
is what Democratic Senator Barack Obama, if elected US president, will think of
charismatic Muslim statesmen like Turkey's Erdogan.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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