Nuclear find raises the ante against Iran
By Ehsan Ahrari
If the world had any doubts that the genie of advanced nuclear weapons
proliferation was out of the bottle, those doubts have been removed by a report
that American and international investigators have found the electronic
blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon on computers that belonged to the
nuclear smuggling network run by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program, Abdul Qadeer Khan.
What is not yet known is whether Iran or other countries have purchased that
blueprint from the nuclear smuggling network. The United States-led pressure on
Iran, the 21st century version of "nuclear brinkmanship", is likely to be
further intensified as a
result of this new disclosure.
The US is an old practitioner of nuclear brinkmanship, a term coined by
president Dwight D Eisenhower's secretary of state John Foster Dulles. Under
this practice of diplomacy, pressure tactics and ambiguous threats to use
nuclear weapons - short of firing a nuclear weapon - were used to bring about
results to America's liking. Its detractors called this exercise pushing a
dangerous situation to the brink of disaster. British philosopher Bertrand
Russell likened it to a "game of chicken", whereby one party is forced to
"chicken out".
In a similar situation, the administrations of presidents Bill Clinton and
George W Bush exercised more of a policy of carrots and sticks than of nuclear
brinkmanship against North Korea. The chief reason for that was a general
understanding that Kim Jong-il already possessed nuclear weapons.
In the case of Iran, the nuanced use of carrot and stick is intermittently
present, with a constant and unambiguous iteration of the mantra that all
options are on the table. That, in essence, is what America's nuclear
brinkmanship against Iran is all about.
The new report regarding the availability of nuclear weapons design promises an
intensification of that brinkmanship. The chief reason is the fact that the
Bush administration's clock is ticking. It seems to be working under
self-induced pressure (and constant urging from Israel) to take military action
against Iran before its term runs out by at the end of the year.
The latest report about the global availability of nuclear design, even if it
has not triggered loud alarm bells, has certainly captured the world's
attention. The recently discovered blueprints resemble a nuclear weapon
developed and tested by Pakistan, although Pakistani officials maintain that
Khan did not have any access to that country's nuclear design.
Khan has been under house arrest since 2004 after confessing to proliferation,
but in recent weeks he has started lobbying for his release, saying that he was
coerced by the administration of President Pervez Musharraf into taking the rap
for Pakistan.
However, there is little doubt that blueprints of nuclear weapons have been in
the possession of Libya, North Korea and even Iran. There is no confusion about
the major role played by the so-called "Khan network" of global nuclear
smuggling in the sale and dissemination of nuclear know-how.
The least-known aspects of that issue are how much the government of Pakistan
has been involved in those activities; and, more to the point, how much of that
network still maintains access to even more advanced information regarding
nuclear weapons designs.
The Pakistani government has been least cooperative in allowing the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog,
access to Khan.
Pakistan's major problem related to this issue is a serious lack of
credibility. Khan's role in providing North Korea the knowledge of nuclear
weapons design has to have at least a tacit endorsement of the government in
Islamabad. One only has to recall how much ballistic and cruise missile
technology has been transferred from North Korea to Pakistan in the past. The
least Pakistan could have done, in return, was to pass on to the North Koreans
the bomb designs and advanced centrifuges. This type of nuclear quid pro quo
has been around for a long time among countries that have mastered nuclear
weapons technology.
The US lent a helping hand to Britain and to France in their emergence as
nuclear weapons states in the 1940s and 1950s. France played a crucial role in
the highly secretive nuclear weaponization of Israel in the 1960s. Israel, in
turn, had a clandestine role in the nuclear weaponization of the former
apartheid government of South Africa. Happily, South Africa abandoned its
nuclear weapons program before handing over political power to the African
majority. Libya also gave up its nuclear program.
The American concern is that Iran has already acquired advanced knowledge of
nuclear weaponization and would suddenly, as North Korea did in February 2005,
declare that it possessed nuclear weapons.
That is one reason the Bush administration has intensified its nuclear
brinkmanship on Iran during Bush's so-called farewell tour of Europe. During
that tour, the US has let the world know that it has established a bilateral
front of nuclear brinkmanship with France against Iran. For now, the focus of
that activity is the issuing of further economic sanctions. However, the threat
of the use of force is going to be repeated with purposeful ambiguity.
So, from Iran's point of view, this new disclosure of dissemination of nuclear
weapons design has come at a very inappropriate time. The fact that the
technological information about bomb designs significantly shortens the time
needed to build the weapons has pretty much nullified previous US intelligence
reports that Iran might be 10 or more years away from developing nuclear
weapons.
What should also be kept in mind is that similar types of estimates were
bandied about regarding Iraq's development of nuclear weapons during the early
1990s. Then it was found that Saddam Hussein was considerably closer to
developing those weapons than was widely reported.
The general expectations are that the Iranian leaders are not likely to cease
their nuclear research program - they have repeatedly asserted their right
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium.
It is a matter of conjecture whether the Bush administration will take the
decision of limited military action against Iran within the next few weeks or
months, thereby forcing its successor to commit strongly to remaining in Iraq.
The advantages for the lone superpower of not blinking against Iran - an
important tactic of nuclear brinkmanship of the 1950s - are not in doubt. The
US has an enormous military superiority over Iran, however, there is no doubt
that, if attacked, Iran would launch its asymmetric war against the US troops
in Iraq and against Israel, which remains the foremost cheerleader for
attacking Iran before Bush's time in office runs out.
In the realm of asymmetric warfare, Iran might have some unknown advantages
against the US. But the exercise of brinkmanship by a nuclear weapons state
against a non-nuclear power is certainly not likely to make west Asia a stable
region any time soon.
Ehsan Ahrari is professor of Security Studies (Counterterrorism) at the
Asia-Pacific Center of Security Studies. Views expressed in this essay are
strictly private and do not reflect those of the APCSS, the United States
Pacific Command, or any other agency of the US government.
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