Syria basks in diplomatic breakthrough
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - "Our telephone number is 202-456-1414. When you are serious about
peace, call us." These were the words of former United States secretary of
state James Baker in June 1990 when he suspended dialogue with Yasser Arafat,
claiming the Palestine Liberation Organization was still committed to armed war
with Israel and thereby not interested in peace.
In 1991, the Americans insisted on bypassing Arafat during the Madrid peace
conference, to punish him for his support of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, right after
the invasion of Kuwait. When talks started in Washington - then Oslo - however,
the Americans realized there could be no peace without Arafat's participation.
That is why they had no choice but to dial his number when they wanted somebody
to make the historical handshake on the White House lawn with Israeli prime
minister Yitzhak Rabin in
September 1993. Arafat waited for nearly two years - almost in the dark - but
in the end got things done - his way.
In similar fashion, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad got things done - his way
- first in Doha in May and now in Paris at the weekend. In a series of meetings
at a "Mediterranean" conference, Assad resumed diplomatic ties with Lebanon,
continuing the trend started with indirect talks through Turkey with
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Assad also made it clear that Damascus is
central to solving problems in the Middle East. He also helped launch the Union
for the Mediterranean with more than 40 other heads of state and government.
In April 2005, relations soured with Lebanon as the Syrian army packed up and
left, implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, under the
watchful eye of the United States and France. Relations also deteriorated
between Damascus and then-president Jacques Chirac, who put his full weight
behind a UN probe that tried to implicate Syrian officials in the assassination
of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri.
Then came the Israeli incursion into Lebanon of 2006 in which Syria was accused
of funding and arming the Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon with the aim of carrying
out a proxy war on Israel, at the expense of Lebanon. All of this was in
addition to the numerous assassinations that took place in Beirut, in which
several prominent Lebanese figures were gunned down and accusations were again
pointed against Syria.
Right after the war, which saw Israel withdraw after 33 days, Shi'ite lawmakers
walked out on Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora (much to the pleasure of Syria),
making his cabinet illegitimate and sparking a constitutional crisis that
turned political - then military - in May this year.
Syria's friends took to the streets of Beirut, disarmed armed men loyal to
anti-Syrian statesman Saad al-Hariri, and forced the international community
into a new reasoning: we cannot get anything done in Lebanon without the
Syrians. Neither the Syrian Accountability Act, nor resolution 1559 - and not
even the Mehlis Report [1] - were able to break Syria's power base in Lebanon,
which mainly includes Hezbollah, Amal and several Sunni and Christian
heavyweights not amused with the hegemony of power practiced by the Hariri team
over Beirut's politics.
An argument that repeated itself since 2005 was that Syria had the ability to
destabilize Lebanon; then came the realization that those who can destabilize
can also - logically - stabilize.
Three years ago, the entire world was on the verge of telling Syria what Baker
told Arafat in 1990, "When you are serious about peace (or in this case
Lebanon), call us. " They felt that Syria was bluffing - waving a friendly hand
on one side - and carrying a rifle in the other. Syria's support for Hamas in
Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, its friendship with Iran, and its loud
criticism of the US occupation in Iraq, all contributed to the international
perception of Syria in 2005-2007.
Matters began shifting in Syria's favor after the Israeli war on Lebanon in
2006. The Europeans - more so than the United States - realized that
"isolating" Syria had led nowhere, except to empower groups like Hezbollah and
Hamas. If anything constructive was going to be done in the Middle East with
regard to Arab-Israeli peace, it needed to include the Syrians.
The US-imposed isolation began crumbling when Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel
Angel Moratinos visited Syria in 2006, right after the end of the Lebanon War,
followed by Javier Solana, the European Union's chief foreign policy
negotiator, in March 2007. Solana offered the Syrians a series of economic
incentives, including the signing of the EU Partnership Agreement, in exchange
to finding a solution to the crisis in Lebanon.
Seemingly, the perception of Syria started to change, from problem-maker to
problem-solver. Among other things, it was reasoned that getting rid of
Hezbollah through military force was impossible - as Israel found out in 2006.
Israel clearly could not do it, and nor could UN Resolution 1701, which
distanced the Lebanese group from Lebanon's border with Israel. The only way
was to get the Syrians to cooperate on changing Hezbollah's behavior, either
directly through their considerable weight in Lebanon, or indirectly through
Iran.
Syria, for example, helped release the 15 British sailors taken hostage by Iran
in 2007, and also helped release BBC reporter Alan Johnston from the hands of
an Islamic group that was reportedly close to Hamas in Palestine. Syrian
cooperation on Iraq and Palestine paid off, but the real breakthrough came at
the weekend when Syria started indirect peace talks with Israel, and helped
solve the crisis in Lebanon. The time difference between both events was no
more than five minutes.
The fact that Syria was willing to enter into indirect talks with Israel -
under the auspices of a world-recognized honest broker like Turkey - was proof
that the Syrians were not as bad as the world had thought since 2003. Before
that, the Syrians had gone to the Annapolis peace conference in the US in 2007,
despite objections from allies like Hamas and Iran, aimed at showing the
Americans that they were in fact serious about finding solutions to the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Annapolis is actually what got the Americans to refrain from vetoing the
Syrian-Israeli talks, since prior to 2007 the George W Bush White House had
shown absolutely no interest in re-activating the Syrian-Israeli peace track,
which had been dormant since 1999.
Decision-makers in Paris were meanwhile watching the developments in Syria with
interest. It is no secret that, unlike the Americans, the French cared more
about Syrian cooperation in Lebanon, than Iraq. They even complain, as one
statesman put it, that the Americans "wake up very enthusiastic about Lebanon,
with loud words in favor of solutions in Beirut. By midday, so many other
foreign policy issues swamp their agenda that Lebanon drops to 10th in
priority."
The Syrians realized this early on, and capitalized on Franco-American
differences towards the Middle East. The French are practical when it comes to
Lebanon; they want solutions, regardless of how they are reached, and who is
involved in reaching them, whether it is Hezbollah, Syria or Iran. They
departed from Bush's earlier strategy of not talking to Hezbollah by inviting
all Lebanese statesmen to a resort near Paris, including members of the Shi'ite
group. French President Nicolas Sarkozy promised to re-engage the Syrians once
a solution was reached in the presidential vacuum in Lebanon. If it meant
departing from American dictates in Lebanon, then so be it.
From France's perspective, in the past two months the following has been
achieved:
The election of a president for Lebanon, after a vacuum that had existed since
November 2007. France - the former colonial power in Lebanon - remains very
much committed to Lebanon and was sincerely worried about Lebanese affairs,
unlike the Americans, who used Lebanon for political reasons to achieve other
ends (like Iraq) since 2005.
French credibility was restored in the eyes of ordinary Lebanese - even the
Shi'ites among them - thanks to Sarkozy's even-handed policy of standing at
arm's length from all parties and talking with everyone - Hezbollah included.
The French balance in the entire Middle East was restored after things became
too personal in 2005-2007, due to Chirac's links with the Hariri family. France
now returns to Syria, both politically, culturally and economically. One
immediate result of the rapprochement is a contract for a French firm to build
two cement factories in Syria, worth US$1.2 billion. Another is serious talk
about granting a French firm the right to construct a metro in Damascus.
From the Syrian perspective, the following are important:
Syria sidelined all of the anti-Syrian candidates running for the presidency
and secured the election of Michel Suleiman, a man who is a friend of both
Damascus and Hezbollah. It got its way when saying that it would not allow an
anti-Syrian statesman to become the new master of the Baabda presidential
palace. Suleiman is a staunch supporter of resisting Israel and will not
tolerate any force being used to disarm Hezbollah. He is also a non-sectarian
figure who believes in excellent relations with Syria and is on the payroll of
neither the Americans nor the Saudis.
Greater representation has been given to the Hezbollah-led opposition in the
30-seat cabinet created by Siniora this weekend. They received 11 seats -
thereby granting them veto power to obstruct any anti-Hezbollah legislation
pushed for by the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition of political parties.
Hezbollah got three portfolios - but only one will be occupied by an actual
Hezbollah member - Labor Minister Mohammad Fneish.
Syria patched up with France without having to change a single policy it had
been preaching since 2005. Nor did the Syrians have to make any concession with
regard to Lebanon, such as cuddling up to Siniora or March 14, or working
against Hezbollah's interests, or abandoning Iran.
Speaking at a press conference with both presidents Assad and Suleiman, Sarkozy
announced that both countries had taken a "historic" step and had decided to
normalize relations by opening embassies - something that has not happened
since the countries received their independence from the French during World
War II.
These are good days for Syria. They feel confident that the dark clouds of 2005
are gone and that the future is in their hands; they waited for Chirac to leave
the Elysee in 2007, and it has paid off. They are now waiting for Bush to leave
the White House in 2009.
Note
1. The Mehlis Report was the result of the United Nations' investigation into
the February 14, 2005, assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafik
Hariri. The investigation was launched in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 1595 and headed by the German judge, Detlev Mehlis. It involved
questioning of Lebanese and Syrian officials. The final draft of the report was
released on October 20, 2005, and found that high-ranking members of the Syrian
and Lebanese governments were involved in the assassination.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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