BOOK REVIEW Fundamentalism with nuances Hamas in Politics by Joeroen Gunning
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Since the 2006 election victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the
big debate has been whether a hawkish militant movement could evolve into an
accommodative political actor. The answer could determine whether Israel and
the United States will ever allow a full-fledged Palestinian state to emerge.
As long as Tel Aviv and Washington fear Hamas taking over an independent
Palestinian state and turning it into a jihadi paradise, a final settlement
will be delayed.
In a new book based on extensive field research, British political scientist
Jeroen Gunning argues that although Hamas is self-consciously motivated by
Islamism, its practices are "confined by necessity and opportunity" (p 55). His
thesis is that Hamas is a
changing product of a dynamic environment and should not be judged as an
unmoving monolith.
Hamas was launched in 1987 as the quietist Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood's
paramilitary wing. It was a move by the Brotherhood to remain politically
relevant when radicalization was becoming the norm under the first Intifada.
Hamas outgrew its creators and soon became the central Islamist player by
virtue of sound grassroots organization and deft relationships with donors in
the Gulf Arab states. Its heterogeneous and decentralized structure, with an
internal leadership separated from an external leadership, helped expand
following from wide sections of Palestinian society.
From 1992, Hamas began repeatedly defeating the dominant Palestine Liberation
Organization faction of Fatah in student and professional union elections. The
installation of a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) after the Oslo peace
accords changed the balance of power by granting state apparatus and foreign
sponsorship to Yasser Arafat's coterie. One factor influencing Hamas' decision
to continue armed struggle against Israel despite Oslo was its rivalry with
Fatah. The wave of Hamas suicide bombings on Israeli targets in the mid-1990s
was not just an expression of fanatical resistance but also of
intra-Palestinian tussles for power.
By the new millennium, public disillusionment with Oslo and the PA's misrule
discredited Fatah and gave fresh legitimacy to Hamas' inveterate hostility for
Israel. Hamas' fortunes also soared due to the long-term growth in the size of
the Palestinian lower-middle and middle classes, who resented the PA's
nepotistic grip on business opportunities.
In the book's early chapters, Gunning parses through Hamas' political
philosophy. One core belief in the movement is that a genuine Islamic state
cannot be imposed by force but must be willed by a clear majority of the
people. To achieve this endpoint, Hamas advocates "education" and
"socialization" through a network of charities, mosques, orphanages and
schools. Gunning notes the tension between respecting popular will and seeking
to "prepare society" into wishing for an Islamic state. By presuming to know
what is in the best interests of the masses, Hamas' vision carries the dangers
of "forcing people to be free". (p 91)
Other paradoxes lie in Hamas' endorsement of "free will" for all human beings,
but with the rider that they must submit themselves to God's will by obeying
the sharia. Political leaders are expected to ensure that people behave in
accordance with God's laws, but rulers have to first win the consent of the
ruled through free nation-wide elections. Gunning remarks that Hamas' ideal
political system is "neither a theocracy nor a democracy but a hybrid" that
contains echoes of Western social contract theories. He contrasts it with the
models of Takfiri jihadi outfits like al-Qaeda, which see no need for elected
legislatures.
Breaking with the dominant theme in Islamic jurisprudence, Hamas refrains from
insisting that legislators be qualified religious experts. The vast majority of
its current municipal councilors and legislators are secular professionals.
Hamas' proposed legislature in an Islamic state would have no authority to pass
fatwas (rulings) and no automatic seating for religious scholars. The movement
also rejects Iran-style vetting of candidates for elections by a religious
tribunal.
Hamas' internal organizational structure is consistent with its ideology. The
elected shura (council) is its highest legislative body. Not even
charismatic leaders like Ahmad Yassin, Abd al-Rantisi or Khalid Mish'al can
overturn the council's collective will. In Hamas' collegial leadership culture,
grooming family members for political succession is condemned. Consensual
leadership prevents splits in the organization but also militates against
flexible decision making.
Gunning observes a widespread practice of Hamas' upper echelons nominating
candidates for organizational positions. Since party bigwigs limit the choice
of candidates, there is no free and open competition for posts. On sensitive
subjects such as whether or not to recognize Israel, enormous pressure is
exercised on members to conform to the dominant view. Even if the dissenting
position represents the majority view of grassroots members, the demand for
Islamic unity is used to enforce compliance. Gunning refers to this strategy as
"symbolic violence".
The ability to inflict violence against Israelis is an important source of
legitimacy for Hamas as an organization and for its individual commanders.
However, Hamas rarely resorts to internal violence to discipline its members or
settle their disputes. Few schisms have sundered Hamas compared to Fatah
because of the former's explicit emphasis on Islamic fraternity and
selflessness.
In the 2004-2006 municipal and legislative elections, Hamas fared particularly
well in urban areas and refugee camps where Islamism had greater resonance and
traditional clan intermediaries were weak. It campaigned on a platform of
anti-corruption, religiosity and security, issues shown by surveys to be
voters' main concerns. By shrewdly catering to the winds of public opinion, it
outdid the clueless Fatah.
Gunning's crucial deduction is that if elections are held regularly, Hamas is
likely to pay heed to shifts in the popular mood and compromise on a few
principles. For instance, Hamas' take on the status of women progressed over
time from arch conservative to active encouragement of female political
participation. In 2006, Hamas played down its "destruction of Israel" goals and
did not field al-Qassam fighters as candidates to avoid alienating undecided
voters wedded to a two-state solution. Concerns over losing mass popularity
also constrained Hamas from elevating its skirmishes with Fatah into a civil
war (fitnah).
Hamas' rhetorical opposition to the peace process with Israel has been
implacable. However, it intermittently refrained from attacking Israeli targets
in 1996 and again since early 2005. In February 2007, it went so far as to
agree to "respect" past pacts between the PLO and Israel. Gunning explains
these puzzling actions as not only tactical concessions to gain relief from
Israel's targeted assassinations but also as deference to Palestinian public
opinion.
Unlike during the 1990s, Hamas today cannot afford to be seen as blatantly
contradicting the popular will, since its dependence on winning elections has
increased. Its 2003, 2005 and 2008, its ceasefires with Israel were propelled
by major shifts in public opinion in favor of halting violence. Yet, Gunning
sees an unresolved internecine tug-of-war within Hamas between "pragmatists"
(Gaza based politicians) and "absolutists" (paramilitary leaders and refugees).
The latter category is not amenable to the vagaries of public opinion and is
more steadfast on the vow of relentless jihad.
The 1996 waves of suicide bombings, for example, were spanners thrown by the
"absolutist" external leadership to disrupt rapprochement between the
"pragmatic" internal leadership and the PA. According to Gunning, the
"pragmatists" need incentives to keep Hamas on the path of compromise, but
Israel and the US have lately been doing everything that strengthens the
"absolutists".
Gunning concludes the book with an assessment of Hamas' contribution to
democratization of Palestinian politics. Its constituency of lower-middle
classes and its participatory internal practices are conducive to democracy.
But its parallel armed forces and welfare structures are impediments to
realizing an impartial state with high capacity and low coercion. Its
involvement in vicious inter-factional violence against Fatah also severely
undermines democratic processes.
Gunning runs a fine-toothed comb through the nuances of Hamas' fundamentalism
but does not discuss whether it has the yen to demilitarize state and society
in an independent Palestine, whenever it is born. He does not consider if Hamas
has been complicit with Fatah in silencing non-violent projects and streams in
Palestinian thought. As Hamas morphs from an opposition faction into a ruling
party, how liberal will it be towards a civil society that is critical of
authorities? Hamas is certainly responsive to majority public opinion for the
sake of votes, but does it have the eclecticism to defend minority standpoints?
Reports of serious rights abuses in Gaza are warning shots that alternative
voices may not find space in a future dispensation under Hamas. Gunning
convinces that some Hamas elements are interested in a deal with Israel, but he
leaves a haze around how the movement will deal with its own people.
Hamas in Politics. Democracy, Religion, Violence by Joeroen Gunning.
Columbia University Press, New York, 2008. ISBN: 978-1-85065-876-4. Price U$$
34.50, 310 pages.
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From 1992, Hamas began repeatedly defeating the dominant Palestine Liberation
Organization faction of Fatah in student and professional union elections. The
installation of a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) after the Oslo peace
accords changed the balance of power by granting state apparatus and foreign
sponsorship to Yasser Arafat's coterie. One factor influencing Hamas' decision
to continue armed struggle against Israel despite Oslo was its rivalry with
Fatah. The wave of Hamas suicide bombings on Israeli targets in the mid-1990s
was not just an expression of fanatical resistance but also of
intra-Palestinian tussles for power.
