NEW YORK - In his new book on the covert history of Iran's 1979 Islamic
Revolution, award-winning journalist Roozbeh Mirebrahimi says that Western
powers, including the United States, accelerated events by recognizing and
supporting religious revolutionary forces, forcing the shah to leave the
country and averting a coup by Iran's army.
In 1953, the United States had deposed the popular government of prime minister
Mohammed Mosaddeq and his cabinet via a Central Intelligence Agency-backed
coup. Anti-communist civilians and army officers supported the coup.
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's second departure from Iran, almost a month before
the victory of the revolution in February
1979, had dramatically raised concerns among the leaders of the revolution that
Washington would try to stage another coup to bring back the shah, who had fled
to the United States. However, diplomats who were at the center of events say
that an accommodation was reached between Western countries and Iran's Islamic
clergy.
In an interview with Inter Press Service correspondent Omid Memarian,
Mirebrahimi said that the role of the West in facilitating the revolution has
been largely ignored, particularly by the Iranian government itself. His
Farsi-language book, Untold Aspects of the Iranian Revolution (Khazaran,
2008) is based on an extensive interview with Abbas Amir-Entezam, the spokesman
and deputy prime minister in the interim cabinet of Mehdi Bazargan in 1979.
Amir-Entezam, now Iran's longest-serving political prisoner, was an ambassador
to Scandinavian countries during the hostage crisis at the US Embassy. He was
accused of spying for the US, arrested and sentenced to death in 1981. This was
later reduced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Critics suggest
the charges were retaliation against his early opposition to theocratic
government in Iran.
Inter Press Service: There are rumors of a meeting between the
French president's representative and Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris, prior to the
revolution. What was the significance of this meeting?
Roozbeh Mirebrahimi: While Khomeini was in exile in
Neauphle-le-Chateau near Paris and leading the revolution, he was asked by the
current world powers to meet and to have a dialogue. He raised some demands,
including the shah's removal from Iran and help in avoiding a coup by the
Iranian Army. On the other side of the table, the Western powers had certain
demands too. They were worried about the Soviet Union's empowerment and
penetration and a disruption in Iran's oil supply to the West. Khomeini gave
the necessary guarantees. These meetings and contacts were taking place in
January of 1979, just a few days before the Islamic Revolution in February
1979.
IPS: What made these same Western countries turn against Khomeini
and others just months after 1979 Revolution?
RM: Western powers had been monitoring the political and social
changes inside Iran for a long time. They had been trying to understand the
internal changes in Iran through the forces they had in Iran or the people they
would send to Iran, such as [former US attorney general] Ramsey Clark. They had
realized that Iranian society was on the verge of a fundamental change. They
chose to accommodate this change. After recognizing the opposition groups, they
facilitated them with opportunities such as media coverage. Through this
action, changes accelerated with an unexpected speed. In the next stage, in
order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of these changes,
amongst all existing opposition groups they chose the religious forces to stand
against communism, which was anti-religion by nature.
IPS: But why after the revolution did they turn against them?
RM: I would say because of the revolutionary atmosphere inside
Iran and actions of the empowered radicals, this relationship faced challenges.
IPS: Why did US officials trust Ayatollah Khomeini enough to
negotiate with him?
RM: [William H] Sullivan, the US ambassador to Iran, was keeping
a very close watch over Iran's internal affairs and analyzing all the
developments. All the army and military affairs, all the macro-level decisions
and reactions by the shah's regime, all the activities of the religious forces,
activities of the communists, and all other revolutionary forces were monitored
by him. According to documents and books published in the United States and
other Western countries, around September 1978, four months before the
revolution, it was clear that the shah could no longer stay, and that they
should be looking for a way to reach an agreement with the opposition. All the
contacts and dialogues picked up pace during this time. The religious forces
that were surrounding Khomeini at the time were people like Yazdi, Bazargan,
Bani Sadr, Ghotbzadeh or among the clergy, people like Beheshti and Motahhari
... They were educated and relatively technocratic and the West felt that they
could rely on them. After the revolution, this trust and relationship remained
intact until the invasion of the US Embassy.
IPS: Why did the hostage-taking occur at a time when the new
government under Ayatollah Khomeini had a normal relationship with the US?
RM: Ayatollah Khomeini was opposed to radical actions such as
invading the US Embassy. For example, this was not the first time the US
Embassy was occupied. Right around those early days of the revolution, during
the first 10 days, the US Embassy was occupied for the first time by the
leftist forces such as Khalgh and other parallel forces, but this received a
very strong reaction from Ayatollah Khomeini who sent Ebrahim Yazdi to the
embassy to get the revolutionary occupiers out of there. During the second
incident, Khomeini was caught off-guard after the incident had already taken
place. Pressure by the radicals at that time caused Khomeini to react by
standing behind it. That incident caused Prime Minister Bazargan to resign.
Prior to this incident, the relationship of the new government with the West
was still quite normal. We should not forget that exactly one day after the
revolution, the United States officially recognized the new government.
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