US too much in the dark for
Iran strike
By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON - A military attack on Iran's major nuclear facilities by the United
States or Israel would likely result only in a delay - and not a particularly
significant one at that - in Tehran's ability to produce the fuel necessary to
build a nuclear weapon, according to a report released on Friday by an
influential think-tank on nuclear proliferation issues.
The 15-page report by the Institute for Science and International Security
(ISIS) concludes that too much is unknown about Tehran's entire program for
enriching uranium and how quickly it can be reconstituted if its major known
facilities were destroyed in such an attack.
"Without such information, an attack is unlikely to significantly
delay Iran's mastery of enrichment with gas centrifuges" that can eventually be
used to produce a nuclear bomb, the report said. Iran has long denied that its
nuclear programme is designed for that purpose, insisting that it is aimed
exclusively at producing nuclear power for civilian use.
"Iran's decision to disperse and keep secret several of its key sites further
hinders the development of a full picture of its centrifuge complex," according
to the report. "Considering the modular, replicable nature of centrifuge
plants, we conclude that an attack on Iran's nuclear program is unlikely to
significantly degrade Iran's ability to reconstitute its gas centrifuge
program."
Moreover, according to the report, the downsides of such an attack - including
the possibility that it would lead to a general war spilling beyond the borders
of Iran itself - suggest that the military option should be taken off the
table, particularly because the continuing threat of military action by the US
and Israel makes it less likely that Tehran will accept a more stringent
inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
"An emphasis on military responses to this conflict has the effect of
discouraging Iran from allowing more effective IAEA inspections, something
necessary for the successful conclusion of a diplomatic solution to Iran's
nuclear program," the report said. "Iran is understandably concerned that more
transparency on its part could lead to the US and Israeli militaries gaining
better targeting information on its nuclear program."
The ISIS, which is headed by former IAEA weapons inspector David Albright, an
influential authority on nuclear proliferation issues here, said, "It is time
to set aside the military option and concentrate instead on credible diplomatic
approaches to end Iran's growing nuclear weapons capabilities."
The report comes amid persistent speculation that the US and Israel are
considering attacking Iran's known nuclear sites - among them, the enrichment
plants at Natanz and the Esfahan uranium conversion facility - before President
George W Bush leaves office next January.
The speculation has been largely driven by neo-conservatives and hawks with
close ties to the office of US Vice President Dick Cheney along with a number
of Israeli officials and opposition leaders who have publicly warned that if
diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment program do
not soon bear fruit, military action may be necessary to prevent Tehran from
gaining a nuclear weapon.
These same voices cite Israel's strikes against Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981
and against an alleged clandestine nuclear reactor in Syria last September as
precedents, although they concede that the challenge of destroying or at least
significantly setting back Iran's nuclear programme will be considerably more
difficult.
On a visit here at the end of last month, Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak
left a White House meeting with senior US officials insisting that Washington
is still mulling a possible attack. His visit immediately followed that of
Israel's military chief, General Gabi Ashkenazi, who reportedly argued that
preventive military action would be preferable to permitting Iran to advance
much further in its enrichment program.
The Pentagon is known to be strongly opposed to an attack, which in its view
would further destabilize a region in which already over-stretched US military
forces are fighting two wars. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Michael Mullen, reportedly conveyed that message personally to
Ashkenazi during a visit to Israel at the end of June and subsequently called
publicly for Washington to engage in "dialogue" with the Islamic Republic.
The Pentagon has been backed up by the State Department, which last month sent
its number three official, Undersecretary for Policy William Burns, to take
part in direct talks for the first time with Iran on a package of measures
designed to induce Tehran to freeze its enrichment programme. Burns was joined
by his counterparts from the four other permanent members of the UN Security
Council - Britain, France, China, and Russia - and from Germany.
The so-called "freeze for freeze" offer reportedly calls for Tehran to stop
adding centrifuges to its enrichment operations in exchange for a commitment by
the "Five Plus One" not to pursue a new round of UN Security Council sanctions
against Iran pending additional talks on a possible deal regarding Iran's
nuclear-energy program.
To date, however, Iran's response to the proposal has been ambiguous at best,
leading hawks to press for stronger action. The State Department has begun
consultations about a new sanctions resolution at the Security Council, even
while it is reportedly pushing the White House to establish an Interests
Section in Tehran.
The ISIS study stresses that the analogy drawn between Israel's previous
pre-emptive attacks on its neighbors' nuclear facilities is "grossly
misleading" and that any effort to destroy Iran's nuclear programme would
require "multiple strikes against many sites.
Due to the program's widely dispersed, relatively advanced, and hardened
facilities, not only would the attacker lack the confidence that it had set
back the programme by at least several years, but such strikes also "could
prompt Iran to hasten its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons [by] embarking on
a crash programme", almost certainly to expel IAEA inspectors, and to withdraw
from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
"Iran could then build a small centrifuge plant at a secret location capable of
producing weapons-grade uranium for one or two nuclear weapons per year," it
noted, adding that gas centrifuge plants could be hidden very effectively.
The new study is likely to bolster those in the Bush administration who favor
diplomatic engagement with Iran. Those outside the administration - including,
most recently, former national security advisers General Brent Scowcroft and
Zbigniew Brzezinski - urged the administration to take the military option off
the table and drop pre-conditions for direct talks with Tehran.
The ISIS study also comes on the heels of a much longer study for the air force
by the Rand Corporation, which concluded that US military action against Iran
was "likely to have negative effects for the United States", including the
strengthening of hardline, anti-Western, forces within Iran that would favor
retaliation.
Moreover, such an attack "would be unlikely to stop the Iranian nuclear
program," according to the 150-page Rand report. While it might set back the
economy in certain ways, the resulting increase in oil prices would enable the
government "to finance the reconstruction of the facility and continue the
current programme without major budgetary consequences", it concluded.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
