DAMASCUS - Why did Israel release Lebanese Druze militant Samir Qantar? The
man, for decades known as the "dean" of Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, had
been caught red-handed carrying out a military operation inside Israel in 1979.
Operation Naser led to the killing of five Israelis, including a child and a
31-year-old policeman. An Israeli court sentenced him to 542 years in prison
(99 years for each victim and 47 years for attacking an Israeli officer during
negotiations).
He was a big fish in Israeli jails that consecutive premiers, from Menachem
Begin to Ariel Sharon, had vowed never to release, despite the constant
requests streaming out of Lebanon. Israel suddenly changed course and freed him
in July, along with the remains of 199 Arab fighters, in exchange for the
bodies of two
Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah in 2006.
Israeli society was shocked by Qantar's release and by his welcoming as a
national hero in Lebanon by Hezbollah and even pro-Western leaders like Prime
Minister Fouad al-Siniora and parliamentary majority leader Saad al-Hariri.
When signing Qantar's pardon, President Shimon Peres said, "This is a sad day
for me and for the country. On one hand we have the most terrible murderer. On
the other hand, we have our commitment to our boys who were sent to fight for
their country. It is our moral duty and our heartfelt wish to see them come
back."
The release of Qantar means that a psychological barrier has been broken in
Israel. The fig leaf is making its last dance to the floor. With Qantar free,
anything can happen. That might explain why Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed
to release him in exchange for two dead soldiers. He wanted to accustom Israeli
society to concessions - in preparation for another big fish release - this
time, smaller in weight, than Samir Qantar.
This is the possible release of Marwan Barghouti, the charismatic head of Fatah
in the West Bank, who was convicted of killing five Israelis and sentenced to
165 years in prison (five consecutive life terms and an additional 40 years).
As Qantar is free to roam the streets of Beirut, theoretically nothing prevents
the same from happening to Barghouti in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian Minister of Prisoners' Affairs said on August 9 that Israel is
going to release 150 Arab prisoners "regardless of their political
affiliations" on August 25, in exchange for Gilad Shalit, a young Israeli
soldier taken by Hamas in 2006. This was a "goodwill gesture" to Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas.
This immediately sparked speculation that Barghouti was among those 150
prisoners.
Two Israeli families who lost members during the early stages of the
Palestinian uprising that broke out in 2000 (which Barghouti engineered)
immediately snapped by filing a US$128 million lawsuit against the former
right-hand man to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. According to the United
Arab Emirates-based al-Bayan daily, Shalit will be released in exchange for
Barghouti, along with 150 of the 450-man list presented by Hamas for the
prisoner swap.
Once Shalit arrives safe in Israel (fearing that he too might be dead just like
the two soldiers released in July), Israel will release another 300 Arab
prisoners. The deal was echoed by the mass circulation Arabic daily al-Hayat,
which is published by Saudi Arabia from London. While trying to put on a brave
face, and with maximum face-saving as possible, Israel noted that it will not
release Ahmad Saadat, the secretary general of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, who is accused of killing ex-Israeli tourism Minister
Rehavam Ze'evi. It did not say, however, that it won't release Barghouti.
The man who arrested Barghouti in 2002, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, began lobbying
for his release in late 2007. Ben-Eliezer's plan was Barghouti in exchange for
Shalit. In September 2007, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz wrote that Barghouti
would be winner number one from the Annapolis peace conference, called by
President George W Bush for November 2007. It predicted that if Annapolis
failed to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, then Abbas would clearly be
no longer able to stand as a credible negotiator because the Palestinians
neither obey nor listen to him.
Once that happened - and it already has - it was believed that both Israel and
the United States would search for alternatives in the Palestinian National
Authority. Prime on the list was Barghouti. Israeli analyst Ammon Abramovitz,
among others, was the first to speak on Israeli TV, saying that the only
solution to Abbas' incapacity to deliver was to release Barghouti, someone who
had enough legitimacy to sign a peace deal with Israel. Israelis saw him as
another Arafat, or as one person put it, "Arafat back in 1970; young, popular,
legitimate, and strong."
If Abbas tries to sign a deal, against the wishes of the Palestinians, radicals
will kill him. The story of former president Anwar Sadat of Egypt speaks
volumes of how militants act against a leader who signs an unpopular peace with
Israel: Sadat was assassinated in 1981.
In the Middle East, one needs to be a decorated war hero to sign peace accords
- like Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat or even Sadat. Ariel Sharon, a war hero in Israel,
had the legitimacy - had he wished - to sign peace and not be accused of
treason by the Israeli public. That applies neither to Abbas nor to Olmert -
after Israel's poor performance, to say the least - during the Lebanon war of
2006. Hamas could have signed peace, had it wished, in 2006. It had plenty of
war medals for leading the second Palestinian intifada in 2000. So can Marwan
Barghouti.
Last year, when speculation was raised before and during the Annapolis
conference, veteran Israeli journalist Uri Avnery wrote that Barghouti was "the
Palestinian Mandela", referring to South African anti-apartheid campaigner and
former president Nelson Mandela.
Before Ben-Eliezer made his initiative in 2007, Ariel Sharon had made a similar
offer to the Palestinians. He sent the arrested Fatah leader a message to jail
through future justice minister Haim Ramon of Kadima. Sharon asked whether if
when released from jail, Barghouti would support Hamas. Smart and pragmatic,
Barghouti said "no" and added that he would only back a moderate candidate from
Fatah for the presidency of post-Arafat Palestine. Sharon weighed the options;
either a strongman like Barghouti free to run for president - and win - or the
sure victory of Hamas in the legislative elections of the Palestinian
parliament.
Prophetically, that is what happened, but Sharon's health prevented him from
seeing it since he slipped into coma, from which he has not emerged. Hamas was
in fact elected with an overwhelming majority and this resulted in the Ismail
Haniyya cabinet, the US-led embargo on the Palestinian National Authority, the
radicalization of Palestinian politics, the militarization of the Palestinian
street, and the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza.
In 2006, veteran Israelis repeated Sharon's calls, including former minister
Yossi Belin, Kadima's M K Meir Sheetrit, and ex-prime minister (now president)
Shimon Peres. He actually campaigned on Barghouti's case, saying in January
2007 that if elected president he would pardon the Palestinian leader.
What makes the case all the more interesting is that Barghouti does not hide
his presidential ambitions. He even nominated himself for the presidency - from
behind bars - after Arafat's death in November 2004. Veteran members of Fatah
persuaded him to withdraw his candidacy in favor of Abbas (Abu Mazen). His
chances of winning - if released - are made all the more solid, thanks to the
time he has spent in Israeli jails since 2002, which elevate his already senior
standing in Palestinian society.
Barghouti is young, 25 years younger than the current Palestinian president,
born in 1959. A gifted orator (unlike Abbas) he combines the spirit of youth
and the wisdom of middle-age. Young people look up to him and have his poster
plastered on their bedroom walls. He would make a good negotiator - he speaks
fluent Hebrew, having learned it in Israeli jails in the 1970s. He knows how to
lead demonstrations when needed, a skill earned during his tenure as president
of the student body at Birzeit University.
He rose to fame with the first intifada of 1987, as a youth leader, and was
arrested then and deported to Jordan. Arafat then brought him back to
Palestine. In 1996, he legitimized the Oslo peace accords, under Arafat's
urging, by joining parliament and advocating peace with Israel. The
Palestinians like and respect him. If he tells them to sign peace - just like
Arafat did in 1993 - they will listen. Nobody will denounce him as a traitor,
or as a puppet of the Americans. Arafat used to wave his right hand in 1993 and
tell US secretary of state Warren Christopher, "See this hand? Only this hand
can sign peace with the Israelis."
That hand is no longer here, and the only "other hand" that can - and would -
work for peace, and get away with it, is that of Marwan Barghouti. So popular
is he that nobody, not even Hamas, can accuse him of treason, or falling back
on his duties towards the Palestinians.
That might explain the release of Qantar, and why a weak Mahmud Abbas might
soon begin his long march into history. He might die - be killed - or step down
to avoid going down in Palestinian textbooks as a "leader" who could deliver
neither war nor victory, nor peace to the Palestinians.
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
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