While the Islamic Republic of Iran is always careful to flaunt its independence
from the United States, its next presidential elections in March 2009 may be
decided more by the result of the US elections than any other single factor.
Iran has its own unique electoral system. Serious candidates visit Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to seek his approval to run for office. The
Supreme Leader, while not openly endorsing any candidate, will privately
encourage or discourage candidates. Candidates who are discouraged invariably
do not run for office. The candidates declare their candidacy a few months
before the election as required by the Guardian Council for the vetting of
candidates. The Guardian Council disqualifies many candidates, including all
females. The eligible candidates campaign for a few
weeks before the election. The serious candidates have already begun
approaching the Supreme Leader.
The Supreme Leader's preferred candidate, while never publicized, receives
significant support from the regime. The most important source of tangible
support is from Iran's intelligence services, the most powerful entity in the
land; and the support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps is a close
second. The support of these two entities embraces votes, access to the media
and campaign donations. The actual balloting, while not completely free from
irregularities, is quite clean by most Third World standards.
What will the Supreme Leader consider this time around in picking his favorite
candidates?
For this Iranian presidential election the landscape is unique. Three factors
dominate. First, Iran has moved ahead with its nuclear enrichment program
despite drawing several rounds of United Nations sanctions, as well as some
from the United States. President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has managed to keep Iran's
progress on course.
This success has been important for the regime in Tehran. Iran has demonstrated
its ability to withstand Western, especially US, pressures. Enrichment is a
matter of pride to a large segment of the Iranian population. The mastering of
the peaceful enrichment process affords Iran a credible deterrent against
foreign aggression. In a dangerous region, success in pushing ahead with
enrichment would point to continued support for Ahmadinejad.
The second dominant factor on the Iranian landscape is Iran's economy. Ordinary
Iranians are disappointed with the government's economic performance; they have
not seen the changes and benefits promised by Ahmadinejad. While oil prices
have reached record highs during his time of office, Iran's economic growth,
while respectable, has not been sufficient to reduce unemployment, now around
20%, while inflation exceeds 30%.
Iran's income distribution may have deteriorated over the past three-and-a-half
years. Government finances have suffered in a period that should have resulted
in large surpluses. All the while Ahmadinejad has fired technocrats from the
Ministry of Finance and at the central bank and replaced them with his cronies.
Even the Supreme Leader, and especially those close to him, has voiced his
disappointment in economic performance. Economic failure is the number one
issue for the average Iranian and it is the regime's Achilles' heal. Economic
failure would suggest a break from Ahmadinejad.
The US presidential election is the third factor that will impact the Iranian
election. While not panicked, Iran is still concerned about a US or Israeli
military strike on it. Iran is mindful of developments on its borders. Iranians
are concerned about the downward spiral of the economy and the regime sees
adverse economic developments as a threat to its very survival. To the regime
in Tehran, the next US president will cast a long shadow on developments
affecting these key areas of concern.
In Iranian eyes, one candidate, Democratic Senator Barack Obama, believes in
dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts. While the other, Republican
Senator John McCain, is belligerent and endorses the military option. The
leaders in Tehran see Ahmadinejad better positioned to tackle a president
McCain, while a total break from Ahmadinejad would afford Iran the best
opportunity for rapprochement with a president Obama. It is that clear cut.
Likely candidates
Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president and Expediency Council chairman, is
arguably the most popular politician in Iran today. The most important reason
for this popularity is that he is seen as a pragmatist and most likely to
deliver economic benefits. But he is not a candidate and his time is past.
Former president Mohammad Khatami, largely irrelevant in today's Iran, has
joined forces with Rafsanjani to endorse a common reformist candidate.
The leading candidates from the conservative camp are Ahmadinejad, Ali Akbar
Velayati - a top adviser to Ali Khamenei, and Majlis (parliament) speaker Ali
Larijani, a former chief negotiator on Iran's nuclear dossier. They are
followed by the head of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines, Mohammad
Nahavandian.
Velayati, a medical doctor and foreign minister for many years under
Rafsanjani, is the confidant of the Supreme Leader on foreign affairs. He is
also personally close to him and has the support of a number of conservative
groups, including intellectual conservatives and clerics.
Larijani has been a cabinet minister and was a presidential candidate in 2005.
He was also secretary general of the Supreme National Security Council before
falling out with Ahmadinejad. He received a PhD in Western philosophy from
Tehran University. He comes from a family of clerics and is a confidant of the
Supreme Leader. He is a darling of the hardliners, but Larijani is unlikely to
be a candidate. He only recently became speaker, a powerful post in its own
right; and in doing so he ousted a confidant and relative of the Supreme
Leader, Hadad Adel. He won't take the risk entailed in running for president so
soon after becoming speaker.
Nahavandian is a George Washington University-trained economist. He was deputy
national security advisor and head of Iran's efforts to join the World Trade
Organization - Tehran currently has observer status. Nahavandian is a close
friend of Larijani and had a falling out with Ahmadinejad soon after Larijani
quit as national security advisor in October 2007; he would enjoy Larijani's
support if he ran for president.
The two leading candidates from the reformist camp are Mohammad Ali Najafi and
Mohammad Reza Aref. Najafi is a Massachusetts Institute of Technology-trained
mathematician and former minister of education in the Rafsanjani government and
minister of planning in the Khatami government.
Aref, a Stanford-trained scientist, was first vice president under Khatami. It
is likely that Rafsanjani and Khatami will together pick one of these two
candidates to represent the reformist movement and give him their total
political and financial backing.
The other talked-about candidate is Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the current mayor
of Tehran. While he would have been classified as in the conservative camp some
time ago, he is now seen as a centrist. Qalibaf's faction did well in the last
elections for Tehran's City Council and he is positioning himself to be the
pragmatic candidate who can deliver tangible economic benefits to all Iranians.
If there is a president McCain, there will be a second term for Ahmadinejad. If
there is a president Obama, the next Iranian president will be a moderate,
soft-spoken and Western-appealing individual, one who is not weighed down by
Ahmadinejad's baggage and who can start afresh with the US and achieve
favorable results for Iran with an Obama administration. In that event, the
leader would come from Qalibaf, Najafi, Aref and Nahavandian.
The Supreme Leader and leading contenders in Iran will be watching the US
presidential results as never before.
Hossein Askari is professor of international business and international
affairs at George Washington University.
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