Ba'ath seeks showdown with Baghdad
By Pascale Combelles Siegel
The Ba'athist Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation (SCJL) has announced
that it is preparing to launch the "Battle of Baghdad". The SCJL is a coalition
of at least 22 insurgent groups headed by Izzat al-Douri, the leader of the
banned Iraqi Ba'ath Party.
The August 9 statement is the third in a series since July from the group's
"Sharia fatwa-issuing commission". In these documents, the SCJL looks beyond a
US withdrawal from Iraq and promises a final showdown with the Iraqi government
that will lead to the "liberation" of Iraq and the establishment of a new
political system.
Shift to conventional warfare
The recent SCJL statement is concise and to the point: "We have accomplished
great achievements that require, in this period, that
we change our fighting strategy and establish an army made up of our heroic
fighters in order to make this army similar to the regular armies ...
Regrettably, we cannot explain in greater detail, but the important thing is
that we are preparing our ranks to launch the battle of Baghdad against the
quislings of the occupation soon." [1]
With this brief statement, the SCJL announced changes in both tactics and
targeting. While the insurgency has relied on guerrilla tactics using small
arms in hit-and-run attacks, the SCJL proposes to shift to a more conventional
approach with a regular army capable of launching a large-scale attack for a
final "liberation" of Baghdad that will rid Iraq of the current regime and
political system.
It is not that the SCJL disparages the guerrilla tactics adopted by the
resistance; on the contrary, it states that those tactics have proved very
effective, resulting in "great achievements, negligible losses and limited
security breaches". However, it argues that as dynamics on the battlefield have
changed, the "time is now right" for a new military approach.
The SCJL also announces it will target the "Quislings of the occupation", a
reference to Norwegian prime minister Vidkun Quisling installed by the Nazis in
1942 whose name has become synonymous with collaboration. The reference to
Quisling implies that the SCJL's target is no longer the "occupation" but those
who collaborate with it and carry out its policies, namely the Iraqi government
and the Iraqi Security Force (ISF).
The SCJL's declared ambition is to overthrow the current regime and install a
new one, free of ties to the United States. This new statement suggests that
the SCJL is looking beyond a US withdrawal from Iraq and already relishing the
time when it will face a stand-alone Iraqi government, striving to be in a
position to send the current regime into oblivion.
Throughout its history, the Ba'ath Party has been accustomed to issuing
emphatic statements and using grandiose rhetoric about its capabilities and
achievements. Everyone still remembers Saddam Hussein's 1991 promise to wage a
bloody "mother of all battles" against the US-led coalition to dispirit and
crush it. [2] To an extent, the current promise might again just be built on
rhetoric and empty threats.
The performance of Saddam's military during the conventional part of the war
(March-April 2003) and the multiple divisions and fractures within the
insurgency demonstrate that it is unlikely that the SCJL will be in a position
to raise an actual effective conventional army.
A question of legitimacy
The declared intention of overthrowing the current regime, on the other hand,
should not necessarily be discounted as mere gratuitous gesticulation, as the
SCJL promises to take on a government much despised by Sunnis and install what
they view as a legitimate governing body instead.
This ambition is widely shared by many of the insurgent groups operating in
Iraq. Major groups such the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Iraqi Front for the
Islamic Resistance, the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Mujahideen Army, among
others, have declared the current government illegitimate because it stems from
the occupation.
Accordingly, all of the government's acts are considered "null and void". [3]
These groups also view the Iraqi government as having engaged in sectarian
political and physical warfare to the detriment of the Sunnis. Although no
group has called for a boycott of the next round of provincial elections
(scheduled for this coming autumn), several groups have issued strong
condemnations of the Western style of democratic governance, describing it as
being incompatible with Islamic values.
Meanwhile, current efforts to steer insurgents away from violence and into the
post-Saddam political system have yet to satisfy the Sunnis. Their strategy in
the past year was predicated on a quid pro quo arrangement.
Sunni insurgents turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and helped the coalition and
the ISF drive it out of Anbar and Baghdad provinces. In return, the Sunni
community would get significant political rewards: the Awakening (Sahwah)
councils that guard Sunni neighborhoods from al-Qaeda for a modest stipend
would be incorporated into the ISF; Sunnis would be granted more political
clout and some of the Iraqi constitution's dispositions could be renegotiated
to address Sunni concerns.
The Shi'ite-dominated Baghdad government has shown it is in no hurry to meet
any of these conditions. On the contrary, the central government has hardened
its stance against the Awakening councils, strongly hinting that it prefers to
see them disbanded.
The Ba'athists might seek to take advantage of this disgruntlement by putting
themselves in a position to exploit the growing Sunni disenchantment. To
achieve this, the SCJL will need to convince other insurgents that it does not
intend to reinstate its lost pre-eminence at the expense of other groups.
In this regard, the Ba'athist message is mixed at best. In its latest
announcement, the SCJL defines itself as the leading insurgent faction, the one
around which all other insurgent groups should coalesce. Since its inception,
the SCJL has repeatedly called for unity among all insurgent groups.
However, in this statement, the SCJL goes beyond calls for unity and
aggressively claims a prominent, some might even say domineering, position for
itself. The group declares that "the Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
... is now leading the jihadist brigades and running the faithful battalions in
order to liberate the last span of our beloved Iraq". It further claims that
the SCJL is "the only legitimate authority" entitled to deal with "the invading
infidels" and asserts, "Nobody else can negotiate with the enemy."
The danger in asserting leadership
The SCJL's denial that it is seeking superiority over other groups will do
little to assuage its rivals' fears.
Last year, the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) and the Mujahideen Army openly
quarreled with the Ba'ath party over what they perceive as the party’s tendency
to inflate its role in the resistance.
Indeed, the SCJL's rationale for claiming the insurgency's pole position lies
with the Ba'ath party's historic role in Iraq: "Our brothers, we do not give
ourselves superiority over you; yet, we were the legitimate authority before
the occupation. We are still the sole legitimate authority after the
occupation." [4]
Most other insurgents are likely to object to the SCJL's characterization and
goals. Since the inception of the war, the insurgents have consistently
distanced themselves from the Ba'ath party and the old regime. In fact, the
most common attack used to tarnish another group's reputation is to label it
"Ba'athist".
Invariably, such attacks prompt public and emphatic denials from the accused
party. Further Ba'ath promises to nominate a shura council to organize
free and fair elections after the overthrow of the current political system may
not be enough to alleviate the apprehensions of other insurgents. In this
context, claiming any kind of continuity in legitimacy with the former regime
will by itself be unlikely yield the expected results. In fact, it might even
backfire, making other groups wary of cooperating with the SCJL.
Conclusion
Despite the emphatic rhetoric, it remains to be seen whether the party has the
operational capability to spearhead and lead a unified resistance. The Ba'ath
party is thought to constitute a significant block of the Iraqi insurgency;
according to al-Sharq al-Awsat, the resistance factions are "comprised of three
categories: the militant Islamic resistance, the secular resistance as
represented by the Ba'ath party and the al-Qaeda organization".
However, the overall strength of the Ba'ath military organization remains
difficult to determine. Although the Ba'ath party likes to boast of 200,000
members within the armed resistance factions and 300,000 more invested in
various social and political organizations, these numbers cannot be
independently verified.
Moreover, disputes between the two branches of the movement led by former Iraqi
vice president Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and former presidential aide Muhammad
Yunis al-Ahmad might affect the group's cohesion and effectiveness.
The movement's strength might, however, reside elsewhere. The party's strength
derives from its ability to embody Iraq's national identity, a quality that no
other party, whether Sunni or Shi'ite, has managed to achieve.
Some of the barriers that have prevented other groups from joining the SCJL in
the past will in all likelihood continue to hamper current efforts to rally
other groups under the SCJL's banner. Despite this shortcoming, the warning
could hardly be any clearer: The Ba'ath party is looking forward to taking on
an Iraqi government deprived of US military support for control of "the new
Iraq".
Notes
1. Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation, sharia fatwa-issuing commission,
"The Third Study: The Religious Ruling of Dealing with Infidels Who Have
Declared War on Muslims," August 9.
2. Saddam Hussein coined this memorable quote in a motivational speech he
delivered to Baghdad state radio on the eve of the first Gulf War (17 January
1991). See Kevin C. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's
Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
2008.
3. See, for example, the interview with Dr Ibrahim al-Shemmari, official
spokesman of the Islamic Army in Iraq, on the program "Without Borders",
Al-Jazeera, April 9, 2008. See also the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance’s
weekly messages, available at: www.jaami.info. Finally, see Ayad al-Dulaymi,
Interview with Nasir-al-Din al-Husayni, spokesman for the Jihad and Change
Front (JACF), al-Arab Qatari Newspaper, March 5.
4. Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation, "The Third Study".
Pascale Combelles Siegel is a Virginia-based independent defense
consultant specializing in perception management.
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