WASHINGTON - As the United States waded ever deeper into the Indochinese
quagmire in the early 1960s, Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara called for
"two, three, many Vietnams" to bog down the superpower in unwinnable Third
World conflicts which would drain its treasury and overstretch its military.
While today's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not quite as costly - at least
as a percentage of the gross domestic product - as then, Guevara's vision,
echoed nearly 40 years later by Osama bin Laden, of an increasingly stressed
hyperpower which now confronts its worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression, must weigh heavily on whichever candidate moves into the White
House on January 20.
Indeed, even as both presidential candidates John McCain and
Barack Obama talk about the urgency of sending thousands more troops to
Afghanistan to cope with the growing Taliban threat - potentially magnified
manifold by the ongoing insurgency across the border in the tribal territories
of nuclear-armed Pakistan - the transition set to begin next Tuesday will offer
the president-elect a critical window to contemplate possible exit strategies
not only in southwest Asia, but also westward to the Mediterranean.
A series of interlocking "grand bargains" backed by the relevant regional
players as well as major global powers - aimed at pacifying Afghanistan;
integrating Iran into a new regional security structure; promoting
reconciliation in Iraq; and launching a credible process to negotiate a
comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world - must offer a very
tempting, if extremely challenging, prospect to any new resident at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.
Restoring stability to the Greater Middle East and reducing its on-the-ground
troop presence would not only greatly reduce the US$15 billion dollars a month
Washington spends on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stress on
the US military, and the unprecedented hostility among the world's more than
one billion Muslims.
It would also permit the new president to focus on tackling the global
financial crisis and the deteriorating economic situation at home, including
key issues such as healthcare and the declining middle class, that the public
believes, as made clear by this election campaign, have been too long
neglected.
While no senior policy maker has yet used the phrase "grand bargain", the
notion that the problems faced by Washington in the Greater Middle East - and
thus, implicitly, the solutions, too - are deeply interconnected. General David
Petraeus, who on Friday formally took over the reins of US Central Command,
which covers the entire region and Central Asia and who is certain to have a
major say in future strategy, clearly understands this as well as anyone.
"Where Central Command can help is in looking at this overall challenge as a
region, and helping regionally by looking not just at Afghanistan, but also of
course Pakistan, at the Stans [former Soviet republics], Iran and even some of
the other countries in the greater region that have been long involved, such as
the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states, and even leaders in
Lebanon," he told the New York Times in a September interview.
In one indication of his thinking, Petraeus reportedly requested permission
last week to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the subject of a
three-year-old diplomatic boycott by the Bush administration, only to be turned
down by the White House.
The notion of a "grand bargain" has been most commonly raised in recent years
in connection with Iran in which, according to its most persistent proponents,
former Bush Gulf experts Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, Washington would
provide security guarantees to the Islamic Republic, normalize bilateral ties,
and develop a cooperative approach to regional security - including Iraq and
Afghanistan - in exchange for a halt to Tehran's alleged pursuit of nuclear
weapons, support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups Washington considers to
be terrorists.
But a "grand bargain" was also recently raised in connection with Afghanistan
and Pakistan by two prominent experts, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, who
has reportedly consulted with Petraeus, and New York University Professor
Barnett Rubin, in the influential Foreign Affairs journal in which they called
for a two-pronged strategy.
The US and its NATO allies, they argued, should support efforts - which already
appear to be underway - by the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to
reconcile with predominantly Pashtun Taliban insurgents on both sides of the
border on the condition that they break all ties to al-Qaeda and other
international terrorist groups.
At the same time, Washington should pursue a "high-level diplomatic initiative
designed to build genuine consensus on the goal of achieving Afghan stability
by addressing the legitimate sources of Pakistan's insecurity", especially
vis-a-vis India, which, along with China, Russia, and Iran, would be brought
into the negotiations to provide the necessary assurances.
The latter concept of a regional initiative backed by the great powers is not
so different from the "new diplomatic offensive" proposed two years ago by the
bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG) co-chaired by former Secretary of State James
Baker, which was designed to stretch the withdrawal of US combat troops over a
15-month period.
The ISG stressed the importance of directly engaging both Syria and Iran, as
well as key Sunni-led Arab allies, in a regional framework, backed by the
United Nations, the European Union, and other extra-regional powers, that would
address the security needs of all of Iraq's neighbors and dissuade them from
fueling sectarian conflict within Iraq. It also called for Washington to
condition its future support for the Shi'ite-led Iraqi government on its
efforts to reconcile with the country's Sunni community.
Strongly objecting to any withdrawal timetable, Bush largely ignored these
recommendations and instead "surged" tens of thousands more troops into Iraq to
curb sectarian violence. Two years later, with the hoped-for national
reconciliation still unrealized and the Iraqi government, increasingly
influenced by Iran, refusing to sign a bilateral accord that would permit US
troops to stay at least until 2011, a new president may wish to take the ISG
report's back off the shelf.
The ISG's "new diplomatic offensive" also linked the stabilization of Iraq and
the securing of US interests in the Middle East to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace settlement for which a great-power framework, the quartet, already
exists. While Bush has sought, albeit half-heartedly, to negotiate an
Israeli-Palestinian accord - now considered out of his reach due to pending
Israeli elections in February - over the past year, he has done nothing to
encourage more-promising Turkish-mediated talks between Israel and Syria.
In the last month, however, senior Israeli officials have called on their Arab
neighbors to revive the 2002 Arab League Peace Initiative - originally a Saudi
proposal to offer Israel normalized relations with all league members in
exchange for its return to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a
Palestinian state that would share Jerusalem - as the way forward on all fronts
at the same time.
Like the other three, this fourth possible "grand bargain" will depend
critically on strong US backing, as well as that of the other great powers.
And, as with the other three, much will hinge on the positions of Saudi Arabia
- which not only launched the Arab Initiative, but also hosted talks last month
between senior Taliban associates and the Afghan government and enjoys
considerable influence in Pakistan - and Iran, whose geopolitical gains since
the Iraq invasion have greatly enhanced its ability to play the spoiler from
Afghanistan to the eastern Mediterranean. The outcome of Israel's elections
will also weigh heavily in the balance.
Nonetheless, if the Arab Initiative gains sufficient momentum to induce
Tehran's allies, especially Syria and Hamas, to join the bandwagon, Iran,
according to some analysts, will likely acquiesce, particularly if its security
interests are addressed in the other possible bargains that the new president
may be considering after next Tuesday's elections.
Jim Lobe's blog on US foreign policy, and particularly the
neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.
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