Iran cools on Iraq's US accord
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The issue of the United States-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), now
pending before the Iraqi parliament after its approval by the Iraqi cabinet, is
highly contentious not only in Iraq but also neighboring Iran, which has so
much at stake with respect to the scope and duration of the presence of US
forces in its vicinity.
A considerable initial softening of Iran's fierce opposition to the SOFA
emerged via a statement by Iran's judiciary chief, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi
Shahroudi, that praised the Iraqi government. "The Iraqi government has done
very well regarding this ... We hope the outcome of [the deal] will be in favor
of Islam and Iraqi sovereignty," Shahroudi's statement, widely disseminated by
the Iranian media, stated.
This represented a significant turnaround from nearly two years of
adamant objection to the agreement by Iran's leaders, including from President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad who, in his latest trip to New York in September,
characterized the SOFA as imperialistic and designed to maintain US "hegemony
over Iraq".
This is precisely how Ali Larijani, the powerful speaker of parliament (majlis)
has reacted, by depicting the SOFA as a way of "strengthening comprehensive US
hegemony in Iraq". Ahmadinejad and Larijani may not see eye-to-eye on certain
foreign policy issues, such as Iran's nuclear issue, which led to the
resignation of Larijani from the post of chief nuclear negotiator last year.
But by all accounts, the two men have now found a common cause that may bring
them closer.
By insisting that the Iraqi parliament must now make the right decision,
Larijani has all but advised his Iraqi counterparts to reject the pact, a
position echoed by a number of other members of the majlis, including Avaz
Heidaripour, who sits on the national security committee. Blasting the
agreement, Heidaripour flatly stated it "has no value for the US" and said that
in 2011, the due date for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq per the terms
of the accord, that "the US will use the excuse of explosions and terrorism to
retain some of its forces in Iraq". Indeed, Iranian skepticism that the US will
honor its commitment to withdraw three years from now runs pretty high.
In comparison, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has adopted a more reticent
wait-and-see approach, insisting that the SOFA is an "internal Iraqi matter",
and that the process of its approval is still ongoing, pending the decision by
the Iraqi parliament within a few days.
Meanwhile, the idea that the security agreement serves Iraq's interests has
been expressed by a number of Iranian pundits, including Mashaalah Shams
al-Vaezin and Hossein Sadeghi, on the website www.IRDiplomacy. According to
Shams al-Vaezin, the agreement has been modified at the insistence of the Iraqi
government to make sure that US forces will not attack Iraq's neighbors, "even
if they are threatened".
This is certainly an important consideration on Iran's part, and a real source
of Tehran's built-in ambivalence to an agreement which on one hand sanctions
the presence of US forces in Iraq for three more years, yet at the same time -
at least on paper - ties the hands of US military against Iran. This puts a
premium on the US's "military option" with respect to Iran's nuclear program.
Now, as a result of the SOFA, the gaps between the nuclear issue and Iraqi
security issues have been considerably narrowed.
Iran's reaction has been misinterpreted in the US as a sign of a "green light"
to the Iraqi government to go ahead with the controversial agreement, as noted
in an editorial in the Boston Globe. Not true, as Iran has given at best a
yellow light, which in fact may not last, given the powerful voices of
opposition seemingly on the rise within the ruling circles.
Not everyone in Tehran is convinced the SOFA will muster enough votes in
parliament to pass, and though even the deputy speaker of the Iraqi parliament,
Khaled al-Atayah, has defended it, there is still considerable misgivings on
the part of many Iraqi lawmakers.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government has given credit in Iran for
its ability to introduce some important changes into the text of the agreement,
such as setting up a joint US-Iraqi committee to review cases of any
transgression of Iraqi laws by US forces stationed in Iraq. Still, the required
legitimacy for the security pact is still missing, given the fierce opposition
of it by Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his supporters, who have vowed to
resort to armed struggle if the government adopts the pact.
Nor is it entirely clear that the powerful Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq
has backed the SOFA, despite misleading information in the US and Iraqi media
about it. Sistani's latest statement to the Iraqi parliament in fact falls
short of an endorsement and sets two preconditions for the agreement's
approval. First, it must meet all the criteria with respect to Iraq's
sovereignty and second it must "achieve a national consensus in such a way that
all the different groups of the Iraqi population and the main political parties
agree on this agreement".
According to a Tehran University political science professor, Sistani's latest
statement reflects a minor adjustment on his part, a backing away from earlier
hints of willingness to endorse the agreement. This change is attributable to
Iran's tacit pressure on Sistani which has been reflected in unusually blunt
criticism by some hardline Iranian pundits of his office's handling of the
matter.
What worries the Iraqi government, and Sistani, is that the SOFA may pass with
less than a solid majority, in which case it will backfire and risk the
government's legitimacy and the political stability of Iraq. This would come at
a delicate and dangerous time when the ominous signs of al-Qaeda's return is on
the rise, in light of the spate of deadly explosions rocking Baghdad in recent
days. As a result, there is concern in Iran as well as in aspects of the Iraqi
political spectrum that the Iraqi government may be digging its own grave by
approving the agreement.
That may be an exaggeration and, in the end, the SOFA may prove a glass which
is half full rather than half empty, depending on a multiplicity of intervening
factors, including the future of US-Iran relations. The latter in the near
future involves Tehran "confirming whether a change of US policy toward Iran is
tactical or not", to paraphrase an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson.
The net implication of the SOFA with respect to both Iraq's domestic politics
as well the regional scene is unclear and hard to predict, linked as it is to
so many factors, above all, the ability of Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda to
exploit it for their own purposes. This is after all a security agreement that
can cause greater instability in Iraq by virtue of the oppositions it has
ignited, not only in Iraq, but also in its powerful neighbor, Iran.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
