Iran pushed to the pre-electronic age
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
On Sunday, the New York Times reported that the George W Bush administration
recently rebuffed Israel's request for assistance in launching a strike against
Iran's nuclear facilities, adding however that President Bush had assured
Israeli leaders that he was not sitting idly by while the Iranians were
perfecting their nuclear know-how and that he had authorized a covert operation
aimed at "sabotaging" Iran's nuclear program, one that targets Iran's
industrial infrastructure, computer systems, etc. [1]
Such reports coincide with growing signs of a systematic effort on the part of
the US government to deprive Iran of access to "dual-purpose" technology,
particularly that which has more than a commercial application and which can be
used in manufacturing
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Although the number of IED-related US fatalities in Iraq has sharply dwindled
to a trickle during the past several months, in Afghanistan such attacks are on
the rise and various reports from Afghanistan indicate that the resurgent
Taliban have acquired IED know-how from Iraqi insurgents.
According to a recent report from the US Army College, the majority of IEDs in
Iraq are attributable to Sunni insurgents affiliated with the dethroned
Ba'athist army, although British authorities in southern Iraq have also accused
Iran of having an indirect role via Lebanon's Hezbollah in exporting deadly
IEDs to Iraq. Tehran has flatly denied this charge, insisting that it has
nothing to gain from causing anarchy in an Iraq that is run by a friendly
Shi'ite-led government. Similarly, Iran has no interest in arming the anti-Iran
Taliban with IEDs.
Nevertheless, some US officials (as well as Israelis) are hell-bent on proving
that Iran is the main culprit behind the IED attacks on coalition forces in
both Afghanistan and Iraq, and that to this end Iran has engaged in a clever
multi-front scheme to access US goods forbidden by the US laws. Apart from
several rounds of United Nations sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear
program, the US has unilaterally slapped sanctions on the country.
Last September, a Florida Grand Jury issued an indictment for several Iranians
and Iranian-owned companies in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and
Europe, accusing them of falsifying export forms to conceal the final
destination of those goods that included digital calling cards.
The fact is, IEDs can be made with detonators using, among other things, cell
phones, beepers, garage-door openers, short-wave radios, car alarms,
remote-control toys - indeed, almost any ordinary household item. Thus the use
of the term "dual purpose" is stretching it, just as calling dolphins or
trained dogs capable of carrying bombs as "dual purpose" would be laughable.
All the same, the attorney general in southern Florida claimed to be 100%
convinced that the real purpose of some Iranians in Dubai in getting access to
US telephone cards was to "create IEDs that kill our soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan".
Yet, there is no evidence that in either place have suicide bombers used
digital telephone cards, or the more advanced semiconductors mentioned in the
Florida indictment, such as the Invensys Model 375 Field Communicator.
The legal process in Florida since handing down the indictments has been
tediously slow - there has been no trial, let alone sentencing of the
defendants - yet the allegations have been adopted as fact by some US pundits
and (nuclear) experts alike.
Thus, another high-profile article bashing Iran in the Washington Post [2] is
devoted to this subject, relying on "research by a US institute", the Institute
For Science and International Security (ISIS), which, it turns out, almost
exclusively relies on the 11-page indictment in the Florida District Court.
"This case study, based on allegations, contained in the US indictment,
illustrates the major problem posed by certain countries of diversion," write
David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel. [3] No, this illustrates the
gullibility of such experts who are willing to dispense with the slightest
doubt and adopt as fact the allegations that "these electronic components have
been employed in IEDs or other explosive devices used against coalition forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan".
Yet, as mentioned above, there is no evidence of the use of the sophisticated
Model 375 Field Communicator in any of the various types of IEDs found in Iraq
and Afghanistan, or for that matter the type of "mixed-signal chips" reportedly
purchased by the Iranian-owned company in Dubai. Those chips have an "extensive
collection of applications", as is also the case with "micro-controllers" (also
cited in the indictment) which have usages in motor, lighting and power-related
applications.
The authors of the article also make a passing reference to the fact that "in
some cases, the US indictment is unclear about whether items successfully
reached Iran". Since the whole issue of the US export ban to Iran hinges on the
final end-user, this is an important lack of clarity that goes to the heart of
the validity of the US's allegations in the above-mentioned case.
This is not to absolve the defendants in allegedly trying to defy US laws, but
rather to point out the facility with which conclusions based on thin evidence
are often reached against Iran in the US nowadays; there are persistent efforts
by Washington to cause collateral damage to Iran's scientific and industrial
base in an attempt to sabotage its nuclear program.
This is even though such "sabotage" directly violates Iran's sovereignty and is
at odds with the letter and content of the 1981 US-Iran Algiers accord, whereby
the US pledged to respect Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Dispatching covert operators inside Iran is not considered by the White House's
counsel as a transgression of Iran's sovereignty, and we are now told that the
Barack Obama administration is to "inherit" this operation on January 20. The
operation is only partly covert, for the overt aspect of it, aimed at denying
Iran access to computer technology, is now a widened aspect of this anti-Iran
agenda.
With regard to the latter, there has recently been pressure on US computer
company Hewlett-Packard to order its overseas subsidiaries to stop selling
computer parts to Iran, a small yet symbolically significant victory for the US
and Israeli governments whose leaders appear intent on returning Iran to the
pre-electronic age.
Perhaps, with the Israeli offensive against Hamas in Gaza well underway toward
a "spectacular success", to paraphrase Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, there may be
a strong foundation for their optimism that a similar victory against the
bigger menace that is Iran may be on the horizon.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
