WASHINGTON - United States Central Command (CENTCOM) chief General David
Petraeus and Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) commander General Ray Odierno
have submitted assessments of Iraq combat troop withdrawal plans to President
Barack Obama based on the premise that his 16-month withdrawal plan would pose
significantly greater risk to "security gains" than the 23-month plan they
favor.
But a senior commander in Iraq appeared to contradict that premise last week by
declaring that security gains in the Shi'ite provinces of Iraq are "permanent",
and a field commander in Iraq says there is no objective basis for any
Petraeus-Odierno finding that Obama's plan carries greater risk than their
23-month plan.
Major General Michael Oates, US commander for the eight
southern provinces of Iraq, denied in remarks to reporters February 12 that the
security gains in that region were fragile, contrary to the premise that
Odierno had publicly asserted. Oates cited the dramatic reduction in activities
by Shi'ite militia fighters and the holding of the January 31 elections without
any major attacks.
In a previous press briefing January 14, Oates had told reporters that, even if
violence were to break out after provincial elections, Iraqi security forces
"are well prepared to handle that".
He also cast doubt on Iranian involvement with Shi'ite militias in the south,
saying he had "no evidence or reports of people training in Iran", despite
periodic "anecdotal intelligence reports" of such training camps.
Oates said he had already reassigned combat forces in the region to non-combat
missions, either training or economic development, despite grumbling by
soldiers.
Although Oates did not explicitly address the issue of drawdown plans, he has
been known to favor a more rapid withdrawal from Iraq than Petraeus and Odierno
for some time, according to a military officer who served under Odierno and is
familiar with Oates's views. "His belief is that we need to get out of the
country and let the Iraqis take responsibility for their areas," the officer,
who asked not to be identified, told Inter Press Service (IPS).
A field commander in Iraq, who spoke with IPS on the understanding that he
would not be identified, asserted flatly that there is no greater risk
associated with Obama's 16-month withdrawal plan than with the 23-month plan,
contrary to Petraeus and Odierno.
The officer said that the US military presence has already "passed the tipping
point of diminishing returns" in relation to stability and security in Iraq.
"The longer we stay now, the less we achieve," he said.
Neither Petraeus nor Odierno has offered any public explanation for their
argument that a 16-month drawdown plan would pose greater risk to stability and
security than one lasting seven months longer. However, Stephen Biddle of the
Council on Foreign Relations, an adviser to Petraeus, argued in Foreign Affairs
last fall that the US military presence is "essential to stabilize a system of
local ceasefires" between Sunnis and Shi'ites and between the militias loyal to
Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shi'ite-dominated government.
But the field commander now serving in Iraq told IPS that the US military
mission there has "little correlation" with the present ceasefire between
Sunnis and Shi'ites. The Sunni-Shi'ite conflict, said the officer, "is now one
for political supremacy, not a counterinsurgency as defined in the army's
counter-insurgency manual".
He said he had been briefed recently on the US mission in Iraq and had been
told it is still a counter-insurgency mission, as it has been for several
years. There was "no mention of any peacekeeping function aimed at maintaining
ceasefires”, the officer said.
The idea of enforcing ceasefires is advocated by some in the US command, he
said, but that would be "a very different mission from counter-insurgency".
Biddle confirmed in an interview with IPS that the US military peacekeeping
role he advocates has not been adopted by the MNF-I command. A number of
officers in the command, he said, still believe the US objective in Iraq is
"the gradual elimination" of all forces competing with the Iraqi government's
security forces.
Ironically, it was Biddle who revealed in Congressional testimony last April
that the reduction in sectarian violence in and around Baghdad beginning in
2007 for which Odierno had credited the US troop surge was actually the result
of the heavy defeat of Sunni insurgent forces in a year-long battle with
Shi'ite militias for control of Baghdad in 2006. Biddle observed that the US
military tried to stop the sectarian violence but played "no decisive role" in
the ultimate ceasefire between Sunni and Shi'ite.
In an online discussion on the Washington Post website February 9, Biddle
conceded that US troop strength had been insufficient in 2006 to prevent the
sectarian violence in Baghdad.
That revelation undercuts the Petraeus-Odierno argument that keeping combat
troops in Iraq longer than 16 months would help maintain the present ceasefire
between Sunni and Shi'ite forces. In 16 months, US combat troop strength will
be only a fraction of its 2006 level, even under the Petraeus-Odierno plan.
The US field commander said that, even if US troops were given the mission of
enforcing ceasefires, it would not give the US military any additional
influence over either side to remain several more months beyond the 16-month
withdrawal period.
"At some point [US troops] are going to have to leave," said the commander.
"The Iraqis are going to resolve political differences without American
military muscle to enforce it. It doesn't matter if that process begins in 16
months, 23 months, or 23 years. We gain nothing with the additional time."
"The 1st Cavalry Division cannot make the Shi'ites and Sunnis kiss and make
up," he observed. "They can't make the problems of oil revenue sharing get
resolved. Those are issues only Arabs and Kurds can resolve."
A second US officer now serving in Iraq, who also asked not to be identified,
expressed doubt that a 16-month withdrawal is logistically feasible, based on
his experience in a specific area south of Baghdad. But he agreed that it is
time to complete the turnover of responsibility to the Iraqi Army and rapidly
withdraw US combat troops.
"It's time for us to get out," he said in an interview. "If the US military
continues to do the job, the Iraqis are going to be lazy, and they won't do it
themselves."
The officer conceded that the Iraq army "is nowhere near as competent as the US
Army”, and that "there may be some breakout of bad things" after the troop
withdrawal. Nevertheless, the officer warned, "If you don't give the Iraqis the
mantle of responsibility, we will be there for another 25-30 years."
Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing
in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book,
Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was
published in 2006.
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