The Muqtada factor re-emerges in Iraq By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Four members of the political bureau of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), which is headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, resigned
from their posts on Sunday.
They were protesting a lack of reforms within the PUK, which was founded in
June 1975 by Talabani and firmly controlled by him since then. One of the main
issues was budgeting, with party members asking about sources of money and
where it was being spent, raising big question marks about possible corruption.
Others questioned the PUK's representation in the Kurdish government, and
called for the replacement of PUK chairmen in different parts of the country.
Another demand was keeping tabs
on the party's intelligence branch, the Zanyari, and for Talabani to be more
tolerant of "opinions of the others".
One of those to step down was Khosrat Rasul, the deputy secretary general and
vice president of Iraqi Kurdistan, who, like Talabani, was very active in the
Iraqi underground during Saddam Hussein's rule. When a heavyweight like Rasul
steps down, this means that the "coup" was not merely internal rivalries
surfacing; it spells danger for the Iraqi president, who is popularly known in
Kurdish circles as Mam Jalal (Uncle Jalal).
At 76 and having recently undergone critical heart surgery in the US, Talabani
is a legendary leader to the Kurdish people, very much like Yasser Arafat had
been to the Palestinians. But a second generation is emerging among Kurdish
politicians, and they have been politely demanding that new blood is injected
into the PUK and calling for structural change.
Under pressure, last week Talabani, much like Arafat during his final years,
agreed to implement major political reforms, aimed at averting a showdown, but
quickly backed down on his promises, clearly unconvinced by them, thereby
infuriating Rasul and other members of the political bureau.
This is bad news for both the aging Talabani and for Iraqi Kurdistan at large,
which has been the most stable part of Iraq since the downfall of Saddam in
2003. En masse resignations could disrupt the balance of power between
Talabani's team and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Maasoud
Barazani.
In 2005, the PUK and KDP united with smaller Kurdish parties to form the
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan to run for parliamentary elections.
One year later, the two parties joined forces to run Iraqi Kurdistan, although
while underground, they had quarreled bitterly and sometimes violently over
whom best represents Kurdish aspirations and on what were the best routes to
Kurdish nationhood.
Parliament member Ala Talabani, the president's niece who is also a member of
the PUK, described the current situation as "very serious". Kurdish member of
parliament Mahmud Othman added, "It is not good. The PUK is one of the main two
[Kurdish] parties. A problem like this will upset the whole situation."
Many are questioning the timing of the resignations, which affect the unity of
Kurdish politics, indirectly serving Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. While
originally allied to both the PUK and the KDP, Maliki has famously always
played cat-and-mouse with them, humoring them when in need of Kurdish support,
and keeping a distance when Shi'ite ranks were seemingly united.
When the Sadrists walked out on him, followed by the Iraqi National List of
ex-prime minister Iyad Allawi, and the Iraqi Accordance Front, Maliki cuddled
up to both the PUK and KDP, promising them a basket of reforms mainly related
to keeping the Kurdish military group Peshmerga, protecting the autonomy of
northern Iraq and the future of oil-rich Kirkuk, which the Kurds want
incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan.
He also hinted at granting greater powers to the Kurds, who although currently
seated at the presidential palace in Baghdad have no real authority in Iraq
when compared to Sunnis or Shi'ites. Clearly from the results of the provincial
elections, however, which took place in January, Maliki is no longer in need -
or really interested - in broad support from the Kurdish parties. He was
mandated with 38% of the votes in Baghdad, and got a large number of votes from
young people, both Sunni and Shi'ite, in addition to seculars, who had
traditionally been at odds end both with him and his Da'wa Party.
The Muqtada factor
At one point, Maliki teamed up with both Kurdish parties, and the Supreme Iraqi
Islamic Council (SIIC) of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The aim was to keep a cabinet
coalition floating, deprived of seculars, Sadrists, and Sunnis.
Now that Hakim's team lost most of its provinces and the Kurds are divided like
never before since 2003, Maliki is re-tapping his former friendship with
Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The two sides, which emerged victorious in last
month's elections, are currently negotiating a coalition, as announced by the
Sadrist bloc in Baghdad at the weekend, which would give them both firm control
over Basra, Baghdad, Maysan, al-Wasit and Dhi Qar.
It would also give them - collectively - half the seats in Karbala, Najaf and
Qadsiya. Hassan al-Sneid, speaking on behalf of the prime minister, responded
by saying that an agreement was being wrapped up between the Sadrists and the
Da'wa Party to give birth to a new entity called the “Public Service Front".
Maliki and Muqtada had created what many called an "unspoken alliance" in 2006.
Muqtada supported the newly elected prime minister, giving him legitimacy among
grassroots Iraqi Shi'ites, while Maliki gave Muqtada protection from Iraqi
officialdom, turning a blind eye to the activities of his Mahdi Army.
The relationship grew stronger when Muqtada's team took 30 of the 275 seats in
the Iraqi parliament, and six seats in the Maliki cabinet, including powerful
portfolios like Commerce, Health and Education.
In 2007 the alliance snapped when Muqtada walked out, objecting to Maliki's
refusal to call for a timetable for US troop withdrawal. Maliki saw this as a
blessing in disguise, since Muqtada's outrageous activities had become an
embarrassment to the prime minister, especially before neighboring Arab states
after the execution of Saddam. He accepted the resignations immediately,
cracking down on the Sadrists and turning instead to foster a new alliance with
the Kurds.
Maliki today seems as something of a hypocrite, having rallied last month on a
platform that steered clear from religious slogans and "sounded" secular. He is
now ready to ally himself with someone who wants to create an Iran-like
theocracy in Baghdad, independent, however, of direct Iranian influence.
In 2007, Muqtada gave an interesting interview to La Republica, explaining his
relationship with the prime minister: "Between myself and Abu Israa [what
Maliki is called by friends] there has never been much feeling. I have always
suspected that he was being maneuvered, and I have never trusted him. We have
met only on a couple of occasions. At our last meeting he first told me: 'You
are the country's backbone,' and then he confessed that he was 'obliged' to
combat us. Obliged, you hear me?"
Muqtada was trying to say that while Maliki liked him, the feelings were never
mutual. Perhaps that is true, and we can never know how many times the two men
have actually met, but what is clear from 2006-2007 is that when they were
allied, the Shi'ites were getting the upper hand in Iraqi politics, and greater
security was being brought into Shi'ite neighborhoods. There was also not much
need for strong bridges between the prime minister and either Talabani, or the
now fractured PUK.
Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.
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