Page 1 of 2 BOOK REVIEW Twelve steps to a new grand strategy Great Powers: America and the World after Bush by Thomas
P M Barnett
Reviewed by Benjamin A Shobert
The sheer number of books written about the 2003 Iraqi War suggests the level
of anxiety and confusion many Americans feel - even those who consider
themselves educated on the casus belli of the conflict - remains acute.
A certain amount of honest guilt and soul-searching has driven many of
America's best writers, journalists and thinkers to explore what drove the
country into Iraq. Those who have put pen to paper in an effort to make sense
of it all seem to fall into two separate camps: one dissects
politics and tactics, focusing on how the war was sold and managed, while the
other employs a more strategic evaluation of the ideologies which rationalized
the decision.
Noticeably absent from most of these is an attempt to penetrate the fog of past
mistakes and advocate a path forward based on what the errors of Iraq tell us. Great
Powers: America and the World After Bush, Thomas P M Barnett's newest
book, works to correct this inadequacy by adding clarity to the challenges
facing the world, recasting them as opportunities and reminding Americans that
we are "the source code for globalization". (pg 423) Barnett's passionate
belief comes across clearly in this book: Americans need to be reminded that
even those things which make us feel insecure, such as China's rise, can only
be understood as the American model having won over the decrepit model of
communism. But this equally means that Americans are in a unique position to
set the process back, in particular in response to the country's financial
instability.
Given the current economic turmoil, when baser instincts are to look outside
our borders for others to blame, Barnett's book is a well-reasoned argument for
America to re-imagine itself and re-engage with the world's problems, precisely
when our impulses are to retract and disengage. Barnett believes that America
has insights on politics, economic development and fostering innovation which
are unique to our history. Many of the lessons of our development - in
particular the uglier chapters of America's Civil War period - should be
reminders to us of the challenges emerging countries will face. These memories
should also empower a gracious patience on our part towards them as they
develop.
Equally important, at time when many Americans question both the nature of
their country's power and the means by which it should be used, Barnett reminds
his readers that the US still has the military, diplomatic and economic power
to make the world safer. In many ways, he wants to remind his readers that
America is still a "Great Power".
Granted, the nature of American power is changing, and unless it is properly
managed could lead to disastrous over-reactions and miscues as the shared power
of the world is allocated differently and finds new centers of gravity. In
particular, Barnett believes the next generation of US leaders will need to be
comfortable sharing their power among equals, with confidence that the American
model is ultimately that which most countries seek to emulate. Admittedly, this
can seem to be an increasingly tenuous proposition given the undercurrent of
fear Americans now feel regarding their economic future.
When growth was a given and capital relatively inexpensive, concerns over the
downside risks to the globe's interdependency could be easily accommodated. But
now the interwoven nature of the world's economy seems as much a threat as a
blessing, in particular as the global economy slows down and the much lauded
de-coupling proves to be overstated. At its most profound, Barnett's argument
is that the only path forward, absent conflict of terrifying proportions, is to
give ourselves over to even further inter-connection, greater proximity and
increased cooperation.
This is, as he says, a form of economic mutually assured destruction, where the
disengagement of one partner from bilateral agreements can be enough to tear
the whole thing apart. Barnett believes this is precisely why economic
inter-dependency may be one of the pre-eminent enablers of sustainable peace.
As one might expect of a former Naval War College researcher, Barnett is not
one to overlook or ignore the necessary role of hard power; however, he also
believes that American power is much more than what is enabled by the military.
Barnett does not want us to forget the unexplored opportunities that still
await those who can steer through what he believes are short-term setbacks:
"There is a new world still out there, awaiting some great nation's discovery
and description … a world of unlimited creativity, energy and ingenuity, and we
as its dominant species need to get there fast." (pg 37) Barnett recognizes
that not only does America need to motivate itself to re-engage in the midst of
our crisis, but that post-Bush the rest of the world has some reservations
about our intentions. Consequently, Barnett believes the path forward has to be
marked by an acknowledgement of what went wrong during the last presidency.
To accomplish this, Barnett admits to what he sees as the recent mistakes - the
"Seven Deadly Sins of Bush-Cheney": Lust - leading to the quest for primacy;
Anger - leading to the demonization of enemies; Greed - leading to the
concentration of power; Pride - leading to avoidable postwar failures; Envy -
leading to the misguided redirect on Iran; Sloth - leading to the US military
finally asserting command; and Gluttony - leading to strategic overhang
cynically foisted upon the next president. (pgs 12-35) He does not spend too
much time going over these things, largely because in almost every case the
"Deadly Sin" in question has already been dissected by others. Barnett is
working towards a different goal, to cast a vision of where we go now.
While the majority of the book develops a worldview that is distinctly
different from most of what the last administration advocated, a sense of
fairness seems to drive Barnett to acknowledge what he believes were
constructive actions on their part. These range from compliments for the
president's "strategic imagination regarding development issues" to the
administration's resistance against "popular pressures for trade
protectionism". (pg 10) But readers may struggle with Barnett's somewhat
unapologetic support of Bush's decision to go into Iraq:
I still admire
George W Bush's display of audacity and hope in launching his Big Bang strategy
upon the Persian Gulf. There's not a question in my mind that, no matter the
weak rationales offered (or the slick sales job), Saddam Hussein was a horrific
dictator whose time had come. That Bush-Cheney were able to pin the tail on the
9/11 donkey didn't bother me in the least, for democracies such as our own
always have to make it personal before we can launch a war of choice. (pg 10)
For readers new to Barnett, it helps to understand that much of his work
emphasizes that America must learn to do more than simply project power through
what he calls the "Leviathan", a conventional military. He has long believed we
need to be equally competent at managing the aftermath of our military actions
with a role and set of resources he labels the "SysAdmin, the 'second half'
blended force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has successfully
waged war". (pg 432)
Additionally, Barnett takes international accountability seriously, and takes a
very dim view towards those actors who seek to act disruptively within their
region or the world. Consequently, his support for Bush's decision is
consistent within the arc of his career's work. To his lasting credit, Barnett
is one of a handful of thinkers ahead of the curve in seeing the chronic needs
that reveal themselves once the conventional war is over. Some may read this
section of Great Powers and at a minimum get sidetracked, or worse
misunderstand, the very practical orientation of the book towards how power
should be effectively used.
Regardless of the reader's belief about the rightness or wrongness of going
into Iraq, this brief section may come across as
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
Noticeably absent from most of these is an attempt to penetrate the fog of past
mistakes and advocate a path forward based on what the errors of Iraq tell us. Great
Powers: America and the World After Bush, Thomas P M Barnett's newest
book, works to correct this inadequacy by adding clarity to the challenges
facing the world, recasting them as opportunities and reminding Americans that
we are "the source code for globalization". (pg 423) Barnett's passionate
belief comes across clearly in this book: Americans need to be reminded that
even those things which make us feel insecure, such as China's rise, can only
be understood as the American model having won over the decrepit model of
communism. But this equally means that Americans are in a unique position to
set the process back, in particular in response to the country's financial
instability.
