Egypt has Hezbollah in its sights
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - The relationship between Egyptian officialdom and Hezbollah
secretary general Hassan Nasrallah has never been warm, to say the least.
But political differences exploded last week when Egypt announced the arrest of
49 people accused of being members of Hezbollah, planning to carry out sabotage
attacks on Egyptian territory and bringing down the government.
According to the Egyptian Public Prosecutor, Hezbollah was monitoring the Suez
Canal, Egypt's borders with Gaza and tourist installations in the Sinai
Peninsula, channeling information back
to its leadership in Lebanon. It also said the group had been establishing
links with "criminal elements" to forge passports to facilitate a massive
espionage campaign on Egyptian territory.
The common accusation was also made that Hezbollah - supported by Iran - was
spreading the Shi'ite faith in Egypt to convert the country's Sunni population.
Nasrallah responded with a relatively calm speech on Friday, denying any
attempts at Shi'itification, and confirmed that Sami Shihab, the head of the
arrested group in Egypt, was a member of Hezbollah.
But by no means was he planning any attacks in Egypt, Nasrallah explained,
rather, he was trying to channel assistance to and coordinate with Hamas in the
Gaza Strip. "Our brother Sami [Shihab], is a member of Hezbollah, we don't deny
this. He was providing logistical help to the Palestinian resistance at the
Egyptian-Palestinian border. All other charges against him are false. If aiding
the Palestinians is a crime, then I am proud of it."
One fact stands out and raises questions: Shihab and his comrades were arrested
in Egypt on November 19, 2008, more than one month before the Israeli war on
Gaza began on December 27. Egypt only made the affair public on April 8, five
months later. Observers are asking why the delay?
If Egypt had concrete evidence against the Lebanese group, why did it not
release it on the spot, or during the Israeli war, when relations reached an
all-time low between Egypt on one front and Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah on the
other?
After all, during the early stages of the war, Nasrallah came out with a
thundering speech against Egypt, coming short of calling on the Egyptian people
to rebel against their government. He accused the Egyptian government of taking
orders from the US, and demanded it open the Rafah Crossing between Egypt and
the Gaza Strip, to offer a lifeline to the Palestinians in Gaza.
The fact that Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was in Egypt hours before
the attack began did not make things easier for the Egyptian government, making
it look as if they had been informed of the war before it was launched.
Nasrallah's words sent emotions souring in Egyptian officialdom, and Cairo
would have - logically speaking - used whatever ammunition it had in its hands
to counterbalance Nasrallah's accusations.
While Egypt silently waited, other Arab states took the lead in criticizing
Hezbollah and Iran, paving the way for the Egyptian announcement last week.
Last month, Morocco cut off diplomatic relations with Tehran, accusing it of
harboring territorial ambitions in Bahrain. While hosting talks between Hamas
and Fatah in Cairo, President Hosni Mubarak snubbed the Arab summit in Doha
last month, to object to Qatar's alliance with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and
Hamas.
Not only did he not attend, but he showed Egyptian displeasure by sending a
very low-key minister to deputize on his behalf, and talked other Arab leaders
into boycotting the summit. In January, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud
al-Faisal had called on Arab states to unite to face "the Iranian challenge" in
the Arab world. One explanation of why Egypt waited for five months was to calm
the Egyptian street, which was boiling with anger against the Egyptian
government for its stance on the Gaza War. Ordinary Egyptians are Arab
nationalists to the bone, unimpressed by their country's 1978 peace treaty with
Israel. Nasrallah is an immensely popular leader, at a grassroots level, on the
streets of Cairo.
He reminds many of the "golden years" of Arab nationalism that were spearheaded
by former Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. During times of war, there is
no room for neutrality on the Arab street. People see their leaders in two
strict, black or white categories: either with the resistance, or with Israel.
Egypt - due to several factors - could not stand on neutral territory. It saw
the crisis from two sharp angles. One was: if Hamas wins the war, and
legitimizes its rule in Gaza, Egypt's borders will no longer be with
Palestinians, but with Iran.
Egypt's relationship with the Islamic Republic have been strained, often beyond
repair, since 1979. Mubarak could not tolerate the thought of an
Egyptian-Iranian border, and therefore took a strong and risky position against
Hamas, which embarrassed him among his own people.
The second Egyptian consideration was Hamas' strong relationship with the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which is active in the Egyptian scene, trying to
bring down the Mubarak regime, either through ballots or bullets. Hamas was
originally born out of the Egyptian Brotherhood, and a victory for Hamas in
Gaza would have sent emotions soaring in the Islamic street of Egypt, and
threatened stability of the Egyptian regime.
If Egypt's fear of Iran meant a political stance that was frowned on by the
Egyptian street, then so be it. This was a price Mubarak was willing to pay to
protect his regime, which has been in power since 1981.
On Sunday, Egyptian parliamentarians close to Mubarak called for an arrest
warrant for Nasrallah, and Egyptian dailies, both official and semi-official,
launched an aggressive campaign against the Hezbollah leader. They accused him
of being an Iranian stooge. Hezbollah media outlets snapped back, claiming that
official Egypt was taking orders from the United States and Israel.
Ordinary Egyptians stood by and watched, confused as to whom to believe. They
have genuine respect for Nasrallah, and for his commitment to the Palestinians.
Many do not trust their aging president because of his ties to the West, but
are too afraid to voice criticism.
They are still overwhelmingly emotional when it comes to Palestine. Watching
the Egyptian street during the war on Gaza, one finds more outpouring, however,
than during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. One reason is that in 2006,
many Egyptians had question marks on the wisdom behind provoking a war with
Israel, by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers from South Lebanon. Many believed
that Hezbollah cornered itself into war, and that Lebanon 2006 was a proxy war,
between the US fighting Iran through Israel, and Iran doing the same through
Hezbollah.
Things were different in Gaza in 2009. Nothing unites the Arab street more than
solidarity with the Palestinians. The Palestinian issue is still considered
"the first Arab cause", despite all the hardships in Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan.
Additionally, the amount of destruction in Gaza, and the images of dead
Palestinians on the streets of Gaza, captured the hearts of ordinary Egyptians
and inspired revolution in them; against Israel, against silent Egyptian
officialdom, and against the George W Bush White House.
If anything, it brought them closer to those combating Israel directly, like
Nasrallah and Hamas, and indirectly, like Syria and Iran. It also widened the
gap between ordinary Egyptians and their pro-Western government.
Egypt, however, is a stuffy Puritan country when it comes to Sunni Islam. There
is a general fear of Iranian influence, because of its Shi'ite character. Many
believe what they read in the press, hear on radio and see on television.
Egypt's media, both independent, official and semi-official, have for years
been warning against an Iranian campaign of Shi'itification.
The history of bilateral relations between Egypt and Iran is a stormy one,
since the Islamic Revolution toppled Shah Reza Pahlavi, the king of Iran who
had been a strong Egyptian ally, in 1979. The new leaders of Iran never forgave
Egypt for granting him asylum, and retaliated by naming a street in honor of
president Anwar Sadat's assassin, in 1981.
For years, Iran refused to change course, and grew in power throughout the
region, through Hezbollah, and since 2003, through its proxies in Iraq. When
Egypt's ambassador to Baghdad was kidnapped and then killed in 2005, many in
Egypt pointed fingers at Iran, claiming that Tehran wanted no Arab presence in
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, wanting to transform it into an Iranian satellite.
The battle is currently underway between Nasrallah's charisma and his stance on
Palestine, and the Egyptian media, which is trying to implicate him in sabotage
and in trying to bring down the Egyptian government.
The Egyptians, an emotional and patriotic people, are likely to believe
Nasrallah, but rally behind their government, in fear of persecution or arrest,
saying, "Nasrallah is innocent, and he is telling the truth, but we are unable
to stand up to our government."
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
