Most of the media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden has drifted
understandably towards the sensational part of the story: how are the pirates
able to roam the ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option than to engage
them militarily? And will a military intervention against the pirates worsen
the situation; will it lead to a massive escalation in Somalia and a
Vietnam-like quagmire for many years to come?
The armed bands on the waters which are still roaming the seas of Aden and the
Indian Ocean across from Somalia and Kenya are not impressed with the dozens of
naval units dispatched by powerful navies from around the world.
What is behind this piracy phenomenon, what lies ahead if the
international community intervenes and what could develop in that region if the
latter is late to intervene or doesn't meet the challenge? It appears the
strategic challenge is even bigger than the mere piracy. Indeed, the strategy
now contemplated by regional powers could become a major military debacle. Here
is why:
These so-called Somali pirates are strategically different from their
historical predecessors in the Caribbean or from their contemporary colleagues
in archipelagoes around the world. They aren't a vast collection of individual
thugs, acting as bands replicating what successful sea gangs have accomplished
for centuries before them. They are too many, operating from extremely long
shores, all using similar methods, and are backed from hinterland forces.
They may seem like pirates as they seize ships and negotiate for ransom. But
these water thugs actually belong to a wider chess game. The grand ensemble of
the army of little boats is part of a regional jihadi apparatus being deployed
in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The jihadi grand circle building in the
region is not limited to the pirates but involves hostile forces from the
mid-Red Sea to East Africa. The Somali pirates are merely one facet of this
grand circle.
Ironically, the term used in Arabic (and now in Arabic media) to depict the
Somali pirates is Qursaan, which derives from Corsairs, the
swashbuckling French privateers from a bygone era. A view of the operations map
of these Somali Qursaan leaves little room that the end aim is to create
a vast zone of insecurity stretching from East Africa to the Red Sea.
A closer look allows strategists to easily realize that these are the maritime
passages from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal
and also parts of the East African alternative routes - the most economic via
Cape Town on the southern tip of Africa.
So, above and beyond the globally low (even if locally lucrative) revenues that
these operations bring to their little pirates, the greater Qursaan operation
is of regional-international dimension. It is about holding these passages
hostage, thereby bringing global negotiation. This is nothing more than a
maritime jihad striking at international lifelines on high seas to bring about
a change in balance of power.
If the West (with other democracies or powers) decides to engage the Qursaan
on high seas only, there will be more waves of piracy action, and revenge will
gradually take place against the countries whose vessels conducted the military
interdictions. When such escalation takes place, the options are only two:
either the powers suspend the operations and negotiate with the pirates, or
they take offensive against their ports of launching, that is, on Somali soil.
If the United States and its allies drop the naval campaign and assign
diplomats to treat the matter, the Qursaan will grow in number and
influence and eventually their outreach will close the waters between the
Arabian Peninsula and Africa. But if the international coalition (which yet has
to take shape) decides to take on the points of origins of the attackers, this
will lead to a massive campaign along the Somali-Kenyan coastlines forcing
actions to be taken against ports, many small ports and eventually beachheads,
establishing security enclaves.
Such a projection will re-create a multinational force to perform the missions,
reprisal operations and eventually inland deployment, deeper and deeper inside
Somalia. That's precisely what the jihadis are looking for: brigades of
international forces landing in that country, infidels in nature, so that the
Somali Shabab al-Mujahideen and other groups have the honor of fighting them.
The so-called pirates are being used by land-based forces to drag the enemy
into a wider war in the region, with all probabilities and possibilities open.
To each decision made by the West and its allies, a counter plan will be
applied. These are the types of complex threats that 21st century terror forces
will develop to upset the balance of forces. For by challenging a previously
stable area of transportation and commerce, the forces behind the Qursaan
will be scoring a major victory. If the foe negotiates, they win, and in their
view also, if the foe engages militarily, the jihadis win too.
Indeed, if Somalia goes back to full war, the forces engaged in such a campaign
would involve many navies in the area.
Two months ago, Eritrea and the Iranian regime signed an agreement granting
naval facilities to Iranian military ships to use the country's ports and
eventually build a base on the Red Sea. Last month, reports signaling an
alignment of military intelligence between the Sudanese and Iranian regimes and
Hezbollah's networks in the region.
At this stage, sensationalist stories and footage of modern-day piracy
dominate. In the war rooms of the other side, the Qursaan are probably
the tip of an Islamic iceberg moving slowly towards one of the most sensitive
regions of the world.
Dr Walid Phares is the author of The Confrontation: Winning the
War against Future Jihad. He is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at
the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the
European Foundation for Democracy
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
