Iran takes a stand over Kurds
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Kurdish leaders in Iraq face tough decisions with respect to the central
government in Baghdad and powerful neighbors Iran and Turkey. The Kurds are
confronted with a formidable regional alliance that threatens to dislodge the
ethnic group's considerable gains made since the fall of Saddam Hussein in
2003.
The key issue is whether the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Administration
(KRG) will eventually become an independent state, or whether it will remain
within the bounds of Iraq's new federalist system. Aligned with this issue are
a host of related questions, above all control of the oil-rich region
surrounding Kirkuk. United Nations mediators have proposed compromises, like
making Kirkuk an autonomous city run by all three ethnic
groups. - Kurds, Turkoman and Arabs.
As the New York Times wrote in a May 3 editorial, "If an agreement cannot be
crafted, Washington, Baghdad and the Kurds may have to consider outside,
possibly UN-led administration for some period."
But Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, an ethnic Kurd, said in a press conference
alongside the KRG leadership that the Kurds would not "barter Kirkuk", and
would not be satisfied with anything less than complete control of the city and
its outlying oil fields.
This spells trouble for Iraq, where a renewed campaign of terror attacks has
eroded some of the stability gains of recent months. An outbreak of violence
between the Iraqi army and Kurdish fighters, or Peshmarga, may be just a matter
of time, according to experts.
Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, is visiting
Iraq's Kurdistan region this week to mediate between the Kurds and Baghdad.
According to Mullen, a clash between the two would "reverse the progress in the
country". Perhaps another way to describe this possibility would be Iraq's next
civil war.
KRG leaders claim they are studying the UN plan, but have previously denounced
it and insisted on complete control of Kirkuk. The Kurds have only a marginal
majority in the city.
The KRG is already on the defensive following reports from rights organizations
that have blamed the group for following a policy of Kurdification and ethnic
cleansing. The groups claim that many non-Kurds have been forced to flee the
area.
Compounding an already volatile situation is the KRG's provision of sanctuary
for Kurdish militants opposed to the governments in Turkey and Iran. As a
result, coordinated counter-insurgency actions by both governments have taken
place inside KRG territory.
The news from Turkey is that Ankara is considering establishing two military
bases in northern Iraq to confront the menace of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK). Meanwhile, Iran has recently escalated its responses to cross-border
attacks by Kurdish militants with the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan
(PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK that - unlike the PKK - lacks grassroots support
in Iran and is widely viewed by Tehran as a proxy for the US and Israel.
In early February, the US government for the first time designated the PJAK a
terrorist organization. The designation comes after years of media reports that
the US has aided and trained PJAK fighters to incite ethnic strife for Iran.
Iran's hot pursuit of the PJAK into KRG territory these past few days -
including the May 4 shelling of villages in Kurdistan border regions - has sent
a signal to the KRG regarding Tehran's unhappiness with Kurdish inflexibility
on Kirkuk. The PJAK claims that Iran's attacks have occurred in areas not under
their control.
The KRG's representative in Tehran, Nazim Omar Dabbagh, has warned that Iran's
raids and bombardments could "harm bilateral relations". Although the KRG has
called on the PJAK to refrain from further attacks on Iran, Tehran is weary of
attempts by the KRG to leverage the PJAK in the course of negotiations with the
Tehran-backed regime in Baghdad.
A pillar of Iran's policy toward the "new" Iraq has been to prevent the
partition of Iraq and to ensure the country's territorial integrity. Tehran has
also sought to quell violent secessionist insurgents who have been taking
sanctuary across the long, porous borders with Iraq since the early 1980s.
The KRG, which is scheduled to hold a meeting in May aimed at ending decades of
hostility between Turkey and the PKK, is now being pressured by Iran to take a
similar initiative with the PJAK. Some experts believe the PJAK's latest
incursions may be its last military salvo.
Unlike its PKK progenitors, who can claim grassroots support among the 20
million or so Kurds living in Turkey, the PJAK has no such internal backbone
and suffers from an important perception problem as a Western proxy. Despite
its spate of attacks in Iran, the PJAK represents a much less menacing threat
to Tehran than the PKK has been to Ankara.
Iran's 4 million or so Kurds, mostly inhabiting the provinces of Western
Azerbaijan, Ilam and Kurdistan bordering Iraq, have been much quieter than the
Kurds in Iraq or Turkey. This is partly because they have a long heritage as an
ethnic-Iranian group and have been integrated in the post-revolutionary
political system.
There are valid criticisms of Tehran's handling of Kurdish rights and issues of
cultural and linguistic autonomy. Yet government efforts to improve the living
conditions of its Kurdish population cannot be overlooked.
For example, since the 1979 revolution the number of university students has
risen 400% in Kurdistan province and literacy has gone up from 24% to nearly
80%. The province's six deputies in parliament have been vocal in their
criticisms of government policies, specifically on joblessness. The central
bank recently announced a new infusion of cash to the local Kurdish economy, in
addition to hundreds of urban and rural projects.
According to Shaker Ebrahimi, the head of Workers' Islamic Council in
Kurdistan, budgetary constraints have caused the shutting down of a number of
smaller businesses over the past few years. Still, this is not specific to
Kurdistan as 300,000 workers have lost their jobs throughout Iran in the past
year.
In Western Azerbaijan, where the population is split between Kurds and Turks,
the head of policy planning, Ghani Zadeh, has attributed the recent closure of
some factories to old technology. According to Zadeh, the government has
adopted 34 projects for Urumieh, the capital, and nine state-wide
infrastructure projects.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has announced an impending visit
to Kurdistan and several Kurdish officials have been quick to point out this
will be a "turning point" for employment in the region.
Such progress doesn't mask shortcomings in the Iranian government's cultural
policies toward the Kurds and other ethnic minorities. According to experts,
Tehran has always had to amend its respect for minorities' rights with national
security concerns.
Historically, this has been a complex balancing act. Should neighboring Iraq's
experimentation with federalism prove productive - and this will be a matter of
more than just a few years - it is likely that Iraq's example will influence
Iran. At the present time, however, Iraqi Kurds give the impression of
leveraging their federalist rights as a prelude to eventual independence.
Perhaps the best help that Iraqi Kurds could give their brethren in Iran would
be to remain within Iraq's federalist system, setting a viable example for Iran
to follow. Instead, they are only adding to Iran's security worries by
allegedly supporting groups such as the PJAK.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
