Page 1 of 2 Limits to the Saudis' jihadi crackdown
By Kamran Bokhari
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has historically played a major role in the
development of jihadism. Key pillars of the Saudi state - oil, Wahhabism (a
conservative form of Sunni Islam) and the strength of tribal norms - were
instrumental in facilitating the rise of Islamist extremism and terrorism
around the world prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. These same pillars
allowed Riyadh to contain al-Qaeda within Saudi Arabia in the wake of the
insurgency that kicked off in the kingdom in 2003-2004. After this success on
the home front, Riyadh is still using these pillars to play an international
role in counter-jihadist efforts - a role welcomed by the United States.
During a visit to the kingdom last week, US Defense Secretary
Robert Gates said the Saudi rehabilitation program for former militants
impressed him, prompting him to consider sending Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo
Bay to Saudi Arabia as part of Washington's efforts to close down the detention
center. The Saudis probably have done "as good, if not a better, job of that
than almost anybody," Gates said of the Saudi program. In separate comments,
Gates called on Riyadh to assist Pakistan in the latter's efforts to combat its
rapidly expanding Taliban insurgency - and Saudi Arabia in fact has been
playing a role in efforts to contain the Taliban insurgency in both Pakistan
and Afghanistan for some time.
Clearly, Saudi Arabia is taking a lead role in anti-extremism,
counter-terrorism and de-radicalization efforts. Understanding what the Saudis
are doing and how it has permitted them to succeed in this regard will shed
light on Riyadh's domestic successes, and it will indicate what can be expected
from its efforts abroad.
Saudi domestic counter-jihadist successes
The Saudis have had ample experience in dealing with religious extremists and
militants since long before their struggle with al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula in the aftermath of 9/11. The kingdom's founder, King Abdel-Aziz,
faced a situation similar to that now faced by Pakistan before he defeated the
Ikhwan in the 1920s. The Ikhwan (not to be confused with the Egyptian group
Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, which is Arabic for "Muslim Brotherhood") was a tribal
religious militia of extremist Wahhabis. Whereas the Pakistanis have nurtured
jihadist groups as tools of foreign policy in their dealings with India and
Afghanistan, the Ikhwan helped Abdel-Aziz conquer most of present-day Saudi
Arabia.
While Abdel-Aziz was not interested in conquering additional territories, the
Ikhwan had larger regional ambitions. The group wanted to expand its jihad into
places like Iraq, which the British then controlled. Just as Pakistan has found
itself caught between its Islamist militant assets and the United States in the
aftermath of 9/11, the nascent kingdom had to decide between the Ikhwan and its
first Great Power ally, the United Kingdom. Exigencies forced Abdel-Aziz to
choose the British, and he put down a subsequent Ikhwan rebellion.
Petrodollars
Notably, this all occurred before the discovery of oil and Saudi Arabia's
subsequent emergence as a petrodollar-rich monarchy (and for that matter, even
before the state was known as the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"). While the Saudis
did not have their present financial resources, they did have one very
important tool they wielded successfully against the Ikhwan threat. That tool
was religion, which had become a key part of the fabric of the Saudi state
since its first incarnation in the mid-1700s. Religion mixed in with a culture
based on strong elements of tribalism and familism provided for a strong social
contract involving the Saudi royal family, the family of Muhammad bin
Abdel-Wahhab (founder of the Wahhabi school of thought) and the masses.
This historic Saudi-Wahhabi alliance has long provided the state with religious
legitimacy, which the royal family has used to put down religious dissent on a
number of occasions since the Ikhwan uprising. Key among them were the 1979
incident in which a group of Wahhabi militants took over the Kaaba, the dissent
within the religious establishment in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War,
and the 2003-2004 al-Qaeda insurgency. The use of religion to consolidate
national power has led to a significant blowback, as evident from the global
emergence of violent Islamism. But unlike other states, Saudi Arabia has been
able to mobilize the tribal, religious, security and commercial spheres of the
country against Islamist rebels.
Religion and tribalism
The secret to the Saudis' success was turning the rebels' strongest weapon,
religion, back against them. This was possible because the state enjoyed a
monopoly over religious discourse thanks to the vast religious establishment
that Riyadh had cultivated over the years. Paradoxically, while this religious
establishment has been the source of much radicalism in Saudi Arabia and
worldwide, it also has served the Saudis well in terms of giving the state a
powerful tool with which to quell dissent and preserve the regime.
The tribal nature of Saudi society, with its norms of obedience to those in
authority, complemented the state's religious tools. The Saudi ulema (scholars)
supported by the tribes have laid great emphasis on Koranic notions of
obedience to rulers as long as the rulers do not clearly defy Islam. Another
important tribal and religious concept is abhorrence of social chaos, which
also helped the Saudis isolate the Islamist rebels from the rest of society by
arguing that jihadist activity would lead to anarchy.
Tribal social structure imposes a hierarchy that forms a strong bulwark against
rebellions by forcing conformity upon the tribes, clans and families. This
limits the social space available for rebels to operate in. Tribes cooperate
with the authorities in taking action against belligerents, and then they also
take responsibility for the "good behavior" of repentant militants.
The power of the tribal norm is such that it is very unlikely that militants
could influence enough tribes to mount a successful uprising. The Saudis have
had some two-and-a-half centuries' worth of experience at skillfully managing
tribal politics. The rise and fall of the first (1744-1818) and second
(1824-1891) Saudi states and the establishment of the modern kingdom in the
early 1900s were to a great degree a function of the ruling al-Saud family's
ability to forge tribal alliances.
Prior to 9/11, one Saudi strategy for dealing with products of the Wahhabi
establishment who exhibited levels of extremism deemed intolerable involved
directing the radicals to fight in war zones like Afghanistan, Central Asia,
the Balkans and the Caucasus. This maintained order and security while the
rebels were away (and in many cases the radicals died in the fighting). Even
after 9/11 - and particularly in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq - the
Saudis employed this approach to defuse domestic tensions and to try to contain
increasing Iranian influence in Iraq and the rise of Tehran's Iraqi Shiite
allies.
But US-Saudi tensions in the aftermath of 9/11 reached a point where Riyadh
knew this was no longer an option. Consequently, under the guidance of King
Abdullah, the kingdom embarked upon a strategy of permanently dealing with the
issue through reforms at the governmental and societal levels, a process that
is still very much a work in progress. The aim was to curb further extremism,
as well as to address existing radicalism.
High oil prices, which lasted until July 2008, gave the country the financial
wherewithal to invest in such a major anti-jihadist initiative. But without a
powerful religious establishment at its side, the money alone would not have
permitted the Saudis to succeed. This religious establishment has played a key
role in the country's rehabilitation program, which is designed to integrate
militants who have surrendered or been captured back into society. While
financial resources have played a critical role in efforts to bring previously
radicalized youths back into the mainstream, the scholars have provided the
theological gravitas to counter the jihadist ideology and wean the youths from
jihadism.
As mentioned, the process is still in its infancy, and incidents of recidivism
have occurred. For example, Said Ali al-Shihri emerged in Yemen as a key leader
of the jihadist node on the Arabian Peninsula after undergoing the rehab
program. Still, the Saudis' ability to put a major dent in the capabilities of
jihadists in the kingdom and to avoid major backlash to the reform process
highlights Riyadh's successful use of religion to curb extremism.
The jihadist threat within the kingdom remains, but a combination of unique
circumstances enabled Saudi Arabia to make considerable progress on the home
front. Fears still exist that because of the ultraconservative religious nature
of the state, the monarchy might fall and be replaced by a radical regime -
especially as the kingdom enters an extended period of transition. But for now,
the Saudi situation is stable to the point where the Saudis can look beyond
their borders and offer help to other jihadist trouble spots.
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