Page 2 of 2 Limits to the Saudis' jihadi crackdown By Kamran Bokhari
Replicating Saudi counter-jihadist successes
Saudi Arabia's counter-jihadist successes and position as a religious and
financial leader of the Islamic world have prompted the United States and
countries like Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan to seek Riyadh's help with
jihadist problems.
Yemen
The first such place to do so is
just south of the Saudi border. Yemen has become a jihadist hub where Saudi
jihadists have regrouped along with their counterparts from Iraq, Somalia and
elsewhere under new management. The country also faces other forms of unrest
and insecurity that are weakening the state and raising fears of regional
instability among Yemen's wealthier Arab
neighbors. For example, Yemen's north-south divide is re-emerging, meaning that
there are two competing branches of nationalism in the country. As a result,
Sanaa and Riyadh have moved toward greater cooperation, especially on the issue
of the jihadists; the Saudis can offer financial assistance and advice to the
cash-strapped Yemenis regarding the Saudi rehabilitation program.
But unlike Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis have the upper hand in the
relationship with the religious establishment, the Yemeni state is dependent
upon its religious leaders and upon the Salafist-jihadists who dominate the
country's security establishment. Moreover, Yemen is not as religiously
homogenous as Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, the religious establishment
was strong enough to claim the mantle of Wahhabism and isolate the jihadists as
"deviants," Yemen would have to develop an alternative religious discourse to
successfully counter the theological challenge posed by the jihadists.
Engendering a mainstream national religious identity takes a long time even for
those states endowed with resources, which means there are serious limitations
on how far Yemen can expect to succeed in anti-extremism and counter-terrorism
efforts.
Like Saudi Arabia, Yemeni society is also tribal, but it is much more
fragmented than that of its richer, larger neighbor. Unlike Saudi Arabia, where
the House of al-Saud sits at the top of the tribal hierarchy, Yemeni tribes are
neither as strong nor as organized. Moreover, the Yemeni state is dependent
upon the tribes for support - explaining why Saana's bid to win tribal
assistance in dealing with militants has not attained the desired results.
The huge differences in economic conditions, religious hierarchy and tribal
structures between Saudi Arabia and Yemen accordingly will make it difficult
for Riyadh to reproduce in its southern neighbor the successful results it has
enjoyed at home.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
enjoys a disproportionate amount of influence over both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. For example, Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin has recently
been involved in efforts to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. Likewise, the
Pakistani interior minister and the two most senior generals of the Pakistani
military have made trips in recent months to the kingdom - most likely not just
for monetary assistance, but also to benefit from the Saudi experience in
dealing with the Taliban problem.
Ground realities in Afghanistan and Pakistan make these states much more
difficult nuts to crack than even Yemen, which shares some basic social
similarities with Saudi Arabia. The security situations in Afghanistan and
Pakistan are in advanced stages of deterioration (though to different degrees).
Both South Asian neighbors face full-blown insurgencies, making it difficult
for the respective states to maintain their writ in the affected areas. This is
quite different from anything Saudi Arabia has ever faced, and it also is
different from Yemen, where the jihadists have not transformed themselves into
a guerrilla movement.
On the religious front, Afghanistan and Pakistan lack religious establishments.
Instead, they both have highly fragmented religious landscapes consisting of
rival Islamist groups, competing Sunni sects and networks of madrassas (seminaries).
Even the two countries' more mainstream ulema are divided into various groups.
Unlike in Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser degree) Yemen, only a tiny minority
adheres to Salafist/Wahhabi Islam in Southwest Asia. Even so, the Deobandis
(the sect of the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups) are a growing
movement, posing a challenge to the Shi'ites and the majority Barelvis (a South
Asian form of Sufi Islam).
On the social level, while tribes exist in both South Asian states, they are
very weak compared to the Arab states in question. In Afghanistan, the tribal
hierarchy is almost nonexistent in terms of being able to project power because
of the rise of the mullahs and militia commanders. In Pakistan, the tribes are
limited to Pashtun areas, and even there the mullahs and militiamen have
significantly degraded the power of the tribal maliks (chiefs).
These factors place significant limits on how much the Saudis can assist
Islamabad or Kabul in their respective counterinsurgency efforts and
anti-extremism drives.
For these reasons, the Saudis have focused on trying to broker talks between
the Taliban and the Western-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Even on this
issue, Riyadh is not having much luck, because the Taliban elements it has been
dealing with thus far have been former leaders of the movement, while current
Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar and his associates have rejected the idea of
talks because they feel they have the upper hand in the insurgency and do not
see the West as "staying the course" in their country.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan the Saudis have been focused on efforts to create a
consensus among various stakeholders on how to deal with the militancy. Riyadh
maintains strong ties with Pakistan, especially with the military establishment
and right-of-center forces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of
former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with several of the country's
Islamist political parties. As a result, the Saudis may be able to use their
financial and energy clout to get the religiously and socially conservative
forces in Pakistan to agree to support a major state initiative to contain the
violence. But in sharp contrast to the way Riyadh took a focused approach to
its own Islamist rebels, Islamabad lacks coherence.
Therefore, given the social fragmentation and complexities of the two South
Asian states, the Saudis will not be able to help either Afghanistan or
Pakistan much in terms of bringing down the violence those countries face. It
can, however, assist in curbing religious extremism by undermining jihadists,
given the ideological proximity of the Deobandis and the Wahhabis. But since
the Saudis are still working on the ideological front through rehabilitation at
home, it will be awhile before they can help others.
Saudi Arabia's successes in rolling back religious radicalism at home are the
result of the confluence of certain unique circumstances that simply do not
exist in more troubling jihadist hot spots like Yemen, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The Saudi example thus offers few lessons for Sanaa, Kabul and
Islamabad in dealing with their own situations. Ultimately, while the Saudis
will be able to play an important role in providing financial assistance and
some help in ideologically undermining Islamist extremism and radicalism, they
will be able to do less on the physical battlefield.
(Published with permission from Stratfor,
a Texas-based geopolitical intelligence company. Copyright 2009 Stratfor.)
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