Israel plays on Obama's Iran policy
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
United States President Barack Obama may have talked tough with visiting
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on the need for a "two-state
solution" to the Palestinian issue, yet by all indications Netanyahu's visit to
Washington on Monday was a minor success in terms of the US's Iran policy.
In response to Israel's approach of prioritizing Iran's nuclear threat, Obama
appeased Netanyahu by reiterating his shared sentiment about Iran's nuclear
threat (to both Israel and the US). He also expressed his determination to stop
Iran's development of a "nuclear weapons capability" by resorting to tougher
sanctions if need be in the event Tehran refused to budge in nuclear
negotiations.
Regarding the latter, in light of Israel's pressure on Washington to
set a timeline for nuclear talks with Iran, although officially the White House
has rejected this idea, Obama nonetheless told Netanyahu that he expected
results from engagement with Iran by the end of the year, thus implicitly
setting a timeline for more coercive action against that country.
As a follow-up, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a US Senate
committee on May 19 that the administration opposed Iran having a nuclear
weapons capability and was relying for now on diplomatic pressure to stop this
happening. She added that Iran's nuclear pursuit was causing a dangerous arms
race in the Middle East that, in turn, would make "the Iranian regime less
secure".
Conspicuously missing in Clinton's testimony was any clue that there is already
a nuclear arms race in the volatile Middle East, triggered by nuclear-armed
Israel.
The US, though, has over the years, particularly since the events of September
11, 2001, done much to make Iran feel "less secure". The latest being the
recent statement of some US lawmakers about playing the "ethnic card" against
Iran to cause the country to break up along ethnic lines.
Clinton's concern about Iran's security, if genuine, ought to extend to a frank
discussion of how the US's post-September 11 military intervention in Iran's
vicinity has substantially aggravated Tehran's national security headaches.
This is irrespective of how this intervention has toppled Iran's adversaries in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
From Iran's vantage point, the US has filled the vacuum of traditional enemies
directly, by forming a menacing security belt around Iran that covers Central
Asia and even the Caucasus, in light of the US's and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's military projections with countries such as Azerbaijan.
What is more, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is on a
two-week tour of Iran's Kurdish region, has blasted the US for engaging in a
"conspiracy" along Iran's western borders to "sow ethnic divisions" inside
Iran.
According to some Iran analysts, the US is not alone and Israel is equally if
not more active, through its Mossad agents training, arming and financing
Kurdish terrorists who have been conducting bold cross-border attacks inside
Iran. (See Iran
takes a stand over Kurds Asia Times Online, May 6, 2009.)
Not only that, Iran in the past has accused both the US and Israel of being
behind the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jundallah, which "was propped up as a
response to Iran's support for Lebanon's Hezbollah", to quote a Tehran
political analyst.
But, according to the same analyst, just as momentum behind Jundallah fizzled
after a joint Iran-Pakistan operation to root it out of Pakistan's Balochistan
region, the same fate awaits the Kurdish terrorist group known as the PJAK
(Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan). This is in light of an Iranian military
counter-offensive inside northern Iraq and a new determination on the part of
the leaders of the Kurdish Regional Administration to clip the PJAK's wings.
However, recalling a June 2006 report by American investigative reporter
Seymour Hersh that US special forces were training PJAK fighters, in the
absence of a breakthrough in the nuclear talks, the US may adhere to a more
forceful use of the "ethnic card". This is irrespective of the US naming the
PJAK as a terrorist outfit as of this February.
For now, though, the Iranian presidential elections in June take center stage.
These feature fierce competition between the top four candidates:
Incumbent President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
Former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
Former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Mohsen Rezai.
Former speaker of parliament (Majlis) Mehdi Karroubi.
The elections and foreign policy
The presidential elections invariably afford a rare opportunity for the
articulation of contending visions for Iran's domestic and foreign affairs.
What is different now is the public display of sharp divisions among the
leading candidates, who have been authorized to run from a long list of some
477 candidates. They disagree on a broad range of foreign-policy issues.
Basking in the numerous advantages of incumbency, Ahmadinejad is counting on
the hope that the electorate agrees with his administration's prioritization of
security and military interests over "soft-power" diplomacy. And also the fact
that Iran has made great strides in the area of nuclear technology since he
assumed the mantle of presidency in August 2005.
In a speech at Semnan, northern Iran, on Wednesday, where he announced that
Iran had successfully fired a long-range surface-to-surface Sejil-2 missile,
Ahmadinejad severely criticized the previous Tehran administration for signing
"the disgraceful Saadabad agreement". In terms of this accord with the
Europeans in 2003, Iran suspended its sensitive nuclear activities.
For nationalistic Iranians, Ahmadinejad's willingness to push ahead with the
nuclear program despite mounting external pressures may be his biggest plus.
For the other candidates, they may want to capitalize on the adverse impact of
United Nations and US sanctions on Iran because of its uranium-enrichment
program, but they dare not do this publicly. Mousavi in particular has gone on
record by promising to continue with enrichment.
Mousavi, from the reformist camp, has a foreign policy team made up entirely of
individuals associated with former president Mohammad Khatami. He has pledged
more "constructive relations with the world" and he would likely amend some of
Ahmadinejad's specific stances with respect to cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog.
A great unknown about Mousavi, known more as a "leftist conservative" than a
reformist, according to many Iran watchers, is his chemistry with Supreme
Leader Khamenei. The latter has made some critical comments about Mousavi and
the two did not have particularly rosy relations during the 1980s when Khamenei
was a largely ceremonial president and Mousavi the hands-on prime minister.
Mousavi will have to realize that times have changed and he must show greater
deference to Khamenei than he did when Khamenei was in the much less powerful
position of a ceremonial president.
Khamenei, despite a recent public rebuke of Ahmadinejad over a merger of the
Tourism and Mecca Pilgrimage offices, which was widely interpreted as
Khamenei's displeasure with some foreign policy mishaps, the leader continues
to have confidence in Ahmadinejad and in today's Iran that is a huge factor in
determining the outcome of national elections.
Rezai, on the other hand, has pledged to prioritize Iran's relations with its
neighbors, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, and has singled out
Saudi-Iran relations as a major area in need of immediate repair.
Karroubi, on the other hand, has been more vocal than the other two candidates
in criticizing Ahmadinejad's foreign policy, particularly with respect to the
president's stance over the Holocaust, which, according to Karroubi, "is not an
Iran issue".
According to some Iran analysts, the chances of the election going to a second
round are great because Mousavi and Rezai can split the hardliners' vote and
thus reduce Ahmadinejad's chances for re-election. Mousavi has pledged a
"coalition government" of national unity. This appeals to a broad segment of
voters who have shown dissatisfaction with the present administration's rather
monolithic make-up. However, Ahmadinejad, who is ahead according to some Tehran
polls, may increase his chances should he pledge a more inclusive
administration come a second four-year term.
Iran's troubled economy, rising unemployment and the intersection of foreign
policy (which includes sanctions), weigh heavy on voters, who want to see a
much-needed breakthrough in the stalemated US-Iran relations.
According to reports from Tehran, Ahmadinejad sent an envoy to New York
recently for negotiations with the US regarding the opening of a US diplomatic
office in Tehran.
This, together with Ahmadinejad's overtures toward Obama, such as sending him a
letter of congratulations on winning the US presidency and the release of
jailed US-Iranian journalist Roxana Saberi, indicate that Ahmadinejad is
determined to negotiate with the US. But he wants to do so from a position of
strength rather than weakness, something for which he has criticized his
reformist predecessor for not doing.
The reformists, on the other hand, believe there is much to exploit on the
foreign policy front. They cite Iran's isolation, its damaged ties with Europe,
alienation from the Arab world and the UN sanctions.
The voters will make up their own minds in three weeks. Meanwhile, one thing is
clear: Obama's growing concert with Israel against Iran is a bad omen that
reinforces Iranians' suspicion that Washington remains hostage to the
pro-Israel lobby and that Obama will act like the previous US presidents who
have targeted Iran.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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