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    Middle East
     May 30, 2009
Obama steps into diplomatic minefield
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

Ahead of two critical elections, in Lebanon and Iran, United States President Barack Obama's visit to the Middle East next week is a delicate matter that may even prove to be a litmus test of his foreign policy orientation.

The trip is unlikely to have any major impact on the parliamentary elections in Lebanon on June 7 or the Iranian presidential elections on June 12. Nonetheless, the visit to the region's two leading Sunni Arab powerhouses - Egypt and Saudi Arabia - may be interpreted as a sign of foreign policy continuity with the past. That is, a return to former president George W Bush's Cold War-style politics that encouraged an alliance of Arab moderates versus Iran-led radicals.

According to former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who

 

advises the Obama administration, the US should pursue the objective of "strategic balance" in the region. Assuming that the pro-Iran Hezbollah will dominate the Lebanese elections, then according to this "neo-realist" perspective, this will add to the present regional imbalance favoring the Iran-Syria bloc, backed by Hamas and a number of other Palestinian organizations.

From the point of view of Egypt, which considers itself a strategic counterweight to Iran, Obama's highly-anticipated visit is bound to shore up Cairo's role and influence in inter-regional affairs, particularly as Cairo has been upping the ante against Hezbollah recently.

For Saudi Arabia on the other hand, its late addition to Obama's travel itinerary is a welcome sign it is not isolated from the current inter-Arab jockeying for leadership, which is mainly between Cairo and Riyadh.

But, the big question is: what exactly does Obama wish to gain from his trip to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as part of an overseas tour that includes France and Germany? According to a White House spokesman, the president's intention is to discuss the Iran nuclear issue and to generate support for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

On both these subjects, after four months in office, Obama has little tangible progress to show and it is doubtful that this trip will make any significant dent. In fact, should it appear that Obama is overstating his case in either department, then his entire journey could backfire and cause unwanted backlashes in Israel and Iran, considerably deflating the new US administration's enthusiasm for foreign policy change.

With the US and Israel out of step on the idea of a two-state solution and on Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the chances are that if the White House misplays its card, then the gap between the US and Israel may grow even bigger. Or, vice versa, it might narrow, at the cost of Obama's favorable image in the Muslim Middle East.

On Thursday, after a meeting in Washington with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Obama expressed optimism that Israel would realize that a two-state solution with Palestine is in its best interests.

Obama said the best way to guarantee Israeli security was to "set the stage for a Palestinian state", a process he said should include Israel stopping the construction of settlements and Palestinians following through with security steps in the West Bank.

The Obama administration's quest to revive the Arab peace plan hinges first and foremost on convincing Israel to come on board, something that Obama failed to do during the recent Washington visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As a result, Obama's trip has the potential to be perceived as an effort in coalition-building to bring Israel into line.

Given Israel's insistence on linking the Iran nuclear issue with the stalled peace process, Obama needs to make some headway in building up regional pressure on Iran. Yet it will be difficult to do so short of replicating Bush's "new cold war" rhetoric and "divide and conquer" approach - a stable feature of US policy in the Middle East since the end of World War II, albeit with changing nuances.

Obama's focus on the Iran nuclear threat, if overdone, will likely create the impression that his administration is equally prepared as its predecessors to use Iran-fearmongering to maintain US power over the oil regions of the Persian Gulf.

This may explain the timing of a recent statement by Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, claming that Iran is "one to three years" away from acquiring nuclear bombs, a possibility that Mullen in apocalyptic language described as "calamitous".

Mullen's statement coincided with the release of a new report by the East West Institute [1] on Iran's missile threat, which predicted that an Iranian nuclear capability - and especially the warhead delivery capability - is far more distant. This undermines alarmist predictions by top US officials.

Many observers feel the Obama administration took the wrong approach to both Lebanon and Iran by dispatching Vice President Joseph Biden to Beirut last week. Biden did all he could to undermine Hezbollah's chances by, above all, warning that future US assistance depended on the election's outcome. This was another reminder that this White House, like its predecessor, has a qualified understanding of democracy: it's good as long as it does not bring the wrong candidates to power.

This is a questionable way of promoting democracy in the Middle East, particularly since no one in the Obama administration seems bothered by the highly restrictive elections in Egypt or the absence of any elections in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has been rattled by neighboring Iraq's experiment with democracy - one reason why Saudi-Iraqi relations remain poor.

Once in Saudi Arabia, Obama would be wise to press the kingdom's leadership hard on the issue of full diplomatic relations with Shi'ite-led Iraq, instead of seeking a Sunni-led alliance against Iran, which is Iraq's key trade partner.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are experiencing the pains of the global recession and are more eager than ever to halt any regional arms race. The US, intent on collecting the rewards of hefty, multi-billion dollar arms sales to GCC states, may seek to fuel a Persian Gulf arms race through anti-Iran propaganda.

If so, Obama may soon be perceived as yet another shrewd salesman of US hegemony, the personification of the US's current bid at "smart power". This could backfire with respect to Obama's nascent Iran policy, which is under fire from both the right, center and left in the US. A recent opinion piece in Sunday's New York Times by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Man Leverett accused Obama of not living up to his campaign promise to make a serious overture towards Iran.

Coinciding with such left-of-center criticisms of Obama's Iran policy, was the revelation by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in a Sunday interview with NBC television that Obama had requested an updated plan for a military strike on Iran, adding that "we have refreshed our plan".

This translates into a new US determination to back its Iran diplomacy with a "military threat", to paraphrase Washington columnist David Ignatius. Contrary to Ignatius, the present efforts to bolster diplomacy with the stick of military threats only torpedoes the chances for a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran, a country that traditionally does not respond well to external threats.
The US pundits who point to Iran's cooperation with the US on Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, fail to see the primary underlying reason for Iran's cooperation: the fact that it was largely born by shared interests vis-a-vis the dreaded Taliban and less as a result of fear that "Uncle Sam is coming".

As Obama prepares to traverse the length of the Persian Gulf, he may want to reflect on the current trends in Washington aiming to perpetuate US hegemony in the name of "containing Iran". Such ambitions may lead to static foreign policy that constantly demonizes Iran, a country with which the US in the post 9/11 milieu has much in common.

Note
1. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, a joint threat assessment by US and Russian technical experts.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here. His latest book, Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) is now available.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)


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