Al-Qaeda seeks to win over Sunnis
By Rafid Fadhil Ali
After a gradual handover process, the Sunni fighters of the Sahwa (Awakening)
Councils have come under the responsibility of Iraq's Shi'ite-led central
government. From their emergence two years ago until recently, the Sahwa
councils, which cooperated with Coalition forces to drive al-Qaeda out of their
areas, have been paid and backed by American forces in Iraq.
On April 2, the handover was completed and all 92,000 men of the Sahwa councils
transferred to the payroll and command of the Iraqi government. Yet this date
was barely indicated in the media, which was still busy reporting the aftermath
of clashes in central Baghdad between Iraqi government forces and the Sahwa
fighters of the Sunni Fadhil neighborhood.
The fighting broke out on March 28 when the Sahwa fighters
protested the arrest of the leader of their group, Adil al-Mashadani. After a
two-day operation supported by the American army, the Iraqi forces took control
of the area and the Sahwa fighters surrendered. Two people were killed and 11
others arrested.
The spokesman of the Iraqi government pointed out that al-Mashadani was a
wanted terrorist. An Iraqi military spokesman accused him of leading the local
branch of the banned Ba'ath party, but one of al-Mashadani's men said after
their defeat “The Sahwa is over now. Al-Qaeda and the bombings will be back.”
Violence increased by 40% in the month of April, with mass bombings in Shi'ite
civilian areas and attacks on Sahwa fighters both on and off duty.
Al-Fadhil is a small neighborhood and it is unlikely there was a direct link
between events there and the recent surge of violence in different areas around
Iraq. Yet the events of al-Fadhil might be an indication of how the relations
between the Iraqi government and the Sahwa councils could affect the security
situation in that country.
By mid-2007, the American surge strategy had been applied and had started to
work. Yet that strategy could not have been effective without the unexpected
help of the Sunni population in Iraq. Thousands of Sunni fighters, many of whom
were members of insurgent groups (including al-Qaeda), turned against the
insurgency and started an alliance with the US military. These fighters formed
the first Sahwa councils.
The Sahwa movement started in the western province of al-Anbar and expanded to
all of the Sunni population in central Iraq. With American support they
succeeded in pacifying their areas and violence consequently dropped in the
country. Al-Qaeda lost its urban strongholds, all located in Sunni areas.
Whereas al-Qaeda elements were comfortable enough in October 2006 to celebrate
the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq with a parade in the main street
of al-Ramadi, capital of al-Anbar, within a matter of months Sahwa fighters
defeated al-Qaeda in such a way that former American president George W Bush
was able to visit al-Ramadi in September and meet the founder of the first
Sahwa Council, the late Shaykh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha (who was assassinated in
a suicide attack a week after that meeting).
The Sahwa Councils and al-Qaeda's infiltration
The Iraqi government and Shiite politicians often refer to an infiltration of
the Sahwa councils by al-Qaeda and the Ba'ath party. In addition to the
al-Fadhil events, recent developments have included the arrest of 11 Sahwa
fighters in different areas around Baghdad and the arrest of Mullah Nadhim
al-Jubouri, the prominent Sahwa leader and former member of al-Qaeda from
Dhuluiya (north of Baghdad). Al-Jubouri was wanted on terrorism charges related
to his earlier al-Qaeda membership and is also alleged to have played a leading
role in the killing of Shi'ites in the town of Dujail.
Many Sahwa leaders do not rule out the possibility of infiltration but see it
as a result of government policies and actions. Adnan al-Janabi, a tribal
leader from south Baghdad, warned that the security situation could collapse in
his area and criticized the government for not fulfilling its promise to
recruit Sahwa members from his area into the security forces: “It is possible
that al-Qaeda will succeed in infiltrating the Sahwa councils if the situation
stays the same.”
The major demand of the Sahwa members has been to join the Iraqi security
forces. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has promised that only 20% of them
would be able to join the army and the police. The others are to have civilian
jobs or pensions. The Iraqi government says the process of recruiting and
employing Sahwa fighters is continuing while the latter believe government
hesitation has created a stagnant situation.
In response to the clashes in al-Fadhil, al-Maliki took to the government-owned
television station to deny reports of a clash with al-Sahwa. "What have been
happening in al-Fadhil lately were not armed clashes with the Sahwa forces but
with a Ba'ath party branch ... We want what happened in al-Fadhil to be a
message to all of those who follow the route of the gang ... They might think
that they operate and make contact out of the sight of the state and its
security forces. They are all under monitoring and surveillance and each of
them will receive his fair punishment."
Al-Qaeda makes an offer
Al-Qaeda would not have missed the opportunity to gain something out of the row
between al-Maliki and the Sahwa councils. The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir (aka Abu Ayoub al-Masri), called upon the Sahwa fighters to
switch their loyalty back to al-Qaeda and the insurgent groups.
"The Sahwa fighters are criminals," he said. "They committed crimes against
their religion and people. However, if they abandon what they do and sincerely
repent to Allah we will not chase or hunt them down. Those who were in groups
which claim jihad will have our word to ensure their safety on condition that
they do not carry arms again until we make sure that their repentance is
sincere."
It was interesting that al-Muhajir, who had not been heard from for almost two
years, chose this moment to renew an offer he made earlier in late 2006. That
offer did not bring much interest at the time, a rejection that led al-Qaeda in
Iraq to form the Siddeeq brigade to fight the Sahwa Councils.
Recruitment attempts
Months before the current crisis, the Jihad and Change Front (JCF), an Iraqi
insurgent organization, claimed that its attempt to change the loyalty of the
Sahwa men had been met with a positive response. In an Internet interview, a
JCF spokesman claimed many Sahwa fighters were ready to join the resistance:
The
front was approached by groups and individuals from the Sahwa councils … our
call was for all who realized the scale of the conspiracy and the reality of
the American traps … The response proves the sincerity of the JCF's initiative.
It also indicates that those who are aligned with the occupying American forces
to fight the extremists of al-Qaeda or to confront the Iranian-backed Safavid
[ie Shi'ite] militias have concluded that they served the occupation. Their
positive response expresses their faithful intention to change their course and
to make amends for what they have done against the country and the armed
resistance. What also helped the Sahwa members was that the American occupying
forces had used the Sahwa Councils for their occupying purpose. When the Sahwa
Councils had done what the Americans wanted they were no longer necessary. The
Americans started to get rid of them. With the increase in assassinations,
hunting and arrests of the Sahwa elements, many of them decided to respond
positively to the JCF initiative.
Conclusion
Trying to create a political representation to support their demands, many of
the Sahwa councils formed political groups and participated in the last
provincial election in January 2009. With the exception of the western province
of al-Anbar, where the population is overwhelmingly Sunni and Sahwa Councils
are part of the tribal structure of the society, most of the Sahwa groups
failed to place members in parliament.
With their choices significantly reduced, the Sahwa are not in a comfortable
negotiating with the Iraqi government. If the latter intends to maintain a
hardline approach, it will not be surprising if some of the Sahwa fighters
decide to rejoin the insurgency or give up their positions in the government.
The recent deterioration in the security situation might be an indication that
some fighters have already done so.
The Sahwa row reflects one of the most significant questions in post-war Iraq -
how to deal with the Sunnis. It is no secret that many of the Sahwa council
fighters used to be active members in the insurgent groups, including al-Qaeda.
By the Iraqi and American definitions, they have committed crimes. They
attacked Iraqi and coalition forces and during the Shi'ite-Sunni sectarian
conflict some of them may have been involved in crimes against civilians.
Yet the Sunnis argue that the Shi'ite militias on the other side are guilty of
similar behavior. There is currently a great need for a legal and political
framework to deal with this situation. Without an effective and workable
national reconciliation, the danger of a great deterioration in security will
always be there, as proven by recent setbacks.
With a timetable now set for the American withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian
tensions have become the major challenge to Iraq's stability. Both the Shi'ite
and Sunni insurgents found the energy and resources to fight each other and the
coalition forces in 2005, 2006 and 2007. It would be naive to rule out the
possibility of a new wave of Shi'ite-Sunni violence if the issue surrounding
the Sahwa councils is allowed to deteriorate.
Rafid Fadhil Ali is a freelance journalist based in Iraq who specializes
in Iraqi insurgent groups.
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