Ahmadinejad tries to douse the flames By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad stated in his victory speech on Sunday that a new
era had begun in Iran. Yet he offered few details, except to say Iran would not
bow to the pressure of bullying powers, and that accountability and
anti-corruption would be top priorities in his next administration.
Even though he belittled the brewing crisis over the disputed presidential
votes, the next day's mass rally organized by challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi,
and the related street clashes - all indications suggest Ahmadinejad is caught
in an escalating drama with dangerous consequences for the entire nation.
Will Iran's seasoned leaders and political rivals somehow manage
to strike a deal to avert a full-blown crisis?
Prudent crisis management is called for. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei's consent to a probe of the allegations of voter fraud is a step in
the right direction - there will be a recount. Mousavi's team disputes the
result that gave Ahmadinejad some 64% of the presidential vote.
On Tuesday, Mousavi, Mehdi Karrubi and Mohsen Rezai, two other candidates in
the presidential race, were to attend the powerful 12-member Guardian Council
to discuss the situation. Mousavi, who has refused to recognize Ahmadinejad's
re-election, issued a communique on Sunday in which he pledged loyalty to the
principle of religious leadership; more to the point he acceded to Khamenei's
ultimate authority. Without that sign of compromise, Mousavi's meeting with
Khamenei may not have been possible.
The probability of new elections as requested by Mousavi and his reformist
supporters, including former president Mohammad Khatami, is unlikely. Observers
believe a more realistic scenario is the formation of a new script for
Ahmadinejad's second administration in which an "all-inclusive cabinet" yek
kabineh faragir will emerge, including representatives from the
reformist camp.
A clue that this may be in the offing emerged in Ahmadinejad's post-election
press conference when he invited his challengers to introduce lists of people
for inclusion in the next government. He must now follow up on this initiative
to appease the tens of thousands of mostly urban voters who opposed him and who
are now chanting slogans against him in the streets.
Iran's restricted political culture tends to interpret political affairs in
zero-sum terms. Such a mindset militates against this viable option of crisis
management.
Should Ahmadinejad and his reformist challengers reach a compromise whereby a
number of his cabinet would be drawn from the latter's camp, then his second
term will be the closest scenario to a coalition government.
On the surface, this does not seem possible because Iran has a presidential,
rather than a parliamentary, system. Still, new crises of government require
new methods of crisis resolution, even if it means changing the rules of the
game and making institutional adjustments.
Iran could well follow the German model in which a right-wing chancellor and a
leftist foreign minister work together. Mousavi as Ahmadinejad's foreign
minister? That is something to ponder.
Short of such far-reaching initiatives, the chances are that the crisis will
deepen beyond control, particularly because so many foreign hands could add
fuel to the fire. Iran's current national security crisis could represent a
setback for the country for many years, all the more reason for the leading
players involved to think outside the box.
The circumstances do not call for a zero-sum political game, but one founded on
the art of compromise.
Unfortunately, in Iran's political culture the word "compromise" often carries
a negative connotation as a sign of weakness, lack of will, even defeatism. The
transformation of this limited culture in favor of an expanded tool kit is an
important prerequisite for political compromise. In the long term, it would be
interpreted as a sign of political acumen and foresight.
As the self-declared "president for all Iranians", Ahmadinejad needs to prove
that he is also the president of the 13 million voters who voted against him by
catering to some of their key demands, otherwise the risk of major voter
alienation remains huge.
Another area where Ahmadinejad may have no choice but to curtail his agenda is
anti-corruption. He must let go of his stated intention to go after such
leading personalities as former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his
family on allegations of corruption and nepotism. Should he persist on his
anti-Rafsanjani agenda, Ahmadinejad may soon discover that he is tackling more
challenges than he can possibly handle.
With the crisis over elections results chipping away at the legitimacy and
power of the Ahmadinejad government, the re-elected president may be able to
keep hold of his position once the Khamenei-sponsored probe is over. Yet,
inevitably, he faces a new balance of power that will dictate a new strategy
and new game of political survival.
There must be an understanding that even the losers in an election have a stake
in the government, and that unless their grievances are addressed, it is a sure
bet that things will get a lot worse in the days and weeks ahead.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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