Page 2 of 2 Turkey balances on shaky ground By Reza Akhlaghi
Turkey's continued purchase of Iranian natural gas, much to the chagrin of
Americans, followed by its refusal to partake in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and
subsequent post-war fears of resurgent Kurdish separatism brought the two
countries closer together. The two countries even supported each other in their
military incursions into the Iraqi territories against Kurdish separatists.
Today Turkey is aiming to mediate between Iran and the US, pushing for a
possible rapprochement. It also wants to play a role in reducing tensions in
Iran's continuing nuclear saga. This approach helps Turkey shoot two birds with
one stone: it confers Turkey with great credibility among the Israelis and
Arabs alike, who are concerned about Iran's rise in the region and continue to
look at Iran's nuclear program with deep suspicion.
The absence of tensions between the US and Iran also helps Turkey with its
ambitious goal of becoming an energy transport route from Central Asia and Iran
to Western Europe. Iran is also viewed by Turkey as a strategic alternative
source of energy to Russia, should Russia decide to use energy as a bargaining
chip against the NATO bloc.
Dealing with Arabs: Islam as a force of unity
Since the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923 by Kemal Mustafa Ataturk on
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, Arab politicians and intellectuals have viewed
Turkey as a subordinate Western client in denial of its glorious Islamic past.
Arabs have also looked with a sense of shock and disbelief at Turkey's
decades-long relentless efforts to become part of Europe both culturally and
economically. These Arab views of Turks and the Turkish government's efforts to
distance themselves from the entire Muslim world led to the formation of a
great divide between Arabs and Turks.
Under AKP rule Turkey's efforts to reverse the trend in Turkish-Arab relations
started with gestures of diplomatic outreach and continued with concrete
actions to forge new economic as well as defense ties with the Arab world. A
turning point in Turkish Arab relations came with the state visit by King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to Turkey in 2006 in which the Saudi King openly
expressed willingness to seek Turkish assistance in expanding Saudi-European
ties and in the construction of massive development projects, an implicit show
of trust in Turkey as a strong Muslim state.
The Saudi visit gave Turkey a handsome diplomatic payoff, following Erdogan's
tour of Arab countries in 2005. Arabs have also welcomed Turkey's secret
attempts to mediate between the Israelis and Syrians. The Saudis, also known
for their allergy to anything Iranian and their fear of the Persianization of
the region, have also hoped that Turkey's mediation between the Israelis and
Syrians will result in rifts in the Syrian-Iranian alliance.
Another significant show of willingness by Turkey to expand its influence in
the Arab world was the visit to Istanbul in early May by the militant Shi'ite
Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his entourage of more than 70 people. During
his visit, Sadr met with both Erdogan and Gul.
In the light of continued enmity between Tehran and Washington, Muqtada's visit
to Turkey can be seen as Turkey's determination to mediate and resolve
differences between Americans and their remaining enemies in Iraq and bring
about stability to the war-ravaged country.
Worried about continued Iranian influence in the region, Arabs are open to
warming trends in Turkish-Arab ties as most Turks, similar to Arabs, follow the
Sunni branch of Islam, an added counterweight against Iranian ascendancy in the
region. But Turkey does not want to be in the anti-Iranian camp; nor can it
afford to, given its growing ties with Iran in energy trade. For now, Turkey
uniquely remains the only Western ally with good relations with all actors in
the Middle East and in light of Obama administration's efforts to repair ties
with the Muslim world, it is a great asset that the US can bank on.
Central Asia: the geopolitics of energy
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent independence
of its satellite republics, Turkey has put enormous effort into carving out a
strategic position for itself in the region's economic development. Today
Turkey exports Iraqi crude oil from the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline in its
southeastern border to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, where it is
shipped to refineries in Europe and the US.
Eastward in the Caucasus region, via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline,
Turkey exports one million barrels of oil per day from the former Soviet
republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The BTC pipeline carries Azeri oil from
the Chirag-Guneshli fields to Turkey's Ceyhan port.
Turkey is intent on turning itself into a critical component of the evolving
Euro-Asian energy infrastructure and is now facing competing influence from
Washington, Moscow and Tehran in a game of inclusion and exclusion. For
example, Turkey agreed to construct the Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline, which carries
natural gas from Iran to Turkey. Iran remains Turkey's second biggest source of
energy after Russia.
The Nabucco pipeline is another project that is a testimony to Turkey's
determination to become an integral part of the emerging Euro-Asian energy
infrastructure. Nabucco is a 3,300 kilometer natural gas pipeline that starts
from Turkmenistan, passes through Azerbaijan and Iran and terminates in the
Turkish city of Erzrum, bordering Iran. From Erzrum the product is to be
distributed to Western Europe.
A balance between East and West
Since its founding as a republic, Turkey's relationship with the West can be
characterized by a sense of envy and an urge to catch up. The Turkish republic
has had both right and left wing governments that took secularism to an extreme
and in the process isolated Islamists and portrayed them as a threat to
Turkey's secular principles. Over the past eight decades as a secular republic,
and compared to its Sunni brethren in the Arab world, Turkey has demonstrated
enormous economic and social progress. It is an economic powerhouse in the
region that is more advanced than most of Europe's former eastern bloc states.
Today Turkey strives to benefit from its position in Europe as an emerging
economic powerhouse while forging new relationships and partnerships in the
Muslim world with both Arab states as well as with Iran, irrespective of the
latter's stormy relationship with Europe and the US. For Turkey, maintaining
close economic and political ties with various players is a long-term strategic
asset that it can leverage for regional stability. These ties help first and
foremost the country's continued economic prosperity.
The revival of Turkey's relations with the Muslim world is taking place at a
crucial time in the Middle East, where forces of change are making themselves
increasingly felt with the potential to impact Turkey's emerging relationship
with Arabs and Iranians alike.
Obama's new approach to the Muslim world, the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon's
recent elections, and the post-election turmoil in Iran are all bound to
seriously impact the AKP's ability to successfully garner domestic support for
its Islamic oriented agenda. AKP faces formidable challenges within the
military establishment and should it forge closer ties with the Muslim world at
the expense of its secular principles, it could face the ire of the army and
hardline secular nationalists. The future of AKP's Islamic agenda is at the
mercy of unfolding events in the wider Middle East.
Reza Akhlaghi is a freelance writer based in Toronto.
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