US closer to Iran as Europe drifts
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
The Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Italy this week failed to reach a consensus
on tougher sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. This was despite
harsh rhetoric from French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who threatened such
measures at the Group of 20 summit in September. The consensus was unlikely to
happen, given the growing signs of a widening policy gap between the so-called
"Iran Six" nations involved in nuclear talks with Tehran.
A mini-victory for Iran at a critical time when the tumult of post-presidential
elections has yet to subside completely, the G-8 summit's inaction on Iran has
been widely attributed to a reluctance on the part of China and Russia to go
along with tougher actions against Tehran, which has defied the demands of the
United Nations Security Council to halt its uranium-enrichment program. (The
"Iran Six" consists of the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council - the
United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, plus Germany.)
United States President Barack Obama's Moscow visit on Monday has highlighted
the seemingly ineradicable differences between Washington and Moscow on the
issue of Iran's perceived missile threat as well as the US's plan to install an
anti-ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe.
At their joint press conference, whereas Obama reiterated the US's linkage of
the two and insisted that the US would scrap its plan once the missile threats
from "third countries such as Iran" were eliminated, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev refused to soften his country's opposition to the shield or conform to
Obama's justification. "Moscow does not see a direct connection between
Tehran's nuclear ambitions and the US missile defense plans for Poland and the
Czech Republic," Vladimir Nevsoyev writes in Rianovosti.
China is on the same page as Moscow with respect to Iran; both countries are
clearly rattled by signs of Western complicity in the recent Iranian elections
to engineer a "velvet revolution". This explains the warm reception of
re-elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad at the Moscow summit of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization during the week of June 14 - right after
Iran's controversial elections in which the main losing candidate, Mir Hossein
Mousavi, and others accused the authorities of vote-rigging and took to the
streets to express their discontent.
Nearly one month later, Iranian officials continue to rail against the British
and French for allegedly meddling in Iran's internal affairs. Ali Akbar
Velayati, a former foreign minister and advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, has lashed out at London and Paris, describing them as "worse than
America".
Hassan Firouzabadi, chair of the joint armed forces, has threatened that either
the European Union "apologizes for its mistake of supporting the rioters ... or
it has no right to seek a dialogue with Iran".
This does not mean that Iran is completely shutting the door to diplomacy with
the West. Both the Foreign Ministry and the speaker of parliament (Majlis), Ali
Larijani, have been sending more moderate signals that reflect Tehran's mixed
mood - now somewhat assuaged by the G-8's lack of tough actions against Iran.
According to Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, the G-8 did not move for
sanctions because the "conditions" for tougher action against Iran "were not
present".
Some Western pundits concede that Iran's stinging criticisms of Britain have
been somewhat effective, by putting Prime Minister Gordon Brown on the
defensive and forcing him to make a concession by openly stating that Iran's
elections were "an internal matter". This means there will be no European Union
recalling of its ambassadors over the disputed Iranian polls.
But perhaps an equally important but less-noticed factor behind the G-8's
surprisingly low key stance on Iran is the attitude of the US, which this week
released five Iranian diplomats held in its custody in northern Iraq since 2006
on suspicion of aiding Shi'ite Iraqi militants. This is a gesture of
unmistakable goodwill that is bound to improve the climate for US-Iran
dialogue.
Coinciding with the release of the diplomats are reports in the US media about
the convergence of interests between the US and Iran - on Iraq, Pakistan and
Afghanistan - that warrant the US's acknowledgment of Iran's "leadership role"
in a new "power bloc in the Middle East", to paraphrase USA Today.
Such emerging discourse on Iran in the US is a departure from the previous
George W Bush administration's "new cold war" approach that contemplated the
bifurcation of the Middle East along the old, and defunct, politics of
alliance.
In view of news from Washington that it is upgrading its diplomatic ties with
Syria, Iran's close ally, the Obama administration, is clearly on the right
path, irrespective of Israeli pressure to up the ante against both Tehran and
Damascus.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility of sudden about-turns caused by
the shifting balance of arguments within the Obama administration in favor of
hawkish voices such as that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has
advocated tougher action against Iran. (Vice President Joe Biden's recent
statement on US national television regarding the US's willingness to tolerate
an Israeli strike on Iran has been all but publicly rebuffed by the White House
- led by Obama himself, who issued a strong statement against any Israeli
attack on Iran.) (See
Obama discredits Iran 'green light', Asia Times Online, July 8,'09)
Overall, according to some Tehran analysts, the recent crisis in Iran over the
elections has culminated in a major setback for European policy and a minor
plus for the US.
"In a nutshell, the Europeans tried to cause a regime change in Iran and they
failed and it backfired against them and the US is now harvesting the
benefits," a Tehran University political scientist told the author, adding,
however, "this does not mean we think the US was completely clean, only that
the Europeans were a lot worse."
Another Tehran political scientist informs the author that Iran may ask for
nuclear talks without the participation of Britain and France and may seek the
participation of other European countries, possibly Spain and Italy, since "the
trust has been broken with Britain and France because of their abuse of Iran's
democratic process".
Iran might resort to this approach as there is a strong feeling in the country
that its diplomacy has suffered as a result of the uproar over the elections
and it may be perceived as weak in the upcoming nuclear talks.
However, yet another timely boost for Iran's negotiation position is the
admission by the incoming head of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Yukiya Amano, that "there is no hard evidence" that Iran is trying to
acquire nuclear weapons.
Amano, whose candidacy for the United Nation's nuclear watchdog agency was
supported by Iran, has set a positive mood for Iran-IAEA discussions in the
coming months, given the IAEA's latest report that while it reiterates there is
no evidence of military diversion, it continues to press Iran for greater
transparency over its nuclear program.
The latter is within the realms of possibility, particularly if the US remains
consistent in its present approach of "welcoming talks with Iran", to quote
Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mullen's statement,
timed with the release of the Iranian diplomats and Obama's prudent diplomacy
at the G-8 summit, reflect a new level of maturity in the US's approach toward
Iran that is bound to bear fruit if it proves resilient enough to withstand the
negative influences seeking to undermine it.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New
Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry,
click here. His
latest book,
Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing
, October 23, 2008) is now available.
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