Prayers and politics in Iran By Shahir Shahidsaless
"It is a bitter era," said former centrist president Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, once the second-most powerful cleric in Iran after
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in his sermon at July 17 Friday prayer. Rafsanjani
spoke at the prayers, which reportedly attracted over a million worshipers, in
an effort to capture the hearts and minds of battered Iranian protesters
following the controversial re-election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in
June.
The air was filled with tension between the supporters of the defeated
reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi, who made his first official public
appearance in weeks, and Ahmadinejad's radical religious followers. Chanting
competing slogans, hardliners shouted "death to America" while Mousavi's
supporters countered
with "death to Russia", referring to Russia's recognition of Ahmadinejad as the
new president.
Mousavi's overwhelming defeat in the June 12 presidential elections has
provoked the most widespread, bloodiest and longest uprising in Iran since the
1979 revolution.
Rafsanjani, now a shadow of the man that two decades ago paved the way for
Khamenei to reach the top of the Iranian theocratic system as "Vali Faqih"
(supreme leader), confessed that the country is in crisis. As was the main
mission of his appearance in this prayer, Rafsanjani asserted that "the most
important problem is to regain people's trust, which is damaged to some
extent".
What transpired after the prayer was a clear indication that despite the
apparent success of the crackdown by the Sepah (the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps) and the security apparatus, the rage of young protesters is far
from over.
Riots erupted in Revolution Square close to Tehran University in central Tehran
but were fiercely confronted by the anti-riot police and plainclothed Basij
militia, the paramilitary group that is backed by the guards.
But now, as before, analysis of the speech by Western analysts and policymakers
has been deeply inaccurate. An earlier case in point is US statesman Henry
Kissinger, who in an interview with the BBC called the upheaval a "color
revolution", and neo-conservative Kenneth Timmerman, who called it a "green
revolution" (referring to the green color used as the trademark of Mousavi's
campaign).
During the days of the street battles in Tehran, following the disputed
landslide victory of Ahmadinejad, the Washington Post, saluting the events,
wrote: "Iran's leaders have been worried about a color revolution, on the model
of Georgia or Ukraine. Guess what? It's happening." There was no shortage of
analysts who saw the events as a revolution of some sort or uprising of the
people against the Iranian regime.
But then perceptions changed and a new theory emerged that the upheaval was a
"power struggle between factions of the regime". In a recent article titled
"Misreading Iran's Unrest", the LA Times wrote:
The troubles that have
followed the Iranian presidential elections have been generally misread by the
Western media and policymakers. What we are witnessing is not a frustrated East
European-style 'color revolution'; nor is presidential candidate Mir Hossein
Mousavi's movement an uprising of liberal, Westernized sympathizers against the
principles of the Iranian Revolution - although there are surely some who are
hostile to the revolution among his supporters.
Rather, what we have been seeing is a power struggle - between factions of the
'old-guard' clergy who all initially assumed power in 1979 - that erupted into
public view in the recent presidential election campaign.
Foreign
Policy magazine, analyzing the chain of events, drew a similar conclusion. As
read in a recent analysis, "After weeks of silence, Iran's mainstream clerics,
perhaps the most powerful constituency inside Iran, have spoken out. In a bold
statement Saturday, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom called
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election illegitimate." The article
concluded that "Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, could be dwarfed by
Rafsanjani and the mainstream clerical establishment ..."
The lack of a clear understanding about Iran's complicated religious and
political structure is the root cause of these misperceptions. To take Foreign
Policy's analysis as an example, the problem starts right from the beginning
where the "Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom" is considered as
"Iran's mainstream clerics, perhaps the most powerful constituency inside
Iran".
This misjudgment originates from confusing the mentioned group with a
similar-sounding assembly called the "Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary", a
conservative association with seven ayatollahs and three grand ayatollahs
sitting on its board and which is assumed to hold "the most powerful
constituency inside Iran". The Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary issued a
statement and congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election.
The assembly which is referred to in the Foreign Policy story is a
pro-reformist group of clerics that has an insignificant level of political and
religious weight. To weigh their influence, it is noteworthy to remember that
the leader of the group, Ayatollah Mousavi Tabrizi, was disqualified by the
Guardians Council in last year's parliamentary elections and could not even
run.
The theory of a power struggle inside the Iranian ruling oligarchy once again
captured the headlines of the Western media following the July 17 Friday
prayer.
The Guardian referred to the incident as "Rafsanjani, a bitter rival of the
supreme leader" breaking his "month-long silence to issue a stark warning ...
".
Contrary to the Guardian's claim, Rafsanjani had made strong remarks on June 28
by referring to the post election events as "the result of complicated plots by
obscure sources with the aim of creating separation and differences between the
people and the system".
The Los Angeles Times, quoting an analyst, wrote, "The main goal of
Rafsanjani's sermon today was to improve his own position so he can pressure
Khamenei."
This observation and conclusion overlooks a crucial issue: who issues the pass
for a person to take the role of Imam Jomeh (Friday prayer leader) and
which body organizes the Friday prayers? It is Vali Faqih (the supreme
leader) who appoints the prayer's leader and then the "Council of Policymakers
of Friday Prayer", the body tasked to organize the prayer determines Imam Jomeh
weekly. The head of the council - currently Seyyed Reza Taghavi - is appointed
by Khamenei and also acts as the supreme leader's representative.
Yes, Rafsanjani is one of the Friday prayer leaders appointed by Khamenei, but
there is no mechanism, formal or informal, available for to him to push himself
to the prayer's stage. In fact, Seyyed Reza Taghavi made a speech before
Rafsanjani's sermon in which he made it clear that he never tells the prayer's
leaders what to say. Rather, he emphasized that he tells them to remain in "the
framework of the system and the supreme leader's policies".
He also referred to Khamenei's controversial June 19 prayer where Khamenei
attempted to limit the damage inflicted on Rafsanjani when Ahmadinejad accused
Rafsanjani of corruption during a televised presidential debate. Taghavi asked
worshipers to respect Khamenei's comments made in defense of Rafsanjani.
Basically, Rafsanjani could not have reached the podium without Khamenei and
Taghavi's consent.
In short, what is happening in Iran is neither a revolution of any kind nor a
power struggle, "between factions of the old-guard clergy", as proposed by the
LA Times. The current crisis is a fierce battle between two factions of
society. It is a manifestation of a 100-year battle since Iran's constitutional
revolution (1905-1911) between those who advocate the imposition of strict
traditional religious codes and those who seek the liberalization of society
and the establishment of a tolerant secular government.
Inside the ruling oligarchy, the conservatives who are radically hostile to
Western values and modernity are the dominating and indisputable force. This
faction, led by the Sepah and the Basij , is represented by Ahmadinejad and is
symbolized by the supreme leader. The moderates - Rafsanjani being the most
notable figure - are not leading the opposition faction of society. Instead,
they are pragmatically capitalizing on the current dissident movement by
attaching themselves to the movement in hope of survival. Rafsanjani's era came
to an end after his rival Ahmadinejad crushed him in the presidential elections
of 2005.
Shahir Shahidsaless is a Canadian-Iranian political analyst writing
mainly in Farsi. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in engineering, and has
devoted the past 10 years predominantly to researching and writing about the
Middle East and international affairs for Farsi-speaking magazines, papers and
news websites both inside and outside the country. He has authored a book,
which has been published in Iran and Germany.
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