Established in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution to defend the
Islamic Republic against domestic and foreign threats, Iran's Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) has been accused of playing a decisive role in the
re-election of the incumbent president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
Together with the Basij, a volunteer militia force charged with the task of
internal security and suppression of anti-government demonstrations, the IRGC's
role in the June 12 presidential election and its aftermath has largely
consisted of campaign activities, the organization of rallies for the
president, monitoring the elections and conducting crackdowns on
anti-government demonstrations.
While the highest authority in the country continues to be Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the June 12 election
marks a new stage in the paramilitary's emergence as a major political force
within Iran's theocracy, entailing a shift in the balance of power towards the
militant right faction within the conservative establishment.
The Guards enter politics
It was during the 2001 re-election of reformist president Mohammad Khatami that
the IRGC began to emerge into Iranian politics. This development followed the
growth of a tense rivalry between reformers and conservatives in the late
1990s. The re-election of Khatami and the rise of the reformists posed a major
threat to the institutionally-based military forces, such as the Guards and the
Basij.
During the 2004 parliamentary elections, the conservative Guardians Council for
the first time approved the candidacy of a number of former Guard officers. In
many ways, the politicization of the IRGC was seen by the reformists as a
strategic attempt to bring a "security" mindset to the Iranian legislative
branches, a strategy that included the disqualification of a large number of
reformist candidates by the Guardians Council. [1]
The political dominance of the Guards became manifest with the victory of the
hardliner Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election, when a number of
former officers with close ties to the paramilitary force were assigned to the
new administration. Between 2005 and 2008, the IRGC grew in both economic and
political influence, with key figures present in the government, including key
posts in the Interior Ministry, which is officially in charge of overseeing
elections. Moreover, the IRGC gained the full support of the supreme leader,
who has increasingly become reliant on the paramilitary force to control
internal pressure for reforms.
Not just a military force
The second phase of the entry of the Guards into politics came during the 2008
parliamentary elections, when the supreme leader appointed Ali Reza Afshar, an
ex-IRGC serviceman, to oversee the elections. The appointment marked an
unprecedented development in the history of the Islamic Republic, since for the
first time elections came under the direct supervision of a former military
officer who would be accountable only to the supreme leader.
The appointment of Afshar followed the bellicose remarks of a number of Guards
commanders, who argued aggressively that it would be blasphemy to view the IRGC
and Basij as merely military forces, having no involvement in the politics of
the country. [2] Despite opposition from a number of reformist and pragmatic
politicians, like Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, against the entry of the Guards
and the Basij into politics, the supreme leader continued with his push to
qualify more former officers to run for the parliament. By spring 2008, the
hardliners, most of whom are former Guards or Basij officers, dominated not
only the parliament but also the new administration.
In summer 2008, however, a major transformation occurred within the IRGC's
command, which many reformists believe laid the grounds for an "electoral coup"
in the 2009 presidential elections. The new command apparatus included a number
of important hardline figures closely connected with the supreme leader (such
as Mohammad Hejazi and Jafar Assadi) in senior positions in the Guards' 31 new
command units.
Hojjatoleslam Hussain Taeb was appointed to lead the new Basij force, now an
integrated unit within the IRGC. The new commanders can be described as major
Khamenei loyalists, ideologically close to a number of former officers now
serving in parliament and the president's administration.
The reshuffling of the IRGC's command highlights the consolidation of a
hardline faction within the paramilitary unit. To many dissidents, these
promotions were seen as an attempt by the supreme leader to cement loyalty
within the IRGC and stifle opposition against the president, seen by many
middle-ranking and pro-reform commanders as too erratic and unfit for the
office. The promotion of hardline officers sent a powerful message to the
opposition working within Iran's civil society, at that time anticipating the
2009 elections. Aimed at evoking fear in the minds of dissidents, the Guards
accordingly displayed its readiness to confront its domestic and foreign foes
by conducting a number of military exercises in the Persian Gulf and in Iran's
border provinces.
The political emergence of the Basij
Units of Iran's Basij, a lightly-armed volunteer militia under the command of
the IRGC and the supreme leader, emerged to play a more important role in the
practical aspects of the recent election. Just weeks prior to June 12, the
Basij became directly involved in the pro-Ahmadinejad political campaign around
the country (the president is a well-known veteran and patron of the Basij).
With campaign headquarters in major cities, young Basijis recruited through
summer camp programs organized rallies for the incumbent president. [3] Days
before the election, Ahmadinejad's Basiji campaigners organized their largest
rally at a massive public place (Mossalai-e Imam) in Tehran. The organizers
mobilized supporters from other Basij bases set up in the cities and villages
around the capital city, creating the largest pro-Ahmadinejad rally in the
pre-election period. During the election, the Basiji forces were present at the
voting stations, at times appearing to intimidate some of the younger voters
who seemed to favor the reformist candidate, Mir Hussain Mousavi. [4]
On the campaigning level, the IRGC continued to advance its political influence
through propaganda. Some weeks prior to the elections, units of the Guard and
some of its leading commanders began a negative campaign against Mousavi and
his supporters that continues to this day.
Drawing similarities with the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, the
Mousavi supporters were branded as "green anti-revolutionaries". After the
elections, Mousavi was described as a "traitor" for challenging the legitimacy
of the elections by the supreme leader's representative in the IRGC,
Abul-Ghasem Alizadeh. When pro-Mousavi demonstrators stormed into the streets
of major cities around the country protesting the election results, the IRGC
began to organize major pro-Ahmadinejad rallies televised by state TV.
The most controversial aspect of the IRGC's involvement in the electoral
process lays in the actual vote counts. Some opposition activists believe that
many ballots were never counted and the computer system, set up by the
intelligence units of the IRGC, contributed a number of votes in favor of
Ahmadinejad. The reality, however, might be somewhat more complicated and less
conspiratorially determined.
What remains certain is the security role the Guards played in crushing the
post-election protest movement. Deploying 30% of its forces, plus the Basij
militants, the Guards actively participated in both intelligence and anti-riot
tactical operations to crush the demonstrations. The role of the intelligence
services was critical in this process, as hidden video surveillance helped the
Guards detain a number of protestors, including those who used cell phones to
record the events unfolding on the ground. [5] By early July, the IRGC proudly
declared victory over a "foreign plot" to topple the regime.
Conclusion
Opposition groups and dissidents, including the defeated reformist candidate
Mousavi, view the above declaration as the latest attempt by IRGC-Basij forces,
together with the intelligence-security apparatus, to reshape the Islamic
Republic into a military junta.
The Guards is now perceived as the main political force within the theocratic
establishment, remapping its factional political landscape into a new military
oligarchy. It remains to be seen how the opposition will eventually respond,
but one development that has certainly shifted the Iranian political scene is
the growing might of the Guards.
One of the most important implications of this development is the consolidation
of a military state that can be described as a theocracy only in name. But a
more important implication is the impact of the post-election period on
regional security, as many of Iran's neighbors, particularly the Persian Gulf
states, would perceive the rise of such a junta state as a major threat to
their national security. What may have begun as an Iranian internal conflict
could eventually lead to a major regional crisis.
Notes
1. This observation and many others in this article are based on extensive
interviews carried out in Tehran between June 5 and June 18, 2009. For reasons
of personal safety in current conditions, the names of those interviewed have
been withheld by request.
2. Such statements contradicted Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's last will, which
stated that not only the Guards but also the entire armed forces should refrain
from political activities, thus maintaining a separation between the civilian
and military spheres. See Ruhollah M Khomeini,
The Last Message: The Political and Divine Will of His Holiness Imam Khomeini.
3. Fieldwork observation, Tehran, May 25-June 10, 2009.
4. Fieldwork observation, Tehran, June 12, 2009.
5. Based on fieldwork, Tehran, June 14-18, 2009.
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