Shi'ites unite in a new power grab
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - A new coalition formed to run in the parliamentary elections
scheduled for January - announced in Iraq on Monday - has the backing of Iran
and could pose a serious challenge to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
The coalition includes 10 political parties - all Shi'ite - and is to be called
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). It replaces the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)
and will include heavyweights like Ahmad Chalabi, a former vice president, the
Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), its military wing the Badr Brigade, the
Sadrist bloc of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and a breakaway wing of Maliki's ruling
Da'wa Party.
The INA - as was the UIA - will be headed by Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who held the
premiership from 2005 to 2006. The SIIC is a one-time favorite of Iran, and its
military wing, the Badr Brigade, fought
alongside the Iranian army in its eight-year war with Saddam Hussein in the
1980s.
For years its leadership was bankrolled by the Iranians and always drew
criticism from Muqtada for being too pro-Iranian. Muqtada and the SIIC's chief,
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, once had a similar goal - to make Iraq an Iran-like
theocracy - but Muqtada always argued that it should be free of Iranian
influence.
The two men are scions of legendary Shi'ite families who have long competed for
leadership of the Shi'ite community. While Muqtada has always seen himself as
more Arab than Shi'ite, Hakim has strong Shi'ite loyalties, and once even
called for an autonomous Shi'ite district in southern Iraq, a project that was
always strongly vetoed by Muqtada, who favored a united Iraq.
In the aftermath of a terrorist bombing on a holy Shi'ite shrine in Samarra in
February 2006, the two men found plenty of room to cooperate against Iraqi
Sunnis, sending death squads to the streets of Baghdad by night to strike at
traditional enemies whom they blamed for the Samarra bombings.
They also united in the face of increasing Sunni anger, after the execution of
Saddam in December 2006, but always disagreed on Iraq's relationship with the
United States. Hakim has always managed to walk the tightrope between being
both pro-American and pro-Iranian, while Muqtada has been vocal and violent in
his opposition to the US occupation of 2003.
On Monday, Hakim was absent from the launch of the INA, receiving treatment for
cancer at a hospital in Tehran. Deputizing on his behalf was Vice President
Adel Abdul Mehdi, a seasoned statesman who ran unsuccessfully for the
premiership in 2005.
Both parties are rallying today behind the leadership of Jaafari, a founder of
the Da'wa Party and former boss to Maliki. He left the party in May 2008, in
complete disagreement with the prime minister's policies. Jaafari, too, is a
protege of Iran, having spent his long exile during the Saddam years divided
between Tehran and London.
When serving as premier in 2005-2006, Jaafari crippled political life in Iraq
by arrogantly clinging onto power, despite loud accusations against him of
being too weak to run a divided country. When he stepped down, an average of 25
Iraqis were dying per day. Maliki succeeded him, inheriting a country that was
scarred by sectarian violence, filled with mass graves created after the
downfall of Saddam, and divided by political and religious ambitions as never
before in its long history.
It was believed then that Maliki had all of Jaafari's weaknesses and none of
his strengths. Jaafari was more experienced, better connected in the Arab
world, and more politically independent than Maliki. Like Jaafari, however,
Maliki is a product of political Islam. Both of them were allied to Muqtada,
and both were equally sectarian in their policies, having turned a blind eye to
the Shi'ite death squads that roamed the streets and gunned down prominent
Sunnis after the holy shrine bombings.
The two men claimed to oppose sectarian violence, and both called for
incorporating militias into the Iraqi army. Both were in favor of appointing
sectarian officials at the ministries of Defense and Interior, a demand that
was backed by their ally Muqtada. Both are friends of Iran, although they do
not take orders directly from the mullahs of Tehran, unlike the SIIC's Hakim.
Jaafari has since accused Maliki of mismanaging the premiership, being unable
to bring security to Iraq, and of being too sectarian in his policies by
refusing to mend broken fences with Sunnis. He clearly plans on making a
comeback as prime minister in January.
Many are asking, however, whether Jaafari will be able to succeed where former
protege Maliki has failed since 2006? Will he be able to disarm the militias
and bring the Sunnis back into the political process? The two strongest Shi'ite
armed groups, the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army, are members in his new INA.
Maliki sees himself as more powerful than all of the Shi'ite groups in the INA
combined. Although a product of their collective support in 2006, he now
regards himself as an independent Iraqi leader, representing a broad
constituency that includes Sunnis and Shi'ites and not just a communal chief or
head of a religiously driven party.
During the provincial elections in January, he campaigned on a new ticket, the
State of Law Alliance, and won votes in both Sunni and Shi'ite districts.
Meanwhile, traditional Shi'ite parties like the SIIC lost eight out of 11
provinces in the south, showing that if anything, Maliki is getting the upper
hand in Iraq.
The secret of his success is in his non-sectarian program, promising things
that matter to all Iraqis, regardless of religion; like clean water, more
electricity, better schools, higher wages and cheaper hospitals. The relative
stability that Iraq witnessed in the months preceding the elections played
nicely into his program and he boasted of being the man to bring security to
Baghdad.
That "security success" has now gone down the drain, as six attacks rocked the
Iraqi capital last Wednesday in the previously safe Green Zone, targeting
government buildings, including parliament and the Ministry of Defense. The
attacks, which Maliki blamed on al-Qaeda and former Ba'athists, killed 100
people and wounded another 400.
Despite the attacks, Maliki thinks he can survive without the Sadrists - who
are all-powerful in the slums of Baghdad and among young people - and without
the SIIC, which is influential in the Shi'ite business community. To a certain
extent, he sees the new alliance as a blessing in disguise, liberating him from
the towering influence of men like Hakim and Muqtada, who have transformed into
an embarrassment for the prime minister.
While he needed them in 2006-2009 to strengthen his power base in Shi'ite
districts, he has outgrown their patronage and would rather have influential
Sunnis in his coalition, which is due to be announced in the next week. Maliki
has not forgotten the severe embarrassment the Shi'ites caused him when they
supervised the execution of Saddam, chanting Shi'ite slogans and repeating the
word "Muqtada!" in vengeance. They looked more like thugs eliminating a fellow
criminal, while Maliki was trying to come across as a polished statesman
wanting to melt into the community of Arab leaders - who all happen to be
Sunnis.
While Maliki prepares to launch a new coalition next week, so is another prime
minister hopeful, former premier Iyad Allawi. He in turn is trying to put
together a team of Sunnis, Shi'ites and seculars like himself to challenge both
Maliki and Jaafari.
Many are eyeing what the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani will say in the
upcoming days, although sources close to the veteran cleric stress that he will
not take sides, as he did in 2005, so that his support doesn't influence
ordinary voters.
In 2005, Sistani put his full weight behind the UIA, using his image on their
campaign posters - and his unblemished record and grandfatherly status - to get
young Shi'ites to vote for the UIA. The UIA swept the polls, but later
disintegrated.
The real tipping force will be Iran. At this stage, the Iranians have given no
indication of whom they will support of the prime minister hopefuls, Maliki or
Jaafari. Allawi's chances are slim, because of his secular record, which is
frowned on by the Iranians.
Opponents of Maliki and Jaafari have already blamed the Black Wednesday attacks
on Iran, claiming that the weapons used were "made in Iran". Maliki's security
agencies fired back on Sunday, showing confessions of a Sunni Ba'athist,
claiming that he was behind the attacks, to clean the prime minister's
responsibility and that of Iran.
Iraq has proven, time and again, that sectarian violence is just not enough to
bring down a prime minister. Allawi, Jaafari and Maliki all ruled in very
difficult security conditions, and thousands were killed during their
consecutive tenures, yet none of the attacks, no matter how horrific, managed
to bring down any administration.
This might explain why Maliki seemed confident as his contenders announced the
launch of the INA. He is undaunted by their coalition and seemingly untouched
by the attacks, which he promised to deal with in an orderly manner. What
really matters to him is Sunni support - to legitimize himself among different
segments of Iraqi society and within the Arab neighborhood - and the backing of
the Iranians.
Sunni support is something that the INA does not have - and Maliki knows that
very well.
Sami Moubayed is editor in chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.
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